Anton Zeilinger's comment about free will being required for science

[EPR]

Determinism is a useful approximation much like macro objects are average approximations of large degrees of freedom.

Does everyone agree that a physical system can be more than the sum of its parts(and be indescribable completely in terms of its physics)?
If yes, why is free will impossible?

 

[PeterDonis]

Does everyone agree that a physical system can be more than the sum of its parts(and be indescribable completely in terms of its physics)?

I don't know what you mean by "more than the sum of its parts" or "indescribable completely in terms of its physics".

If you just mean physical laws apply to all systems, but we can't always expect to find explicit expressions of the laws for a system in terms of the laws that govern individual parts of it, that's fine.

If you mean physical laws don't apply to some systems, no, I don't agree.

 

[A. Neumaier]

Hm, yes, interesting examples. I think there is a sense of "complex" for which a human brain is still much more complex than soil or a rain forest, but I admit I can't formulate it explicitly right now. I think the term "information processing" could also stand to be formulated more explicitly (after all, there are lots of things going on in soil that could be interpreted as "information processing" in some sense), but it's probably a better term to start with than "complexity".

Complex information processing is necessary but probably not sufficient.

In any case, I haven't seen any discussion of soil or rain forests making choices. Even plants with their complex DNA are generally considered to be passive, though reading DNA is likely some information processing act.

But computer programs make choices very frequently, both deterministic and (pseudo-)probabilistic ones.

 

[EPR]

I don't know what you mean by "more than the sum of its parts" or "indescribable completely in terms of its physics".

If one is a deep believer in determinism as an ultimate(and complete) explanation of reality, one should be able to account for everything in terms of deterministic causes and effects.

If not, a mere description of the events of observations will not suffice to convince everyone.

I treat the current framework and situation in physics and neurology(the hard problem) as transient and a useful approximation. The way reality works appears much more complex than current(approximate) models imply.

 

[EPR]

Because some observables do have values at all tmes. In BM positon.

Who states that there is no reality?

How come electrons do not radiate and lose energy and fall into the nucleus?

 

[PeterDonis]

If one is a deep believer in determinism as an ultimate(and complete) explanation of reality, one should be able to account for everything in terms of deterministic causes and effects.

In a general way, yes. However, if a deterministic system is chaotic, it can be unpredictable even though it is deterministic, so there would be no way of having a predictive model of a specific system that accounted for specific events.

 

[user30]

By that definition, almost all interpretations would be non-realist interpretations, including GRW, many-world and in a certain sense even Bohmian.

That's why they are all problematic.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

I never understood how is compatibilism different from the claim that free will is an illusion.

Is compatibilism actually different from the claim that free will is an illusion?

“Determinism, on the contrary, says they [possibilities, LJ] exist nowhere, and that necessity on the one hand and impossibility on the other are the sole categories of the real. Possibilities that fail to get realized are, for determinism, pure illusions: they never were possibilities at all. There is nothing inchoate, it says, about this universe of ours, all that was or is or shall be actual in it having been from eternity virtually there. The cloud of alternatives our minds escort this mass of actuality withal is a cloud of sheer deceptions, to which ‘impossibilities’ is the only name that rightfully belongs.”

From Williams James’ essay “The Dilemma of Determinism”

 

[PeterDonis]

Is compatibilism actually different from the claim that free will is an illusion?

I've already answered this: yes, it is.

From Williams James’ essay “The Dilemma of Determinism”

There has been a lot of work done in this field since William James.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science.

Hi msumm:

I am having a lot of difficulty distinguishing this quoted concept from philosophy. Any suggestions?

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

I am having a lot of difficulty distinguishing this quoted concept from philosophy.

It's a statement about what Zeilinger believes is required to do science. For purposes of this discussion that makes it a part of science.

 

[user30]

Is compatibilism actually different from the claim that free will is an illusion?

“Determinism, on the contrary, says they [possibilities, LJ] exist nowhere, and that necessity on the one hand and impossibility on the other are the sole categories of the real. Possibilities that fail to get realized are, for determinism, pure illusions: they never were possibilities at all. There is nothing inchoate, it says, about this universe of ours, all that was or is or shall be actual in it having been from eternity virtually there. The cloud of alternatives our minds escort this mass of actuality withal is a cloud of sheer deceptions, to which ‘impossibilities’ is the only name that rightfully belongs.”

From Williams James’ essay “The Dilemma of Determinism”

No, it is not different. Compatibilism is mere semantics. It defines choice different from how the free will people do, but is still a deterministic theory

 

[PeterDonis]

It defines choice different from how the free will people do

From how some "free will people" do, but not all.

Some "free will people" do claim that there must be an element of intrinsic randomness in the physical processes in the brain for there to be true "free will". However, I don't think they have really thought through the implications. If your actions are caused by random chance, that's not free will in any meaningful sense, because you don't choose something that is caused by random chance; it's just random chance.

The process of "choice" in any meaningful sense requires that your "choice" determines what you do. That can only be the case if the physical processes involved are deterministic, at least to a very good approximation. Similarly, "choice" in any meaningful sense means that your choice is based on relevant information: but that can only be the case if the information processing involved is deterministic, at least to a very good approximation. People aren't perfect at having their choices determine what they do or making choices based only on relevant information, so there is room for some indeterminism in the underlying processes (which is why I said "to a very good approximation" above), but that indeterminism can't be an essential part of the process.

 

[user30]

From how some "free will people" do, but not all.

Some "free will people" do claim that there must be an element of intrinsic randomness in the physical processes in the brain for there to be true "free will". However, I don't think they have really thought through the implications. If your actions are caused by random chance, that's not free will in any meaningful sense, because you don't choose something that is caused by random chance; it's just random chance.

Because they believe that minimum moral responsibility entails: "could have done otherwise", which is satisifed under a random antecedent process. "Ought" implies "can", but you could not have acted differently in a deterministic world.

Hence people in an indeterministic universe were "free"of any predetermined action.

 

[PeterDonis]

Because they believe that minimum moral responsibility entails: "could have done otherwise"

I already addressed that in an earlier post. Dennett also discusses moral responsibility in his free will books.

Also, your objection does not at all address the issues I raised regarding random chance.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

It's a statement about what Zeilinger believes is required to do science. For purposes of this discussion that makes it a part of science.

Hi Peter:

It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science.

Perhaps clarifying the meaning of some phrases would help.

What does "from the outside" mean? What does "free will" mean?

I imagine a laboratory with a graduate student taking some instruction from a professor. Does this count as being from the outside? If the student can choose (with no fear of "punishment") not to do what the professor tells him to do, but he chooses to do it, is this a violation of free will? If the student does what the professor says because of fear of punishment, is this a violation of free will?

Regards,
Buzz

 

[user30]

I already addressed that in an earlier post. Dennett also discusses moral responsibility in his free will books.

Also, your objection does not at all address the issues I raised regarding random chance.

There is no issue since you and others assume an idealised concept of free will that is perfect. The traditional free will advocates never claimed that man is in absolute control of his action, but that randomness is a non-starter. Any world which negates randomness is simply a Newtonian clockwork. A true choice can only be in effect if alternatives to the decision that was taken were at play, which they were if randomness played a part. Otherwise it was mere actions like any event in the universe, not choices.

 

[user30]

Hi Peter:

It was a basic assumption in our discussion that that choice is not determined from the outside. This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science.

Perhaps clarifying the meaning of some phrases would help.

What does "from the outside" mean? What does "free will" mean?

I imagine a laboratory with a graduate student taking some instruction from a professor. Does this count as being from the outside? If the student can choose (with no fear of "punishment") not to do what the professor tells him to do, but he chooses to do it, is this a violation of free will? If the student does what the professor says because of fear of punishment, is this a violation of free will?

Regards,
Buzz

If you believe that that antecedent factors unambigiously determine the next action humans make, and you still believe in free will, then a computer must have free will as well by your reasoning.

 

[PeterDonis]

There is no issue since you and others assume an idealised concept of free will that is perfect.

I have made no such assumption. I have already explained the position I am defending in some detail, and have given references to books that explain it in far more detail. You are simply stating the contrary position without addressing any of the actual points I have made in previous posts. I don't see any point in repeating what I've already said.

 

[PeterDonis]

If you believe that that antecedent factors unambigiously determine the next action humans make, and you still believe in free will, then a computer must have free will as well by your reasoning.

Not at all. As has already been pointed out in this thread, it's not just the "choice" that matters, but the information processing that went into the choice. Even the most sophisticated information processing that can currently be done by computers is still far, far short of the information processing that is done by humans when making choices.

That said, it is not at all necessary to view "free will" as a binary property. It can perfectly well be viewed as a continuum, in which case some computers would indeed have a form of "free will" that is simply in a very different part of the continuum from the free will of humans.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

If you believe that that antecedent factors unambigiously determine the next action humans make, and you still believe in free will, then a computer must have free will as well by your reasoning.

Hi user:

I am not sure I understand what you mean by "unambiguously". Also, I am not sure if "determine" means antecedent (old stuff) factors are is the only component of the determining factors, or just part of the factors.

I disagree with the quote above for the reason I explain below.

A person does not make decisions only based on his/her immediate present inputs. It is the nature of growth that habits of making choices which are related to a large variety of situations are a continuous subcounscious process. So when a decision is made, it includes influences from the immediate conscious situation and also influences from subconsciously formed habits. This means that much of the process of making decisions in not conscious, and therefore the sense of exercising free will is partly imaginary. Sometimes decisions are made subconsciously and entirely by the old habits, and usually (but not always) when that happens, a person will not remember making that decision.

Is making a decision by flipping a coin a free will option? Suppose I have to make a difficult choice, and I flip a coin with heads choosng A and tails choosing B. Suppose heads comes up and when I think about this result, I decide: I really don't like A so I will definitely do B. Is this free will?

At the present time computers have not yet been programmed to acquire decision making habits based on a lot of past experiences, but some slow progress is being made in that direction. Different observers are likely to have different thresholds for deciding that some amount of computer habit forming is enough to support something like human free will, or some might call it just imaginary free will.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

What does "from the outside" mean? What does "free will" mean?

In the particular case described in Zeilinger's quotes, it means that whatever it is that determines the measurement settings that Alice and Bob select is independent of whatever it is that determines the measurement results they observe.

One point that often gets discussed is exactly what "independent" should mean in the above. Should it just mean "statistically independent"? Or is some stronger condition required? It's impossible for it to mean causally independent, since the choice of measurement settings must be in the past light cone of the measurement result.

 

[user30]

Is making a decision by flipping a coin a free will option? Suppose I have to make a difficult choice, and I flip a coin with heads choosng A and tails choosing B. Suppose heads comes up and when I think about this result, I decide: I really don't like A so I will definitely do B. Is this free will?Regards,
Buzz

Depends on if you live in a deterministic universe or not.

By ambigious I meant: action b was neccesitated by action a. There was never in doubt what action b would be.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

In the particular case described in Zeilinger's quotes, it means that whatever it is that determines the measurement settings that Alice and Bob select is independent of whatever it is that determines the measurement results they observe.

This is an interesting example, but some aspects are vague. Are you sure that "independent" is related to "whatever it is that determines the measurement results"? Could it be referring to the fact that Alice and Bob make independent decisions about the measurement process? Is there a question about whether or not Alice and Bob have free will when they make their choices about how to setup their equipment?

Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles.​

Suppose Alice and Bob independently choose one of two choices for "the position of the switch". Suppose they both make their choice by flipping a coin. Is their choice a free will choice? According to your interpretation, the coin flips are certainly independent of "whatever it is that determines the measurement results they observe". But it definitely does not seem like free will to me.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

Suppose Alice and Bob independently choose one of two choices for "the position of the switch". Suppose they both make their choice by flipping a coin.

In modern experiments to test for violations of the Bell inequalities, measurement settings are indeed determined by (computerized) coin flips, in order to ensure that the events at which the settings for the two measurements are determined are spacelike separated from each other.

it definitely does not seem like free will to me.

The free will in a case like the above would be the experimenters' choices in how the experiment was set up, including the choice to let the settings be determined by computers. So all the events involved in those choices would also have to be independent of the measurement results.

 

[EPR]

In a general way, yes. However, if a deterministic system is chaotic, it can be unpredictable even though it is deterministic, so there would be no way of having a predictive model of a specific system that accounted for specific events.

Such a system can on the whole be predictable(at least approximately). I had other failings of determinism in mind, e.g. what is the deterministic model of the stability of atoms and matter?

 

[PeterDonis]

Such a system can on the whole be predictable(at least approximately).

For some length of time into the future, yes. But often not very far. We can't predict the weather more than a few days in advance, because the weather is chaotic.

what is the deterministic model of the stability of atoms and matter?

I don't know that there is one, since the only such model we have is QM and QM is not deterministic.

 

[PeterDonis]

Is making a decision by flipping a coin a free will option?

Sure. Choosing how you will make a decision is itself a decision.

Suppose I have to make a difficult choice, and I flip a coin with heads choosng A and tails choosing B. Suppose heads comes up and when I think about this result, I decide: I really don't like A so I will definitely do B. Is this free will?

Yes.

 

[Demystifier]

That's why they are all problematic.

No, that's why such a definition of realism is problematic.
https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9601013

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Summary: Questioning a remark by Anton Zeilinger that free will is required by science

Regarding Zeilinger's "Alice and Bob are free to choose the position of the switch that determines which measurement is performed on their respective particles", maybe the following might be of help:

"After all, the backward light cones of those two acts do eventually overlap, and one can imagine one region which controls the decision of the two experimenters who chose a and b. We cannot deny such a possibility. But we feel that it is wrong on methodological grounds to worry seriously about it if no specific causal linkage is proposed. In any scientific experiment in which two or more variables are supposed to be randomly selected, one can always conjecture that some factor in the overlap of the backward light cones has controlled the presumably random choices. But, we maintain, skepticism of this sort will essentially dismiss all results of scientific experimentation. Unless we proceed under the assumption that hidden conspiracies of this sort do not occur, we have abondoned in advance the whole enterprise of discovering the laws of nature by experimentation."

A. Shimony, M.A. Horne and J.F. Clauser in “An exchange on local beables” (dialectica, Volume 39, Issue 2, 1985)

 

[Lord Jestocost]

There has been a lot of work done in this field since William James.

To my mind, William James’ argument is somehow in line with Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument. According to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"This general pattern of inference is applied to the thesis of causal determinism to yield a powerful argument for incompatibilism. The argument requires the assumption that determinism is true, and that the facts of the past and the laws of nature are fixed. Given these assumptions, here is a rough, non-technical sketch of the argument:

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

According to the Consequence Argument, if determinism is true, it appears that no person has any power to alter how her own future will unfold."

 

[Elias1960]

Because they say that the wave function is real, i.e. not merely a representation of our subjective incomplete knowledge.

That is not a requirement for a realist interpretation. An interpretation where the trajectory $q(t) \in Q$ exists all the time is realistic even if the wave function is interpreted as epistemic, as describing incomplete knowledge of that real trajectory.

An example of such a realist psi-epistemic interpretation is Caticha's entropic dynamics.

Caticha, A. (2011). Entropic Dynamics, Time and Quantum Theory, J. Phys. A44:225303,
arxiv:1005.2357

 

[PeterDonis]

According to the Consequence Argument, if determinism is true, it appears that no person has any power to alter how her own future will unfold."

All three of the given statements are false. People are not separate from the rest of the universe. People themselves are facts (or, if you want to be particular, the states of their brains and bodies and the actions they take are facts) and can "have power" over other facts because people are part of the universe and can interact with other parts.

 

[DrChinese]

In the particular case described in Zeilinger's quotes, it means that whatever it is that determines the measurement settings that Alice and Bob select is independent of whatever it is that determines the measurement results they observe.

One point that often gets discussed is exactly what "independent" should mean in the above. Should it just mean "statistically independent"? Or is some stronger condition required? It's impossible for it to mean causally independent, since the choice of measurement settings must be in the past light cone of the measurement result.

Is there any requirement here that IF Alice/Bob's settings are NOT independent of whatever is determining the measurement results, THEN the results CHANGE from what they otherwise would be?

The thing I get confused about is this: Alice and Bob can set their settings at anything, by whatever means they like. They can change them quickly, or they can leave them set static for hours. We can get thousands of people to participate in the decisions. No matter what is done, the results always confirm the same basic relationship and that relationship matches expectation values from theory. How is that not good science? How is that requiring us to make some assumption other than "the very large sample is representative of the true universe"?

So I guess I don't see that free will is really a significant factor in that equation. And further: why would this be a burning assumption for Bell tests, when it doesn't seem to be much of an issue when we test force of attraction of an object to the Earth? (Or any other experimental result in physics?) I can't tell from the previous comments whether my viewpoint is common here or not. Thanks...

 

[PeterDonis]

Is there any requirement here that IF Alice/Bob's settings are NOT independent of whatever is determining the measurement results, THEN the results CHANGE from what they otherwise would be?

As far as I can tell from Zeilinger's quotes, what he is trying to rule out is superdeterminism:

"If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature."

I'm not sure this sort of thing is testable; I don't think Zeilinger is saying that we would expect Alice and Bob's measurement results to be different if his "free will" assumption were false than if it were true. I think he's just saying that his "free will" assumption is necessary if we are going to deduce laws of physics from experimental results at all; if his assumption were false, we would have no valid grounds for believing, for example, that QM is true simply because all of our experimental results are consistent with it.

why would this be a burning assumption for Bell tests, when it doesn't seem to be much of an issue when we test force of attraction of an object to the Earth?

I don't think Zeilinger intends for his claims to only apply to QM, or to Bell tests; it just happens to be a historical fact in our universe that the kinds of questions he is addressing were prompted by QM and Bell tests.