Free Will vs. Fate: Examining Choice and Determinism

[Zantra]

Originally posted by hypnagogue


A particular roll of die can have only one outcome, depedent on the initial conditions of the system (i.e., the state of motion of the die just after they have been tossed). This is a deterministic process, insofar as perfect knowledge of the system will allow us to predict the outcome with absolute certainty. It's just that the system is so sensitive to variations in the initial conditions that it's very hard to make a prediction with 100% confidence, so the system takes on the appearance of randomness.

This kind of apparent randomness is not applicable to what I'm talking about. Any deterministic process that occurs in the decision making of F by definition must also occur in the decision making of D. So for instance, if F commits to making his decision of whether to choose chocolate or vanilla based on the outcome of rolling a set of die, then D will also base his decision on rolling an identical set of die in an identical way, and they will have made the same decision. (Recall that D and F are identical up to the moment of the decision at t0-- this roll of the die takes place before a decision has been made, so it takes place before t0.) So we have still not accounted for what is different about F such that his decision will not always match D's.

The only way around this is to introduce a truly random non-deterministic element, such that even with perfect knowledge of this random element we will not be able to predict its outcome. Just such a truly random element is the only thing that can differentiate D from F. For instance, in the above example, F could have decided at t0 to change his mind and reneg on his commitment to base his decision on the die roll. This last minute change of heart cannot have been the result of a wholly deterministic process, otherwise D would have undergone the same process and likewise would have changed his mind, and once again we'd have F's decision always agreeing with D's. So F's last minute change of heart must have been not apparently random, but truly random. Whether such a truly random process exists is another question altogether (although as far as we can tell individual quantum events are truly random); what is relevant here is that a truly random element is the only thing that can explain why F sometimes chooses differently from D. Again, I define a truly random element/event/process as one that cannot be predicted with 100% confidence even if we have perfect knowledge of the system. [/B]

Ok I agree that under the condition that a unique "free will" variable is introduced, a different choice can be made. But such a variable only exists in theory. A good example would be time travel. As I mentioned in one of my earlier posts, he could choose vanilla if he somehow knew of the future, and was thus able to make a decision based o knowledge that (D) did not have. But in the normalcy of things, people don't posess that ability, so we have to assume that D=F because the physical world doesn't allow for variables to be introduced. In mathmatical theory it's possible because we can work from a hypothetical persepective to arrive at that conclusion that D does not equal F, thus allowing for free will. But I concede your point- it is mathmatically possible, if not physically.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by wuliheron
This approaches the core issues a bit closer. Just because we can statistically predict something does not axiomatically imply any kind of absolute and uncontestable validity. There are lies, damn lies, and then statistics. It is precisely because of the indeterminacy of QM that it remains such a contested subject. The scientific method taken to its extreme leaves itself open to perpetual attack, but then, demonstrably this is the most productive path to take.

Thus your argument contradicts itself. By attacking the idea of free will using statistics you merely display and open yourself up to criticism. This is a great way to cultivate the art of debate by-the-way, but a terrible way win one!

Wul I think you have touched on the heart of the issue here. Free will exists, but it is predetermined by probability. Then by definition, if a choice is predetermined, it cannot be considered free will, even though it may have the appearance of it. I'll admit I don't have knowledge of indeterminency of QM, but when all variables are solved, then so may the equation have an answer without variables- or a single definative solution

EDIT: I'm pretty confident at this point that I've shown that free will is only an illusion, and our "choices" are in fact already made, and determined by the events of our lives.

 

[wuliheron]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I don't quite see where you're coming from. Can you clarify for me? Specifically, I don't see how I am using statistical prediction to axiomatically imply anything. As far as I can tell it's more the other way around. I take two assumptions: F has free will, D does not. From these definitions it necessarily follows that if we can somehow repeat the decision made at t0 over and over (say, for instance, if we can observe infinitely many identical parallel universes each with their respective D or F), we will find variations in F's choice but not in D's choice. The stats don't prove the axioms, rather the stats are logically derived from the axioms.

You have stated that the only explanation for the statistical probability of the choices of F is the introduction of a random element. An alternative explanation is that our observations are incorrect. Whether something is random or ordered can be either an absolute state of affairs or a relative one, and which it might be is ultimately anyone's guess.

Originally posted by Zantra
Wul I think you have touched on the heart of the issue here. Free will exists, but it is predetermined by probability. Then by definition, if a choice is predetermined, it cannot be considered free will, even though it may have the appearance of it. I'll admit I don't have knowledge of indeterminency of QM, but when all variables are solved, then so may the equation have an answer without variables- or a single definative solution

EDIT: I'm pretty confident at this point that I've shown that free will is only an illusion, and our "choices" are in fact already made, and determined by the events of our lives.

Without a specific context the terms free will and predestination, real and illusory, have no meaning. When applied as absolutes and generalized to include life, the universe, and everything, they become so much meaningless verbage and the debate disolves into how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Is it random order or ordered randomness? Illusory reality or realistic illusion? Round and round we go.

 

[metacristi]

hypnagogue

So we are left with this simple proposition: D has indeed made his own free choice. The fact that he could not have chosen otherwise is irrelevant.

The usual definition of free will is that human choices are not absolutely determined by external causes,providing the existence of responsability when making the choice:clearly someone presenting mental disorders does not have free will.

All of today's scientific research in neurology suggest that we have such a free will:mind is seen as an emergent property of matter,previous brain internal states influencing the next without the necessity of additional external stimuli.The fact that our choices are limited by some external constraints does not limit our free will (the fact that I cannot fly using only hands does not limit my freedom of choice indeed).

In this view [the so called compatibilist view] free will and determinism are compatible therefore D has free will irrespective whether our universe is deterministic or not (this is still an open question in spite of the claims made by the advocates of the Copenhagen Interpretation regarding the allegedly 'inbuilt' indeterminism of quantum events).

Does there exist the libertarian free will?This implies that at least some of our choices are totally free.Unfortunately we cannot establish that,at least now...Anyway I wouldn't say that it cannot exist,what if our consciousness do randomly select some 'fundamental' properties of our reality (more or less close to Chalmer's panpsychism)?Still there remain a huge doubt:is this really free will?Indeed since we do not 'direct' the random selection of the fundamental properties this could be seen rather as being a 'random will'.The same goes even if consciousness is related with quantum level+the Copenhagen Interpretation of QM (with its postulated 'inbuilt' indeterminacy)...


In my opinion our prospect to draw a clearer conclusion is directly linked with the scientific understanding of consciousness.The actual computational-emergentist theory of consciousness claim that quantum level is not involved,consciousness is entirely related to macroscopic events.Personally I am much more cautious but of course this could be even proved right with arguments beyond all reasonable doubt (still fallible this does not involve having certitudes):for example if the computational approach of consciousness (using boolean algebra) is proved beyond all reasonable doubt as being correct.


Here by arguments beyond all reasonable doubt I mean a detailed,'working',description of the dynamics of the brain,a 'holistic' view (even if we had the proof that all mental states correlate with physical states-anyway far from being achieved now-this would,simply,be not enough).Another chance is to emulate a human mind using technology:an android whose consciousness is indistinguishable from that of a human being for example.These experimental proofs do not imply certitudes,I remember here the philosophical problem of 'zombies' (are machines that show a behaviour indistinguishable from that of a human being really conscious?).

Anyway even in the case that the actual emergentist conjecture (I prefer to label it so we do not have sufficient reasons to think otherwise yet) will be supported by the above presented 'confirmations' I would argue that we still cannot say that reductionism (at the laws acting at macroscopical level) is true.The truth is that we would simply not know.Moreover consciousness could still be emergent in a much broader sense:the 'output' could be more than the initial conditions (previous thoughts+the laws of nature).

Sure to advocate such a position we would need a way to make the difference between simple emergentism of mind from dead matter (but totally determined by the previous brain states+the laws of nature-including external stimuli) and the 'extended' emergentist position.Unfortunately it is possible that we will never be capable of that if consciousness is at least a chaotic phenomenon...Anyway the 'extended' emergentist hypothesis would be totally compatible with the observed reality,though being more complex it cannot be eliminated using Occam's Razor...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok let me clarify, and if I'm just reiterating what mentat's saying in a different context, sorry.

You do have a point, HOWEVER, you're going on the assumption that free will exists, which I propose it does not. In fact both (D) and (F) will make the same choice inevitably, no matter how many times the scenario is run. Because (D)=(F). They are both one and the same. Thier thought patterns are equal. Thier experiences, everything up to the point of selection is equal. Therefore each time they would follow the same behavioral patterns and decision based on the static congruity. The only way to change the selection is to introduce another variable into the equation, thus skewing the sampling.

We may PERCIEVE our lives as free will, but in fact they are based on patterns established through our experiences, our intelligence, personality, interactions with other people and our environment, and a myriad of other variables that when combined, bring together the solution of chocolate ice cream. The variables could appear infinite, but if one could calculate them, it would all boil down to something that could have no other outcome without changing the equation. Logically it makes sense, and may one day be proven. That is when we have enough computing power to bring all the variables together to a solution.

But this is all just an assumption. After all, the variables needn't really be variables at all. If D was fated to choose chocolate, he would choose chocolate, no matter what the mathematical probability is, since mathematical probability deals with a Universe where only the chances of something's occurring can be calculated exactly, not the certainty.

IOW, if you speak of variables and probability, you speak of two concepts that only exist in a "free" world (wherein I will probably pick chocolate (maybe 99.9999999999% chance) but have always had the opportunity to pick vanilla). In a predestined world, there is no such thing as "opportunity". There is only what will happen, and what will not. No variables involved.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by russ_watters
I like the thought experiment except for one thing: probability. Probability is based on how well you know the situation at hand. Sure, based on "F" eating chocolate 70% of the time in the past that there is a 70% chance that he'll eat it this time. Sounds nice.

But wait, if you dig a little deeper, you might find that he never eats chocolate more than 5 times in a row. Or maybe he's never eaten vanilla twice in a row. Or maybe he eats chocolate in the afternoon and vanilla in the evening.

There is ALWAYS more information that can be added to your understanding of F's decision making process to tighten up your probability. What you find is that the more information you add, the closer and closer (asymptotically) to 100% you get. So then the difference becomes 100% for D who THINKS he has a choice and 99.9999...% for F who KNOWS he has a choice.

Since it is my position that it is impossible to logically prove free will or predestination, I feel that I should re-iterate what I said in my previous post to Zantra: Probability only exists in a world of different opportunities. But opportunities only exists in a world of free will.

The fact that I have eaten choclate a million times before, when confronted with the same choice (betwixt vanilla and chocolate) doesn't mean anything in a world of predestination. It may seem like I "tend" toward chocolate, or my "chances" of chosing chocolate the next time are somehow greater, but "tendency" and "chance" do not exist in a predestined world. In a predestined world, I could eat chocolate a hundred times in a row, and it doesn't indicate or imply anything, except that I was predestined each of those times to choose chocolate.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok I agree that under the condition that a unique "free will" variable is introduced, a different choice can be made. But such a variable only exists in theory. A good example would be time travel. As I mentioned in one of my earlier posts, he could choose vanilla if he somehow knew of the future, and was thus able to make a decision based o knowledge that (D) did not have. But in the normalcy of things, people don't posess that ability, so we have to assume that D=F because the physical world doesn't allow for variables to be introduced. In mathmatical theory it's possible because we can work from a hypothetical persepective to arrive at that conclusion that D does not equal F, thus allowing for free will. But I concede your point- it is mathmatically possible, if not physically.

I think you have it backwards. We don't derive that D ~= F, we assume it at the outset and see where that logically takes us-- i.e. is the proposition "D ~= F" logically consistent or contradictory? If it is contradictory, then we are shown that something must be wrong with one of our assumptions, so we can go about re-evaluating them with this extra information in mind. If it is consistent, then we can proceed with theorizing about what can possibly account for F being different from D.

From the assumption D ~= F (ie F has free will as we have defined it but D does not) at the outset, my argument concludes that this relationship is only logically consistent if we assume F's decision making is influenced by "truly" random processes. We can phrase this as the conditional statement, "If person X has free will (again, as I have defined it), then this free will cannot be accounted for by any deterministic process." The conclusion is therefore not a proof or disproof of the propisition "free will exists," but rather a conlusion about the nature of free will, given that it actually does exist.

Of course, the existence of free will in humans would be enormously difficult to prove or disprove, if it is even possible at all. But if anyone insists that free will does indeed exist, then they must also accept that this free will is not a liberation but rather an inherent vulnerability to uncontrollable random processes (assuming there are no chinks in my reasoning, of course).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by wuliheron
You have stated that the only explanation for the statistical probability of the choices of F is the introduction of a random element. An alternative explanation is that our observations are incorrect. Whether something is random or ordered can be either an absolute state of affairs or a relative one, and which it might be is ultimately anyone's guess.

Alright, let's add the condition that all observations on F and D are made in the same manner, in the same reference frame, and whatever else may be relevant to observational error. This is a theoretical argument, so all that matters is that it is theoretically possible to make observations of F and D such that there is no bias introduced by the observations. So unless there are good reasons to think that such a feat is impossible, we can proceed safely with our reasoning. (Besides, how could it be that if F was deterministic, and we always viewed F making his decision at t0 with the same observational methodology, and the initial conditions of t0 were always identical, that we would not always see F making the same choice?)

Again: If the statistical probability of the choices of F are not generated by a random element, then they must be generated by a deterministic element. But by definition, all the deterministic elements acting on F are also acting on D in an identical way. Therefore, if F's choices can ultimately be traced to purely deterministic elements, then F's behavior must be identical to D's. But this is not the case, so we have arrived at a contradiction; we conclude that there must be a non-deterministic element influencing F's decisions.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Mentat
But this is all just an assumption. After all, the variables needn't really be variables at all. If D was fated to choose chocolate, he would choose chocolate, no matter what the mathematical probability is, since mathematical probability deals with a Universe where only the chances of something's occurring can be calculated exactly, not the certainty.

IOW, if you speak of variables and probability, you speak of two concepts that only exist in a "free" world (wherein I will probably pick chocolate (maybe 99.9999999999% chance) but have always had the opportunity to pick vanilla). In a predestined world, there is no such thing as "opportunity". There is only what will happen, and what will not. No variables involved.

Ok I'm responding to everyone's threads in one post, so as not to have 10 separate replies- so hang in there- and here we go!..

Ok maybe "variables" isn't exactly the correct word to use then. I say variables because at this time and point their definitions are largely unkown to us. So let's refer to them as causes. And there are billions of causal items which all contribute to the ultimate effect, the decision. Since we're speaking of determinism, these "causes" would all have to be known. Every single factor that would contribute to the decision directly or indirectly would have to be known. If this were the case, then we could determine the outcome of the decision to select chocolate. Let's also discard the term probabilty, since that infers variation. We've already established that D=F because we are talking about 2 completely equal examples up to the point of the decision. We're already established that there is no possibility of making a different choice because D and F are identical. Yes it is possible by introducing a "variable", but then the two become unequal, and the example looses it's point. The "probability" of alternate selection is ZERO, nado, null, nill zipp-o. Introducing a variable may change his mind, but if we solve that variable, then we can determine weather or not it will affect his choice. If someone intercepts his timeline and tells him not to pick chocolate, yes we can determine he will pick chocolate. But in the physical world there are no(proven) identical timelines to validate this. You have one set of causes, and it will one day be possible to add all those causes together to determine his "choice".

You see he does not actually have a "choice". All of his decisions throughout his life are unique, not variable, and can lead to only one choice or conclusion. He sees it as free will, like any other person would. However if he were able broaden his scope and examine the cascading cause and effect that brought him to this moment, and all it's intricacies, he would realize that he already knew what he wanted. He wanted chocolate because earlier was craving ice cream, because he saw someone eating chocolate ice cream. He saw that person because he decided to take a walk that day. he decide to take a walk that day because he got up early and was bored. He woke up early because his neighbor was running the lawn mower. His neihbor was doing that because he'd forgotten to do it the night before. His nieghbor forgot because when going out to do it, a friend called. His friend called because..(you get the point) And on and on and on out to the beginning. And if each chain of events could be followed back, it would lead to the moment of the decision, and we would know before he made the choice, and we would know exactly WHY he made the choice. The point isn't that he can't make a different choice- It's that he won't. I could go walk across a freeway, but I won't. I won't because I want to live. I won't because It's a long walk to the freeway..etc, etc.

My point is that it all depends on how you interpret free will. In a sense it does exist- from out perspective. But we always base our decisions on experiences, and those experiences are static, and if they all could be known, then essentially what we could do is in a sense "become" that person, following all the factors that would cause his to make his choice.

So here's my question. If you make a decision without coersion, or any external influences, but the decision you will inevitably make is static and can be predetermined- is it still free will?

I think you have it backwards. We don't derive that D ~= F, we assume it at the outset and see where that logically takes us-- i.e. is the proposition "D ~= F" logically consistent or contradictory? If it is contradictory, then we are shown that something must be wrong with one of our assumptions, so we can go about re-evaluating them with this extra information in mind. If it is consistent, then we can proceed with theorizing about what can possibly account for F being different from D.

From the assumption D ~= F (ie F has free will as we have defined it but D does not) at the outset, my argument concludes that this relationship is only logically consistent if we assume F's decision making is influenced by "truly" random processes. We can phrase this as the conditional statement, "If person X has free will (again, as I have defined it), then this free will cannot be accounted for by any deterministic process." The conclusion is therefore not a proof or disproof of the propisition "free will exists," but rather a conlusion about the nature of free will, given that it actually does exist.

Of course, the existence of free will in humans would be enormously difficult to prove or disprove, if it is even possible at all. But if anyone insists that free will does indeed exist, then they must also accept that this free will is not a liberation but rather an inherent vulnerability to uncontrollable random processes (assuming there are no chinks in my reasoning, of course).

Ok but it all comes down to how you interpret it. By definition, you're acknowledging that free will is depending upon uncontrollable processes. But those processes are determinable. If we can know ALL the processes which factor into a decision, then we can know that decision. My premise is contingent upon all factors being known. You're trying to introduce this "variable" or unknown "factor X" which allows free will. I submit that factor X isn't a variable allowing for free will, but instead a limiter to our knowledge, which doesn't allow us to draw an infallible conclusion. As long as a piece of the puzzle is missing, we can't see the complete picture and must "guess" that is what allows us to conclude free will. If we have all the pieces, there's no guesswork involved, and we have solved the riddle.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by metacristi
The usual definition of free will is that human choices are not absolutely determined by external causes,providing the existence of responsability when making the choice:clearly someone presenting mental disorders does not have free will.

All of today's scientific research in neurology suggest that we have such a free will:mind is seen as an emergent property of matter,previous brain internal states influencing the next without the necessity of additional external stimuli.

Well, this is a slightly different definition of free will than I have been using, since it has the internal/external distinction built into it. But from whence did those previous internal states of the brain arise? In a deterministic world we can trace these initial brain states themselves to past external influences, all the way back to the fertilization of the egg by the sperm. You are implicitly introducing a temporal variable into the definition of free will, when none exists in your explicit definition. For a choice to be an exercise of free will as you have defined it, it's not sufficient to say that the choice is not a (temporally) direct effect of an external cause. We have to be able to say that the choice was not the inevitable effect of external causes, regardless of when those external causes may have operated.

In this view [the so called compatibilist view] free will and determinism are compatible therefore D has free will irrespective whether our universe is deterministic or not

I was unaware that there was a common idea behind the reconcilability of free will and determinism. According to Wikipedia.org:

Compatibilism, also known as "soft determinism" and most famously championed by Hume, is a theory which holds that free will and determinism are compatible. Properly understood, according to Hume, freedom is not an absolute ability to have chosen differently under exactly the same inner and outer circumstances. Rather, it is a hypothetical ability to have chosen differently if one had been differently psychologically disposed by some different beliefs or desires. Alternately, Hume maintains that free acts are not uncaused (or mysteriously self-caused as Kant would have it) but caused in the right way, i.e., by our choices as determined by our our beliefs and desires, by our characters.

I think there are some good points made here, but they all circumvent the determinism/free will clash by defining free will differently from how I have defined it in this thread. Hume equates free will with a person's capacity to act in accordance to his/her desires, which is essentially the same idea I've been using to justify the notion that deterministic beings have a choice even if one particular outcome of that choice is inevitable. This is why I don't think determinism necessarily makes us 'puppet-like' or detracts from the integrity of human life/nature/experience in any significant way. If we define free acts/free will as Hume has, then I agree that we have free will, in this sense. But however we define free will, it looks as if there is still no getting around the notion that the meaningful choices we make are deterministically fixed. If we define free will as freedom from the bonds of causal determination, then either such a thing doesn't exist or it's just an expression of randomness.

 

[Zantra]

I think compatibilism pretty much sums up what I've been trying to voice, I just didn't know the theory existed.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok but it all comes down to how you interpret it. By definition, you're acknowledging that free will is depending upon uncontrollable processes. But those processes are determinable. If we can know ALL the processes which factor into a decision, then we can know that decision. My premise is contingent upon all factors being known. You're trying to introduce this "variable" or unknown "factor X" which allows free will. I submit that factor X isn't a variable allowing for free will, but instead a limiter to our knowledge, which doesn't allow us to draw an infallible conclusion. As long as a piece of the puzzle is missing, we can't see the complete picture and must "guess" that is what allows us to conclude free will. If we have all the pieces, there's no guesswork involved, and we have solved the riddle.

Again, I think you are either overlooking or misunderstanding the theoretical notion of a 'truly' random process. Define a 'truly' random (T-random for short) process as one whose behavior cannot be predicted with 100% certainty, even given perfect knowledge of the system. (Quantum events might be an example of truly random processes that actually exist in nature.) Rather than reiterate my argument, let us assume that the 'free-ness' of F's free will must be the result of T-random process(es). Let us go even further and presume that we have "perfect knowledge" of these T-random processes in F; even with this perfect knowledge, the process will still be unpredictable to some degree. Here's a further assumption: we have perfect knowledge of all the deterministic factors that influence F's decision, and we know how to do the relevant calculations with this data.

So we have perfect knowledge of F, including all the deterministic parts and all the T-random parts-- in other words, there is absolutely no limitation of knowledge here that's just waiting to be unmasked-- we know everything that there is to possibly know about F. But even though we have every single piece of the puzzle that exists, we still have to do some sort of guesswork. We cannot predict with 100% certainty what F's decision will be, since it somehow depends on an unknowable quantity, namely the T-random process. We can do statistics to calculate the probability of what F will decide, but that isn't the same thing as absolute prediction.

We've already established that D=F because we are talking about 2 completely equal examples up to the point of the decision. We're already established that there is no possibility of making a different choice because D and F are identical.

No, that's the thing. There is a possibility that F makes a different choice than D, by definition-- that is why we say F has free will in the first place.

This misunderstanding is probably my fault for being too vague in the initial post and only clarifying the point several posts later, but let me try to clarify it again.

D and F live in identical worlds and have identical attributes, experiences, memories, etc. In fact, they are identical in every single way EXCEPT for the one thing that by definition distinguishes them: the fact that F has free will and D does not. Now, in this thought experiment we are examining what is going on with D and F while they are making a decision at "present" time t0-- every other event fixed in the past is identical. It did not HAVE to be this way-- since F has free will, then he COULD HAVE wound up in a state distinct from D at time t0. We are just examining the one particular situation where it just so happens that F's free choices happen to have been identical in every way to D's determined choices, up until t0. So strictly speaking, D ~= F, even though their histories are superficially impossible to tell apart.

 

[Zantra]

Ok then we must assume (for the sake of the argument) that the T-random process is knowable. I DO understand what you're trying to say. Basically that is always an element of randomness present that allows free will to occur. And I did admit earlier that free will was Mathamatically feasible. I'm not familiar with the aspects of QM pertaining to this(I guess it's time I learned) But in order for determinism to hold true, we must assume no variables, and no unknowns- even T-random process. This may not hold true, but considering we're discussing 2 exactly parallel timelines, you can induldge me So If we assuming perfect knowledge of EVERYTHING, not just from a superficial perpective, but a quantum, molecular, and thought process point of view. We are also making the assumption that we have such a complete knowledge of QM as to be able to determine the T-random process outcome. After all, there is pattern even in randomness (see chaos theory- and no I can't argue the fine points of chaos theory either- I'm not a PHD mathamatician). IF all of the things I just mentioned held true, then indeed D would truly equal F, and determinism would hold true.

Obviously there are a lot of fine points and issues that would have to be resolved in order for determinism to work, and it's not absolutely uncontestable, but compatibility theory works best for me, as contains most of what I've been spewing out.

 

[metacristi]

hypnagogue

Well, this is a slightly different definition of free will than I have been using, since it has the internal/external distinction built into it. But from whence did those previous internal states of the brain arise? In a deterministic world we can trace these initial brain states themselves to past external influences, all the way back to the fertilization of the egg by the sperm. You are implicitly introducing a temporal variable into the definition of free will, when none exists in your explicit definition. For a choice to be an exercise of free will as you have defined it, it's not sufficient to say that the choice is not a (temporally) direct effect of an external cause. We have to be able to say that the choice was not the inevitable effect of external causes, regardless of when those external causes may have operated

An act of will (when making a decision) is linked with a specific moment of time (of course the physical act itself is consequent to the decision to act so),what I had in mind was exactly your point:at a certain moment of time D has free will exactly because there are not only immediate external influences which to lead to the decision made (as behaviourism claim).The fact that there might exist an unknown (by D) chain of purely deterministic causes that leads inevitably toward the decision made is irrelevant.



[QUOTEIn this view [the so called compatibilist view] free will and determinism are compatible therefore D has free will irrespective whether our universe is deterministic or not

I was unaware that there was a common idea behind the reconcilability of free will and determinism. [/QUOTE]


My idea was that though D does not know in what kind of universe does he exist he can still say that he has free will irrespective of whether his universe is deterministic or not ontologically.The freedom of choice he experiences is compatible with both.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zantra
I would have to reiterate the matrix analogy- You've already made your choice, you just don't know it yet. It's so difficult to separate determinism and free will because of the correlation between the two, and it all depends on your point of view. You have the ability to make choices, but those choices, or "variables" have already been determined by your life path. We accept it as free will because we make choices, but those choices are influenced by unvaried factors in your life which you cannot control.

Ever consider that "thought" is deterministic (form) and "emotions" are volitile? (essence). And thus illustrates the relationship between predeterminism and free will, as well as the functioning of the human mind?

While here if we learn to keep our emotions "in context" with our thoughts, and exhibit "self control" -- and don't do stupid things! (not always ) -- then we begin to discover we have mastery over overselves and, "our fate."

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zantra
Ok maybe "variables" isn't exactly the correct word to use then.

It is not the correct word unless you want to believe in free will. Contrary to what seems to have been agreed upon D[x=]F, in any way. To speak of "THE decision" is naive and practically "staw man" in nature. I say this because there are millions of decisions to be made in the course of this person's life, and this particular decision would not have come about exactly as it did, unless many other decisions (perhaps even all of them) were made exactly as they were.

The elimination of the term "variables" is something you do when you wish to prove a deterministic PoV. It is not a logical necessity, since, in the paradigm of "free will", there are indeed "variables". Variables, in this context, are not solvable, but remain variables until the point of decision ("decision" also being a term that only exists in a "free will" paradigm).

I say variables because at this time and point their definitions are largely unkown to us. So let's refer to them as causes. And there are billions of causal items which all contribute to the ultimate effect, the decision. Since we're speaking of determinism, these "causes" would all have to be known. Every single factor that would contribute to the decision directly or indirectly would have to be known. If this were the case, then we could determine the outcome of the decision to select chocolate.

It would help very much if you had added an "IMO", somewhere in there, since this is not in any way proven. Yes, there are many "limiting factors" ("rocks in the paths" as I referred to them on an old thread about the same topic), but these needn't cover every single aspect. IOW, I may be able to know everything that exists, and thus calculate the probability of his choosing chocolate to a perfect degree of accuracy, but I will always be left with a variable (in the "free will" paradigm) and there is thus always the chance (no matter how small) that he will take vanilla anyway.

Let's also discard the term probabilty, since that infers variation. We've already established that D=F because we are talking about 2 completely equal examples up to the point of the decision.

Not so. The fact that F has been making choices throughout his entire life is not over-lookable (if that's even a word ; I guess I mean "irrelevant"), since this situation is exactly like all of the millions of others that have been presented to F before as to whether he is predestined or free to choose. IOW, if F has been making choices throughout his life, then he is free to choose here, and there must thus be a variable (perhaps just the somewhat chaotic (though not stochastic) processes of the brain) somewhere "in the works", allowing him to choose vanilla.

We're already established that there is no possibility of making a different choice because D and F are identical. Yes it is possible by introducing a "variable", but then the two become unequal, and the example looses it's point. The "probability" of alternate selection is ZERO, nado, null, nill zipp-o. Introducing a variable may change his mind, but if we solve that variable, then we can determine weather or not it will affect his choice.

But, in the "free will" paradigm, there are some variables that cannot be solved. There are some points of chaos that, though they are governed by many rules (which is why I said they are not stochastic), are not resolvable, and leave "chance" in the equation.

If someone intercepts his timeline and tells him not to pick chocolate, yes we can determine he will pick chocolate. But in the physical world there are no(proven) identical timelines to validate this. You have one set of causes, and it will one day be possible to add all those causes together to determine his "choice".

I just thought of something. I remember having started a thread about "A Universe Without Logic", or something like that... ah, here it is. Anyway, you should read the first post on there (my own), since it deals directly with this concept of "causes", which you seem to believe in without a doubt.

You see he does not actually have a "choice". All of his decisions throughout his life are unique, not variable, and can lead to only one choice or conclusion. He sees it as free will, like any other person would. However if he were able broaden his scope and examine the cascading cause and effect that brought him to this moment, and all it's intricacies, he would realize that he already knew what he wanted. He wanted chocolate because earlier was craving ice cream, because he saw someone eating chocolate ice cream. He saw that person because he decided to take a walk that day. he decide to take a walk that day because he got up early and was bored. He woke up early because his neighbor was running the lawn mower. His neihbor was doing that because he'd forgotten to do it the night before. His nieghbor forgot because when going out to do it, a friend called. His friend called because..(you get the point) And on and on and on out to the beginning. And if each chain of events could be followed back, it would lead to the moment of the decision, and we would know before he made the choice, and we would know exactly WHY he made the choice.

I understand what you're saying, but I just don't think it's good enough to prove either side, because you leave the real question as wide open as it always has been: Did F have a choice along this chain?

The point isn't that he can't make a different choice- It's that he won't. I could go walk across a freeway, but I won't. I won't because I want to live. I won't because It's a long walk to the freeway..etc, etc.

Ah-ha! And here is the flaw in a much more naked form. You are giving reasons (as you have been) for choices made. Both reason and choice belong only in the "free will" paradigm. Aside from this, you direcly say that he "could" choose one path, but wont, because of some reason. If he "could" choose one path, then he has free will, is not predestined, and has only to deal with the "limiting factors" along with the variable ones, in order to make a decision.

My point is that it all depends on how you interpret free will. In a sense it does exist- from out perspective. But we always base our decisions on experiences, and those experiences are static, and if they all could be known, then essentially what we could do is in a sense "become" that person, following all the factors that would cause his to make his choice.

So here's my question. If you make a decision without coersion, or any external influences, but the decision you will inevitably make is static and can be predetermined- is it still free will?

But this excludes the variables. Yes, it is still free will, provided the variables still exist. For example, it is impossible to determine a person's "clarity of mind" (from a purely materialistic stanpoint), and thus you might walk out into the freeway and be killed, not "because" of anything (no limiting factors), just due to an incalculable variable. If you argue that there are no "incalculable variables" then you have taken the side of predestination. However, it cannot be proven that such variables do not exist, and science (particularly physics) seems to be leaning toward the variable part (just think of Stephen Jay Gould's - purely Darwinian - view of evolution as being amoral. If it is amoral, then it is not "tending" toward anything, and is thus variable (indeterminate)).

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Mentat
It is not the correct word unless you want to believe in free will. Contrary to what seems to have been agreed upon D[x=]F, in any way. To speak of "THE decision" is naive and practically "staw man" in nature. I say this because there are millions of decisions to be made in the course of this person's life, and this particular decision would not have come about exactly as it did, unless many other decisions (perhaps even all of them) were made exactly as they were.

So noted- we must make assumptions in order to prove determinism, but since the same applies to free-will, I'm just going down this particular evil path, and casting asumptions out. Of course it's the path I was meant to take

The elimination of the term "variables" is something you do when you wish to prove a deterministic PoV. It is not a logical necessity, since, in the paradigm of "free will", there are indeed "variables". Variables, in this context, are not solvable, but remain variables until the point of decision ("decision" also being a term that only exists in a "free will" paradigm).

It would help very much if you had added an "IMO", somewhere in there, since this is not in any way proven. Yes, there are many "limiting factors" ("rocks in the paths" as I referred to them on an old thread about the same topic), but these needn't cover every single aspect. IOW, I may be able to know everything that exists, and thus calculate the probability of his choosing chocolate to a perfect degree of accuracy, but I will always be left with a variable (in the "free will" paradigm) and there is thus always the chance (no matter how small) that he will take vanilla anyway.

"the views expressed by this person are not necessarily the view of the forum, and the forum is not responsible for the views expressed in this post"- IOW, IMHO=)

That said, variables are logically solvable because we're assuming we know every element of the universe, including it's properties. So that means that even the variables are known. We know that someone will intersect the timeline to tell the person not to pick vanilla because it was anticipated. We saw that person's(time travellers) actions and realized he would time travel. We realized it would rain that day, causing the person to delay leaving the house because we observed the weather patterns, and accurately predicted the path of the storm.

Not so. The fact that F has been making choices throughout his entire life is not over-lookable (if that's even a word ; I guess I mean "irrelevant"), since this situation is exactly like all of the millions of others that have been presented to F before as to whether he is predestined or free to choose. IOW, if F has been making choices throughout his life, then he is free to choose here, and there must thus be a variable (perhaps just the somewhat chaotic (though not stochastic) processes of the brain) somewhere "in the works", allowing him to choose vanilla.

But in fact they were not "choices" he made-I may have used that word in my haste to prove the point(ya somantics are killing me here;) But PATHS is a more accurate word. At each previous juncture the same rules would apply, and he had only one true path. Think of it in terms of a maze, and there is only one route to the end. It's as if we knew the way to the end, and did not make any dead-end turns. So he went down the chosen path, because it was the only one available to him.

But, in the "free will" paradigm, there are some variables that cannot be solved. There are some points of chaos that, though they are governed by many rules (which is why I said they are not stochastic), are not resolvable, and leave "chance" in the equation.

I believe that ultimately everything is solvable, given enough understanding of it. I can't PROVE that, but it's IMO a truth. I'm of course referring to physical properties of the universe.

I understand what you're saying, but I just don't think it's good enough to prove either side, because you leave the real question as wide open as it always has been: Did F have a choice along this chain?

And my answer- No choice F did not. It was all predetermined. That was his path that led him to this point, there was no other "choice" really, it was just used as a designation-juncture would be a better word.(not going to nail me on somantics;)

Ah-ha! And here is the flaw in a much more naked form. You are giving reasons (as you have been) for choices made. Both reason and choice belong only in the "free will" paradigm. Aside from this, you direcly say that he "could" choose one path, but wont, because of some reason. If he "could" choose one path, then he has free will, is not predestined, and has only to deal with the "limiting factors" along with the variable ones, in order to make a decision.

Busted We have to discard this example- it's a bad one. It's difficult to retrain the mind to think in terms of determinism.. hehe
Instead we must say that I would not walk across the freeway because I know I would be in danger of death. Because I was not MEANT to die.(I'm simplifying here for the sake of space and to cut down on the CTS (carapal tunnel)

But this excludes the variables. Yes, it is still free will, provided the variables still exist. For example, it is impossible to determine a person's "clarity of mind" (from a purely materialistic stanpoint), and thus you might walk out into the freeway and be killed, not "because" of anything (no limiting factors), just due to an incalculable variable. If you argue that there are no "incalculable variables" then you have taken the side of predestination. However, it cannot be proven that such variables do not exist, and science (particularly physics) seems to be leaning toward the variable part (just think of Stephen Jay Gould's - purely Darwinian - view of evolution as being amoral. If it is amoral, then it is not "tending" toward anything, and is thus variable (indeterminate)).

I agree that determism must eliminate all variables, but after all, we are talking about nearly, if not absolute onmipotence here, so it becomes possible. Can it ultimately be proven? No not until we can eliminate all variables- (looks at watch) I don't see that happening this week. But what determinism also does is highlight the fallibility of science, and it's limitations. We can't yet determine "clarity of mind" yet because we lack the understanding of the human mind. Of course I would point out that "clarity" is an abstract term, and that we may one day discover that the synapses are simply firing slower than normal because of multiple factors (what we ate for breakfast, exhaustion from mid-term cramming last night, etc, etc) So you see my point, that we don't have enough evidence to prove that variables can or cannot be eliminated. We must make assumptions in both perspectives (D and F) so the whole point becomes moot without better scientific understanding.

I think I've taken this discussion as far is it can be possibly taken. we could sit and argue all day over weather variables are solvable, and get nowhere. We just must accept that we need more info.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
Ever consider that "thought" is deterministic (form) and "emotions" are volitile? (essence). And thus illustrates the relationship between predeterminism and free will, as well as the functioning of the human mind?

While here if we learn to keep our emotions "in context" with our thoughts, and exhibit "self control" -- and don't do stupid things! (not always ) -- then we begin to discover we have mastery over overselves and, "our fate."

Not to be inhumane here, but I believe that even emotions are predicitable at some level. emotions are reactions, just like our physical being, and that means that something causes them. Do we understand the mechanics of them? No way, but we can establish that they are reactionary in nature.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zantra
Not to be inhumane here, but I believe that even emotions are predicitable at some level. emotions are reactions, just like our physical being, and that means that something causes them. Do we understand the mechanics of them? No way, but we can establish that they are reactionary in nature.

But still, without emotions we wouldn't feel anything, let alone what it's like to be free. As for analytical thinking -- in and of itself -- I think it would be fair to say that it's essentially deterministic, so long as there are no feelings associated to give it "value." Here's your problem with science right there ...

Thus we have the option of going to two extremes, one where only logic rules in a totally deterministic sense, and the other where only feelings rule and we have total chaos. Or, perchance we might discover the third option, which is the "happy medium" in the middle, where we learn to live our lives freely and responsibly.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
Thus we have the option of going to two extremes, one where only logic rules in a totally deterministic sense, and the other where only feelings rule and we have total chaos.

A dual pendulum system is chaotic and volatile, but still deterministic. Chaotic behavior does not imply the absense of determinism. What other reason might you have for thinking emotions are not deterministic?

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
A dual pendulum system is chaotic and volatile, but still deterministic. Chaotic behavior does not imply the absense of determinism. What other reason might you have for thinking emotions are not deterministic?

Of course I'm obviously not speaking of either extreme, but of the equilbrium which exists in the middle. Whereby once an equilibrium is achieved, from the standpoint of "the device" (mind) being fully functional (holistically), the exertion of will becomes a matter of little or "no effort."

Or at least this is how it works with me, and to be honest, I don't have any idea of what's going to happen from one moment to the next. Neither do I really care, so long as I'm enjoying myself, and that, I equate with "free will."

Ever look at yourself doing something in the moment? There are way too many things going on -- on a subconscious level that is -- to suggest that the whole thing was predetermined, especially when all you're doing is something as basic as fulfilling a need as it arises which, has little or nothing to do with choice (like going to the bathroom).

While this is why I think science has a problem grasping the idea of free will, because it refuses to look at how the mind operates, in the "holistic sense." Neither can it handle it or, won't deal with it because it tends to wreak havoc on its whole system of analytical and "sterilized" (the key word here) procedure, amounting to "control" in other words.

Which leads me to wonder, how long is it going to take for science to get its head out from being stuck up its hind end?

 

[CJames]

Eh, back to that whole quantum indeterminacey thing.

Alot of you seem to be arguing for determinism based on scientific principles, which is a big mistake. The argument that a role of dice could, theoretically, be predicted with 100% accuracey is false.

First you must understand that an electron, for example, is not a billiard ball. It is a statistical wave, a wavefunction, that describes the probabilities of its location, it's velocity, etc. From this an electon shell is much more complex, and the interaction between two electron shells surrounding two atoms becomes even more complex.

It is theoretically impossible to predict with 100% accuracy the motion of two atoms comming in contact. With that in mind, the complex interactions between billions of atoms in the throw of a die is a hail marry. It is impossible to predict the land of the dice. Only the probabilities of how the dice land is predictable. It can be predicted to an accuracey much higher than one in six, but it can not be 100%.

This inherent indeterminacey in nature leaves room for free will, though there is also the possibility of a "radom will" or a "probabilistic will." Of course, the differences between a free will and a random one may simply boil down to your point of view.

 

[metacristi]

Basically the roll of a dice is a fully deterministic process though we cannot accurately predict the outcome in the majority of cases.But this is not because of quantum uncertainty.

We talk here of a macroscopical object that is an emergent property of the quantum level,compatible with determinism,we do not need to know the position of every atom or electron inside the die.

The only question is to establish whether it is a chaotic phenomenon (still deterministic but practically unpredictable on an enough long run,depending on its interval of determinacy) or fully deterministic.

The answer is that the roll of a dice is a perfectly regular deterministic system if the air does not introduce nonlinear perturbations.Still we cannot make accurate predictions in all cases.The explanation is simple:in practice we cannot control the initial conditions with sufficient precision (we would need to control them exactly in fact) but only in a certain range.Or the dynamics of a rolling die has many cases where small differences produce very different outcomes.

We have therefore a zone of uncertainty introduced by our incapacity to control exactly the initial conditions that introduce a certain degree of 'randomness' however there are particular cases (providing an enough small range of uncertainty for the initial conditions and a simple movement of the dice) when the outcome could be accurately predicted.

 

[Royce]

From what I have read so far none of you have a very good understanding of probability or are not using it for the sake of this discussion.

If F has free will, there is a 50:50 chance that he will choose Choc. and a 50:50 chance that he will choose van. anyone time. As observers that is all that we can know with certainty because those are his only choices. At any given one time or one sample he has a 50:50 chance despite any history of him having a 70% preference for Choc.
If as observers we observe his choice 10 times and he chooses choc. 7 time and van. 3 time then we can say that there is an 86% probability that in any 10 samples F will choose choc. 7 times. If we observe F for 100 times then we can say the for any given 100 samples there is 96% probability that F will choose Choc. 70 times. If we observe the same behavior 1000 times we can say the there is a 99.6% probability that out of any 1000 samples F will choose Choc. 700 times. That is all that we can say as observers and it doesn't matter what may or may not influences F's choice so long as the ratios hold up and he has free will (Those figures are not statistically correct but you get the idea I'm sure.)
Never the less no matter how many times we sample or observe F for anyone time we can only say that he has a 50:50 chance of choosing choc. This is only if F has free will also D's behavior has no effect on F's choices.

Personally I think that we do have free will. Our choices may be influenced by our past and present mood but we are free to choose not compelled to choose one way or the other. If it were a deterministic world then we might just as well say tha astrology is an exact science as the position of the planets are as good an indiction of that which compells us as any other.

An oracle supposedly sees all time as one. The past, the present and future are all the same and simutanious. An oracle sees the future as already having happened. The Oracle had seen that Neo had already chosen in his future. Not that is was predetermined but that is had already happened. This had nothing to do will free will or determinism but seeing the future as it had already happened. Could Neo still choose differently? Yes, but then the Oracle would have seen that different choice. Like time travel it can only happen if it has already happened. One could easily go nuts trying to figure this out.

 

[CJames]

Basically the roll of a dice is a fully deterministic process though we cannot accurately predict the outcome in the majority of cases.But this is not because of quantum uncertainty.

Actually that's incorrect. Even as things get larger than h-bar, quantum indeterminancey still holds. It's true that things behave more classically, but not fully deterministic. A die made of indeterminit atoms can't be fully deterministic, no matter what. There is always a degree of uncertainty no matter how small. Chaos theory investigates the macroscopic result of that indeterminacey. If you try to balance a pen on its head, it's impossible to predict what direction it will fall. What you can do, is look for patterns in this behavior.

Incidentally, this thread is really about conciousness and if you assume that it comes from the brain, then you have to consider the fact that every synaptic gap is a quantum realm of "full" indeterminacey.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Royce
From what I have read so far none of you have a very good understanding of probability or are not using it for the sake of this discussion.

If F has free will, there is a 50:50 chance that he will choose Choc. and a 50:50 chance that he will choose van. anyone time. As observers that is all that we can know with certainty because those are his only choices. At any given one time or one sample he has a 50:50 chance despite any history of him having a 70% preference for Choc.
If as observers we observe his choice 10 times and he chooses choc. 7 time and van. 3 time then we can say that there is an 86% probability that in any 10 samples F will choose choc. 7 times. If we observe F for 100 times then we can say the for any given 100 samples there is 96% probability that F will choose Choc. 70 times. If we observe the same behavior 1000 times we can say the there is a 99.6% probability that out of any 1000 samples F will choose Choc. 700 times. That is all that we can say as observers and it doesn't matter what may or may not influences F's choice so long as the ratios hold up and he has free will (Those figures are not statistically correct but you get the idea I'm sure.)
Never the less no matter how many times we sample or observe F for anyone time we can only say that he has a 50:50 chance of choosing choc. This is only if F has free will also D's behavior has no effect on F's choices.

Royce, I mean this with all due respect but it appears as if you are the one without a good understanding of probability.

If we can only say that F has a 50/50 chance of choosing one or the other, this is equivalent to saying F has no preference for one or the other-- it's also equivalent to saying that F chooses absolutely randomly. If F indeed has a preference, and acts on this preference, then this preference must have some expression in the choice that F ultimately makes. Since F can only choose one or the other-- chocolate or vanilla-- at one time, this preference will not immediately make itself known after one choice. This DOES NOT imply that the preference has not been factored into that choice-- hence, it does not imply that the choice was a 50/50 proposition.

Let's say we observe F n times, for n arbitrarily large. As you acknowledge, the more observations we perform on F, the more the proportion of times F chooses chocolate in our sample of n observations converges to the proportion of times F chooses chocolate overall, in all his infinite parallel universe incarnations. So let's get extravagant and say we perform 10 billion billion observations on 10 billion billion identical parallel universe incarnations of F at their respective t0's. From this massive sample, we get that F chooses chocolate 90% of the time. Now we perform one more observation on one more identical F-- what would you put your money on, F choosing chocolate or vanilla? From your perspective, you probably wouldn't bet at all since you think that there is a 50/50 chance F will choose chocolate. But this is absurd-- since we have seen that over 10 billion billion identical trials F chooses chocolate 90% of the time, it only stands to reason to say that for our next observation there will be a 90% chance that he will choose chocolate.

Think of the same concept, but for flipping a coin. If it is a fair coin, then over many flips we will converge on the result that there is a 50/50 split between heads and tails. If it is biased, we will converge on a different result over many flips-- say, 70/30. If we flip the coin 10 million times and see it lands on heads 70% of the time do you really think there is only a 50/50 chance it will land on heads on the next flip?

In the hypothetical situation I have posed, F has a natural preference for chocolate, so it is only natural to expect this to be reflected in his choice. Well, you might ask, why should F have any preference at all? If he is truly free, would that not imply that he is free from all external influences? If you want to define free will as such, fine-- but such a radical free will clearly cannot apply to us humans in any way, since we humans ARE affected by external influences, whether we have some degree of freedom in our ensuing choices or not. To deny this is to be blind to human nature.

Personally I think that we do have free will. Our choices may be influenced by our past and present mood but we are free to choose not compelled to choose one way or the other. If it were a deterministic world then we might just as well say tha astrology is an exact science as the position of the planets are as good an indiction of that which compells us as any other.

Free to choose, compelled to choose-- either way, there is an impact from our environment. I was taking this environmental impact into account when I posited that F chooses chocolate 70% of the time. If you say that for every free choice there is a uniform distribution of probabilities across all possible choices, this is no different than saying that the possessor of free will must always choose uniformly at random with no influence from his environment, and therefore ultimately must choose with no justification for his choice that can have external expression.

edit: Another way to think about it... based on the logic you have posed, you may as well ignore weather reports that say there is a 70% chance of rain today-- after all, there is only a 50/50 chance of this happening; either it rains or it does not rain. The (pseudo) deterministic (and more accurate) take on weather forecasting, on the other hand, is that there is a greater or lesser chance that it rains today based on prevailing weather patterns. I don't see how determinism, for you, makes indications of causally influenced human behavior absolutely arbitrary. If anything it is the opposite.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by CJames
Eh, back to that whole quantum indeterminacey thing.

Alot of you seem to be arguing for determinism based on scientific principles, which is a big mistake. The argument that a role of dice could, theoretically, be predicted with 100% accuracey is false.

We're talking here about human choice being either deterministic or free. To say we could predict a deterministic being's behavior with 100% accuracy is perhaps not strictly correct. But we can still distinguish between the determined and the free, which is all that matters. The determined are simply those whose behavior is in rigorous statistical agreement with the predictions of physical theories; the free are those whose behavior is not in such agreement with physical theories, hence their 'freedom' from this framework.

Under this revised way of looking at it, D may choose chocolate 99.99999999999999999999999999997 percent of the time, or some such. So it is not strictly true that D's action was absolutely fixed. But if F is still seen to choose chocolate 70% of the time, there is clearly a meaningful distinction to be made between F and D.

 

[CJames]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
We're talking here about human choice being either deterministic or free. To say we could predict a deterministic being's behavior with 100% accuracy is perhaps not strictly correct. But we can still distinguish between the determined and the free, which is all that matters. The determined are simply those whose behavior is in rigorous statistical agreement with the predictions of physical theories; the free are those whose behavior is not in such agreement with physical theories, hence their 'freedom' from this framework.

Under this revised way of looking at it, D may choose chocolate 99.99999999999999999999999999997 percent of the time, or some such. So it is not strictly true that D's action was absolutely fixed. But if F is still seen to choose chocolate 70% of the time, there is clearly a meaningful distinction to be made between F and D.

I think you're missing my point. If the mind is based in the material brain (and all the things it needs to survive), then free-will's existence depends upon whether the universe itself is deterministic or not. Since the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and chaos theory reveal the universe's nature as indeterminate, the mind is therefore indeterminate. (Only if, of course, you believe the mind is based in material as I do.)

In this way, F is an interaction between various wavefunctions describing a probability of 70% toward chocolate. (This is highly simplified of course. Past experience isn't necessarily what dictates the probability, but rather all the wavefunctions in the system.)

The point behind all of this is that quantum mechanics dictates that our next decision can't be predicted with 100% accuracey. This in turn leaves room for free will, although it doesn't logically imply its existence.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by CJames
I think you're missing my point. If the mind is based in the material brain (and all the things it needs to survive), then free-will's existence depends upon whether the universe itself is deterministic or not. Since the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and chaos theory reveal the universe's nature as indeterminate, the mind is therefore indeterminate. (Only if, of course, you believe the mind is based in material as I do.)

In this way, F is an interaction between various wavefunctions describing a probability of 70% toward chocolate. (This is highly simplified of course. Past experience isn't necessarily what dictates the probability, but rather all the wavefunctions in the system.)

The point behind all of this is that quantum mechanics dictates that our next decision can't be predicted with 100% accuracey. This in turn leaves room for free will, although it doesn't logically imply its existence.

Please indicate to me how what you have just said is not in agreement with what I said in the last post, or how exactly I'm missing your point. What you say here doesn't seem to be inconsistent with what I said.

 

[Royce]

hypnagogue, granted that this is beside the point of this thread and is really nothing more than nit picking; but, My point was that as observers with one observation or sample of one event, can only know that the odds of any one possibility occurring is the reciprocal of the number of possibilities. If there are only two choices or possibilities, and F has free will to choose either, there is nothing that we can determine as observers that indicates that F will choose one over the other at the next event.

F may choose chocolate 10 times in a row but the odds that he will choose vanilla next is still 50:50. To say that the odds that F will choose chocolate are 7:3 in one sample of one event is saying that F does not have free will and must keep track of how many times he has chosen chocolate and then choose the next time accordingly.

It is not that F ignores his propensity for chocolate or ignores any and all external and internal influences. It is as observers observing one isolated event have no way of knowing any or all of those influences and as observers can only say that he will choose one or the other.

If a coin is flipped 100 times and it comes up heads 99 time the odds of it coming up tails the 100th time is still 50:50. Casinoes make fortunes off of people who believe otherwise.

Anyway if F has free will to us as observers only it will appear random if we observe only one event. With a history or sample of many events we can say that F has a 70% preference for chocolate but still chooses vanilla 30% of the time. None of this has any bearing on the one next choise as far as we observers are concerned.

Anyway, I still believe that we have at least limited free will and that the universe is indeterminate. The uncertainty principle supports this. We are not robots of physics, chemistry nor psychology. All of these things and more may influence our choices but they don't compell our choices everytime.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Royce
From what I have read so far none of you have a very good understanding of probability or are not using it for the sake of this discussion.

Of course not, to speak of probability as even existing is a purely "free will" assumption. Throughout the rest of your post you explain probability very well, but such a thing is but an illusion in a prestined paradigm.

For example, if fate and predestination really existed (which they don't in the "Matrix" paradigm) then Neo never had a choice. He though he did, but he was predestined to think that.

Fortunately, the "predictions" of the "oracle" were explained in "Reloaded" as (basically) resultant wisdom from having seen the (almost) exact same occurances everytime the Matrix started over again.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by CJames
I think you're missing my point. If the mind is based in the material brain (and all the things it needs to survive), then free-will's existence depends upon whether the universe itself is deterministic or not. Since the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and chaos theory reveal the universe's nature as indeterminate, the mind is therefore indeterminate. (Only if, of course, you believe the mind is based in material as I do.)

In this way, F is an interaction between various wavefunctions describing a probability of 70% toward chocolate. (This is highly simplified of course. Past experience isn't necessarily what dictates the probability, but rather all the wavefunctions in the system.)

The point behind all of this is that quantum mechanics dictates that our next decision can't be predicted with 100% accuracey. This in turn leaves room for free will, although it doesn't logically imply its existence.

I don't think it really has as much to do with the mind as you indicate here, since we have to introduce an omnipotent being anyway (in order to sustain a "predestination" paradigm, that is).

You are right that Quantum Mechanics, as it is currently understood, doesn't allow for any kind of predestination (at least, not with 100% accuracy), but Quantum Mechanics (like free will itself) may be an illusion, put forth by the Omnipotent Being to trick us (not that such "tricking" would really be necessary, since He could make us believe whatever He wanted).

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Royce
F may choose chocolate 10 times in a row but the odds that he will choose vanilla next is still 50:50. To say that the odds that F will choose chocolate are 7:3 in one sample of one event is saying that F does not have free will and must keep track of how many times he has chosen chocolate and then choose the next time accordingly.

No, it's saying no such thing, since each event of F choosing one or the other occurs in a parallel universe, thus the events are independent of each other. If we are correct in saying that the odds of F choosing chocolate are 70%, then in any given sample of 10 observations we may see any kind of results, ranging from all 10 being chocolate to all 10 being vanilla. But if we take a whole bunch of samples of size 10, then we will inevitably see our average result converging on a ratio of 7:3.

It is not that F ignores his propensity for chocolate or ignores any and all external and internal influences. It is as observers observing one isolated event have no way of knowing any or all of those influences and as observers can only say that he will choose one or the other.

We don't have to know the influences to know the odds. Saying that there is a 70% chance that F chooses chocolate is equivalent to saying that if you compare all the infinite parallel universe incarnations of F to each other, 70% of those will choose chocolate and 30% will choose vanilla. The more samples we take, the more our sample data converges on this 'true' ratio; that is just a mathematically proven fact of statistics. With no information about F, we can't predict anything beyond 50/50 odds. But with a sufficiently large sample, we can say beyond all reasonable doubt that the chance that F chooses chocolate is actually (say) 70%, not 50%.

If a coin is flipped 100 times and it comes up heads 99 time the odds of it coming up tails the 100th time is still 50:50. Casinoes make fortunes off of people who believe otherwise.

That's right, assuming the coin is fair-- i.e., that there really is an even odds of getting heads or tails. But in fact, the probability of getting 99 straight heads on 99 flips of a fair coin is .5^99 = 1.58 x 10^-30, in other words 1 in one hundred billion billion billion. With odds that astronomically low, doesn't it begin to make you suspicious of your initial assumption that the coin is really not biased?

Anyway if F has free will to us as observers only it will appear random if we observe only one event. With a history or sample of many events we can say that F has a 70% preference for chocolate but still chooses vanilla 30% of the time. None of this has any bearing on the one next choise as far as we observers are concerned.

But it does-- if our sample is large enough, it very strongly indicates that there is really a 70% chance F will choose chocolate on the next observation, not a 50% chance. The strength of the indication is proportionate to the size of the sample, so we can make our conviction as to the true chances arbitrarily strong with arbitrarily many samples.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
But still, without emotions we wouldn't feel anything, let alone what it's like to be free. As for analytical thinking -- in and of itself -- I think it would be fair to say that it's essentially deterministic, so long as there are no feelings associated to give it "value." Here's your problem with science right there ...

Thus we have the option of going to two extremes, one where only logic rules in a totally deterministic sense, and the other where only feelings rule and we have total chaos. Or, perchance we might discover the third option, which is the "happy medium" in the middle, where we learn to live our lives freely and responsibly.

And I think compatiblism is that middle road.

 

[Zantra]

Originally posted by CJames
Eh, back to that whole quantum indeterminacey thing.

Alot of you seem to be arguing for determinism based on scientific principles, which is a big mistake. The argument that a role of dice could, theoretically, be predicted with 100% accuracey is false.

First you must understand that an electron, for example, is not a billiard ball. It is a statistical wave, a wavefunction, that describes the probabilities of its location, it's velocity, etc. From this an electon shell is much more complex, and the interaction between two electron shells surrounding two atoms becomes even more complex.

It is theoretically impossible to predict with 100% accuracy the motion of two atoms comming in contact. With that in mind, the complex interactions between billions of atoms in the throw of a die is a hail marry. It is impossible to predict the land of the dice. Only the probabilities of how the dice land is predictable. It can be predicted to an accuracey much higher than one in six, but it can not be 100%.

This inherent indeterminacey in nature leaves room for free will, though there is also the possibility of a "radom will" or a "probabilistic will." Of course, the differences between a free will and a random one may simply boil down to your point of view.

Ok then let me ask you this. Let's for arugments sake- challenge indeterminency. Most things are ordered at a higher level, and can be predicted. We can predict with chromosome makeup that if billy's mom and dad both have blue eyes, and all their ancestors had blue eyes, then billy will have blue eyes. Indeterminecy to me seems like more of a "we don't know so we're making it random" theory. It's true you would need massive amounts of computing power to calculate the interaction of billions of atoms. It could be likened to plotting the rotational pathways of a thousand solar system's planets simultaneously. I don't call that random. I call that beyond our current ability to do. There are patterns in everything. If we could determine the pathway of one single electron, just one, then we can follow them all. It's all a mattere of having the capability to do it.