Is Offshore Oil Drilling Truly Safe?

[rhody]

I just checked the CNN link in my https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=2741505&postcount=623". It has been updated for June 2nd, but scrolls
back to June 1st. It shows the slick approaching the western keys of Florida.

Rhody...

 

[TubbaBlubba]

What is their solution now? I heard (RELIABLE!) that they were going to redirect the oil instead of blocking it.

How high is the pressure of the oil? Wouldn't it be possible to stop it temporarily by crippling (i.e. compressing) the pipe? Or doesn't the material allow for that?

 

[Mech_Engineer]

Apparently the Atlantis is capable of releasing up to 200,000 barrels [8 million gallons] of oil per day. If we had a 40-day leak, as we have now, we are talking about a third of a billion gallons of crude. The numbers are mind-boggling.

Where is that number (200K barrels/day) coming from? From what I've read, no wells in the gulf are capable of producing more than 50K barrels per day (2.1M gallons/day). BP has given worst-case estimates of 60K barrels per day for the Deepwater Horizon site (probably based on the fact that no wells in the gulf have ever been able to produce more than that), but it's unlikely the well is leaking that fast due to obstructions.

Is the number you quoted of "200,000 barrels per day" actually a units error that should have been "200,000 gallons per day," or about 5,000 barrels per day?. BP's website has a news article about the Atlantis oil platform which says:

Since 1995, total daily deepwater Gulf of Mexico oil production has increased from 151,000 barrels of oil per day (about 2.3 per cent of US oil production) to 936,000 barrels per day (about 18 percent of US oil production.)

Considering there are about 3,900 rigs in the gulf, that's an average production of 240 barrels per day per rig.

BP botched the first major cut and got the saw stuck. They got it out, but now there is concern about getting a clean cut so as to maximize the effectiveness of the coupling.

When you say "botched" you're implying BP made a negligent error in the cutting operation. Did they make an error that could have been prevented, or was it new ground being covered due to the depth of the well?

 

[Mech_Engineer]

Why is new ground being covered AFTER the disaster?

Because there has never been a blowout at 5000 ft depth...

 

[Pattonias]

So, you don't run tests for a contingency, but you drill to that depth? That sounds profoundly stupid.

I'm sure they thought the measures they had take would prevent this disaster. Obviously they didn't have a contengency for every possible failure.

It would be somewhat unreasonable to ask all our world industries to have a plan for absolutely everything. There are an infinite number of things that can go wrong. Sometimes you just don't foresee everything.

 

[Mech_Engineer]

So, you don't run tests for a contingency, but you drill to that depth? That sounds profoundly stupid.

Neither of us is an expert in the subject of deepwater exploratory drilling (nor is anyone else on this forum AFAIK), so although we can comment on what we've read in the news it's impossible to comment on what kind of contingency was built-in or planned for by BP. You say BP is profoundly stupid for not planning for contingencies, but you have no real knowledge of what they planned for, or what trade-offs were discussed. Some inherent risk is assumed in exploratory drilling, the only way to prevent 100% of accidents is to not drill at all.

Suffice to say it was expected that the blowout preventer would work (it didn't, due to lacking maintinence and lax regulation enforcement from lazy inspectors) and now they're having to invent new methods of plugging such a leak. Manual attempts at closing the BOP failed (apparently seized due to large flow rates and loss of hydraulic power), the dome filled with crystallized methyl hydrates (unexpected result of pressure and temperature at depth), the top-kill didn't kill it (probably due to flow rate and pressure), and so now they're hoping to shear the pipe and attach a new extension to it. Each attempt they make advances our knowledge of capping a leak like this at extreme depth.

 

[Pattonias]

Given BP's safety record, and the complete failure of 5 or 6 attempts to fix this, I am no longer giving BP the benefit of the doubt. I can't say what they did or did not plan for, but now that we've seen their multiple failures I can say with confidence that they did not plan for THIS, or that their planning was naive or stupid.

I'm sorry, but if you built a LWR without the ability to kill the reaction, who would accept "we're learning as we go" as an excuse? This was not unimaginable, in fact from reading some links earlier in this thread it was expected by many other than BP. They had been having issues since March, and so so.

Just like NASA didn't plan for a piece of ice to knock shielding off the space shuttle in launch causing the shuttle to burn up on re-entry. Perhaps if you had been there you could have prevented that problem too.

That would seem fairly easy to predict wouldn't you think.

Hind-sight is always 20-20.

 

[Pattonias]

Don't confuse our pathetic lack of regulation, and BP'a miserable lack of preparedness for any failure at these depths with a genuinely unforeseen disaster.

Why not? Because you say not to?

Has anyone here argued that BP is blameless? Has BP tried to say that?

What does any of this have to do with whether or not off shore oil drilling is safe?

What we are saying is that due to a single unforseen (quadruple) failure an oil well is leaking into the Gulf. No one forsaw a total failure of the safety measures in place. The freaking rig is at the bottom of the Gulf. Eleven people are dead. This is a problem on a scale that most/all engineers endeaver to avoid and BP is to blame. The question in regards to off-shore drilling is whether or not we can drill without this kind of problem happening again. No one here is arguing that BP isn't responcible. We are arguing that this is a problem that wasn't easily avoidable as so many people seem to want to think. This is an unprecedented level of failure.

 

[mheslep]

Where is that number (200K barrels/day) coming from? From what I've read, no wells in the gulf are capable of producing more than 50K barrels per day (2.1M gallons/day). BP has given worst-case estimates of 60K barrels per day for the Deepwater Horizon site (probably based on the fact that no wells in the gulf have ever been able to produce more than that), but it's unlikely the well is leaking that fast due to obstructions.

Is the number you quoted of "200,000 barrels per day" actually a units error that should have been "200,000 gallons per day," or about 5,000 barrels per day? [...]

That number almost certainly refers to the output of a large multi-well platform. Some of these have up to 25 wells operational at a time. Thus from some kind worst case disaster occurring on the surface at the platform, and where all the fail safes on the individual wells also failed, all 25 wells could theoretically spill.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

We are arguing that this is a problem that wasn't easily avoidable as so many people seem to want to think. This is an unprecedented level of failure.

Nonsense! The accident itself may or may not have been avoidable. There may or may not be criminal liablity wrt that matter. What was avoidable was the lie that BP could handle a spill much larger than this one - they signed a contract stating that they had this ability. But now we find that they had no means to manage a runway well at this depth.

This was completely preventable. It is proof positive that industry cannot be trusted.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

Where is that number (200K barrels/day) coming from? From what I've read, no wells in the gulf are capable of producing more than 50K barrels per day (2.1M gallons/day). BP has given worst-case estimates of 60K barrels per day for the Deepwater Horizon site (probably based on the fact that no wells in the gulf have ever been able to produce more than that), but it's unlikely the well is leaking that fast due to obstructions.

In the video linked, Mike Sawyer, the whistle-blowing engineer from the Atlantis, states that a similar failure on the Atlantis would make the Deep Horizon look like a hiccup. The number of 200,000 barrels per day was stated in the original CNN report commentary. I will try to find additional references. As is usual, CNN is way ahead of everyone else on this story.

When you say "botched" you're implying BP made a negligent error in the cutting operation. Did they make an error that could have been prevented, or was it new ground being covered due to the depth of the well?

They screwed up the cut. I don't really care why. For once I get to judge someone else by the results. In the real world, excuses don't matter - a fact that I live with every day as an independent contractor and engineer.

 

[mheslep]

That doesn't take hindsight, as Canada already requires this. Don't confuse our pathetic lack of regulation, and BP'a miserable lack of preparedness for any failure at these depths with a genuinely unforeseen disaster.

I don't know that this demonstrates a lack of regulation. As I understand it, the current legal framework would have allowed existing regulators with their existing powers to require relief wells, but visibly the Interior Dept chose to avoid in overly cosy industry relations. MMS regulators certainly had the authority to reject the apparently reckless decisions made in the days leading up the accident, but approved them (or at least the framework for them) none the less. As I see this history of inept regulation, it doesn't make a sound argument for 'we need more regulation', which typically means more bureaucrats and larger budgets. Instead, I argue the US needs more informed regulation the Gulf, more drilling in shallow vs deep water, more reliance on insurance oversight, and more extensive enforcement of property rights on behalf of those who make their living from Gulf marine life and tourism.

 

[Pattonias]

This was completely preventable. It is proof positive that industry cannot be trusted.

Every industry or just those that could potentially cause harm to the environment?

What is the answer then? Should we ban industry all together?

Maybe if it was all publicly controlled it would avoid all these problems. Certaintly there is no error or lieing in publicly held offices.

 

[mheslep]

[...]It is proof positive that industry cannot be trusted.

As opposed to who?

 

[Ivan Seeking]

Every industry or just those that could potentially cause harm to the environment?

What is the answer then? Should we ban industry all together?

Maybe if it was all publicly controlled it would avoid all these problems. Certaintly there is no error or lieing in publicly held offices.

First and foremost, the victims of this spill, like you, should quit making excuses for a company that may have literally killed the entire gulf of Mexico. Next, never believe anything a large corporation tells us. If they have a reason to lie, they will lie. If they can cut corners, eventually they will. If it means putting our most treasured resources at risk for profit, they will do it. If it means possibly destroying the global economy, as we saw in the financial crisis, they will do it. We know this for a fact now.

Deep drilling itself is clearly not safe at this time. So the deep-drillling ban should continue at least until a method to handle a disaster like this one, is clearly demonstrated. Next, put the Republicans and their deregulation hysteria to bed, once and for all. It is more clear than ever that heavy regulation of this industry is required. Clearly, when BP signs a contract making promises, it means nothing. So, no more trust. If they say they have a way to manage this or that, then they have to demonstate that fact for the regulators. In short, severe regulation is needed. The Democrats have been right all along.

Obviously this applies to any company that has the capacity to inflict extreme damage on the public or publically held assets and treasures.

When enviromentalists tell us a danger exists, instead of putting on the blinders and calling them tree huggers, instead of turning up the nose and accusing them of fear-mongering, shut up and listen. Then take the appropriate action.

A relief well drilled in parallel with the original well, as is required in Norway and Canada, could have prevented this nightmare.

 

[turbo]

Some industries can be fairly well self-regulated. This one is not.

I spent years as a consultant to the pulp and paper industry, and many of my contracts were driven by the need for pulp mills to properly document the as-installed and as-modified configurations of their Kraft chemical recovery boilers, and evaluate the viabilities of their emergency procedures. The work needed to be done for safety reasons, and to protect the investments of the owners (a new chemical recovery boiler can easily cost more than $100M), but the driving force was compliance with BLRBAC (Black Liquor Recovery Boiler Advisory Board) guidelines. If a mill could not demonstrate compliance, they could lose their insurance and face crippling law-suits in the event of an accident. Black liquor recovery boilers are usually operating at very high pressure (~600-1200 psi) and the result of a tube leak spilling feedwater into the bed of molten smelt at the bottom of the boiler can easily result in a catastrophic explosion. BLRBAC is a powerful organization in the pulp and paper industry, and is staffed by scientists and engineers from boiler manufacturers, pulp mills, insurance companies, etc. They are a serious bunch and they understand the risks (and work to mitigate them) more effectively than a governmental agency could.

 

[russ_watters]

This was completely preventable. It is proof positive that industry cannot be trusted.

Indeed, you are correct on both counts. However, this is neither a new nor particularly profound concept. The entire purpose of huge classes of regulations, whether they be building codes or product safety regulations, are to guard against neglegence/carelessness by businesses.

So perhaps some people have had to relearn something here, but I would hope most people already knew this to be true: businesses need proper regulation.

First and foremost, the victims of this spill, like you, should quit making excuses for a company that may have literally killed the entire gulf of Mexico. [emphasis added]

And second, people need to stop with the nonsensical hyperbolic propaganda, not to mention putting words in other peoples' mouths that they didn't say.

 

[russ_watters]

Given BP's safety record, and the complete failure of 5 or 6 attempts to fix this, I am no longer giving BP the benefit of the doubt. I can't say what they did or did not plan for, but now that we've seen their multiple failures I can say with confidence that they did not plan for THIS, or that their planning was naive or stupid.

I'm not sure you read/comprehended what Mech_E said. He said yes, BP did not plan for dealing with this event. You're not disagreeing with him there.

What you don't seem to be understanding is that the contingencies that were planned for were all [apparently] to prevent a blowout, not to deal with one after it has happened. This makes some sense, since if a catastrophic blowout has already happened, you've already had a major disaster.

So then the questions are:

1. Is this approach reasonable?
2. Why didn't it work?

By now, most of the important facts of what led-up to the disaster are pretty well known. There were multiple failures at multiple levels by multiple companies, and if anyone of several failures hadn't happened, we wouldn't be in the mess we are in today. What that tells us in answer to the questions above:

1. Yes, the "prevent" instead of reacting after the fact approach is reasonable, but it requires that the "prevent" approach is being faithfully followed. This is where (2) regulation comes in.
2. It failed because employees of the companies involved cut corners and there was inadequate regulation (enforcement) in place to catch the corner-cutting.

I'm sorry, but if you built a LWR without the ability to kill the reaction, who would accept "we're learning as we go" as an excuse?

Invalid analogy, since what you are describing for a LWR is exactly the approach taken here. You want to prevent a meltdown, not deal with it after it has already happened, just like you want to prevent a blowout, not deal with it after it has already happened.

This was not unimaginable, in fact from reading some links earlier in this thread it was expected by many other than BP. They had been having issues since March, and so so.

Indeed, given all the failures, it was certainly imaginable that this would happen. But if you had a finite amount of money available to you as a government agency and could choose to do one of the following, which would you do?:

1. Inspect the BOP monthly and order the well shut-down if it wasn't in proper working order.
2. Inspect the disaster recovery contingency procedures and equipment (say, a large, clamp-on BOP) monthly and order the well shut down if it didn't look like they could quickly recover from a disaster.

Obviously, picking #2 means reacting to a disaster after it has happened and #1 means preventing the disaster from happening. I don't think there's any reasonable person who wouldn't rather prevent it than do a better job stopping it after it failed.

Deep drilling itself is clearly not safe at this time. So the deep-drillling ban should continue at least until a method to handle a disaster like this one, is clearly demonstrated.

Nonsense. With all we know about all the rediculous failures of BP and subscontractors that were required to make this disaster happen, one could not possibly reasonably believe deep water drilling is incapable of being made safe. If BP hadn't been cutting the corners and the drilling company hadn't kept trying to use a well with a known-to-be-faulty BOP, this never would have happened. To me, this is a clear indication that offshore drilling isn't unsafe when the proper safeties are implimented, but that the regulations and more importantly the enforcement needs to work better.

This was not a technological failure, it was a human failure. And as I've said before, this is par for the course for engineering failures:

-Challenger
-Columbia
-TMI
-Most coal mine accidents

These are not failures of technology or foolish pursuits of the impossible, these were human failures due mostly to greed that can be easily avoided with proper regulation. The Columbia and Challenger do get a caveat though, in that space travel is an inherrently dangerous and complex pursuit with a known track record and pretty accuratly predicted failure rate and the choice is made with eyes open. But while both cases include technical failures, the failures were for the most part forseen in advance and the proximate cause of both disasters was human, not unforseen technical failures. Ie, both almost certainly could have been prevented, had people made relatively straightforward different decisions.

Next, put the Republicans and their deregulation hysteria to bed, once and for all. It is more clear than ever that heavy regulation of this industry is required.

What regulation would you have put in place? They are already required to inspect their BOPs periodically. The problem (as in the recent coal mine disaster) isn't the regulations, but the enforcement of those regulations.

I may be different than many republicans in that I believe in reasonable regulation/enforcement. The problem I see is that we have too many useless laws and not enough enforcement of the necessary ones. The problem is that congress is great at passing laws, but not good at creating a mechanism for enforcement of those laws. So rather than deal with a problem by fixing the enforcement, they layer more unenforced laws on top of the ones we already have.

When enviromentalists tell us a danger exists, instead of putting on the blinders and calling them tree huggers, instead of turning up the nose and accusing them of fear-mongering, shut up and listen.

So-called "environmentalists" have contributed nothing of any value to this issue. Ignorant fear-mongering most definitely is the primary tool to achieve their misguided and destructive goals. They don't get a win for casting a wide net that once in a blue moon gets a hit. I've never heard an "environmentalist" talk about blowouts or blowout preventers (before this event). Vague fears are not an understanding and are not sound policy.

Taking it a step further: if another similar blowout happens tomorrow on a well built by a different company, it still doesn't change the issue at all: Oil is the lifeblood of the economy and having domestic sources is important. And while perfection is as unreasonable as it is impossible, the risks of offshore drilling are not particularly difficult to manage.

A relief well drilled in parallel with the original well, as is required in Norway and Canada, could have prevented this nightmare.

As would a functioning blow out preventer.

 

[rhody]

This was not a technological failure, it was a human failure. And as I've said before, this is par for the course for engineering failures:

-Challenger
-Columbia
-TMI
-Most coal mine accidents

These are not failures of technology or foolish pursuits of the impossible, these were human failures due mostly to greed that can be easily avoided with proper regulation. The Columbia and Challenger do get a caveat though, in that space travel is an inherrently dangerous and complex pursuit with a known track record and pretty accuratly predicted failure rate and the choice is made with eyes open. But while both cases include technical failures, the failures were for the most part forseen in advance and the proximate cause of both disasters was human, not unforseen technical failures. Ie, both almost certainly could have been prevented, had people made relatively straightforward different decisions.

I agree with Russ in regards to the oil rig disaster, on the Shuttle disaster, Colombia, in particular, managers ignored the advice of the engineers who gave them real potential for failure, example: managers estimated 1 in 100,000 launches with a failure, versus 1 in 100 by the engineers. The risk was even higher on that 38 F day, however, managers overrode engineers concerns over the cold temperatures for fear of losing funding/prestige, and they lost that bet. Human intervention in the O ring failure could have prevented it. Greed for profit was not a factor in either of the shuttle loses.

Rhody...

Edit: Thanks mheslep, fixed managements risk number, 100,000. It has been years since I have read Feynman's report on the disaster, my memory failed me, management was off by three orders of magnitude.

 

[Pattonias]

Well said Russ.

 

[russ_watters]

Thanks, guys.

I agree with Russ in regards to the oil rig disaster, on the Shuttle disaster, Colombia, in particular, managers ignored the advice of the engineers who gave them real potential for failure, example: managers estimated 1 in 1000 launches with a failure, versus 1 in 100 by the engineers. The risk was even higher on that 38 F day, however, managers overrode engineers concerns over the cold temperatures for fear of losing funding/prestige, and they lost that bet. Human intervention in the O ring failure could have prevented it. Greed for profit was not a factor in either of the shuttle loses.

Rhody...

That's the Challenger you're describing, but yes - most people are shocked the first time they hear that the engineers estimated the odds of failure at 100:1 before the program got off the ground. But that's what I mean about going in with eyes open: there is no shortage of astronauts signing up at those odds, even after seen the odds matched pretty closely by the track record.

 

[mheslep]

on the Shuttle disaster, Colombia, in particular, managers ignored the advice of the engineers who gave them real potential for failure, example: managers estimated 1 in 1000 launches with a failure, versus 1 in 100 by the engineers. .

NASA management estimated a failure rate of 1 in http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v2appf.htm" .

 

[jreelawg]

It isn't safe to let BP drill. They have something like 800+ of the worst kind of violations in the industry to something like 8 for the next highest offending oil company.

BP should be banned from drilling in the U.S. period, end of story.

 

[RonL]

I think everyone has overlooked the real reason this has all happened.

The gas boiled up for a mile through sea water and totaly engulfed the rig and generators at the surface.
A rig on land that experienced a blowout, would have gas and oil spew far upward and above all equipment, (most likely) this to me is a major example of people not being able to cover every possible situation.

Industry safety overall is good (IMHO).

Ron

 

[russ_watters]

I think everyone has overlooked the real reason this has all happened.

The gas boiled up for a mile through sea water and totaly engulfed the rig and generators at the surface.
A rig on land that experienced a blowout, would have gas and oil spew far upward and above all equipment, (most likely) this to me is a major example of people not being able to cover every possible situation.

Industry safety overall is good (IMHO).

Ron

I'm not following - that sort of thing did used to be very common on land as well and has been all but eliminated due to modern safety equipment/procedures. Now it is mostly seen in sabbotage (see: the Gulf War).

 

[Gokul43201]

It isn't safe to let BP drill. They have something like 800+ of the worst kind of violations in the industry to something like 8 for the next highest offending oil company.

This needs a citation!

 

[mheslep]

http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=NEWS_RELEASES&p_id=16674

Geigerclick - simply posting links doesn't necessarily help focus the question towards an appropriate answer. Perhaps you could [quote /quote] passages relative to the point at hand: comparisons between BP and other firms, and in particular the claim of fact the the ratio is 800:8. The first link, at least, provides no comparisons.

 

[jreelawg]

What I saw on CNN was 800 and something to 8, and exxon had 1, but online all I find is that BP has 780 of them, in the last 3 years.

Here we go.

"BP accounted for 829 of the 851 willful violations among all refiners cited by OSHA during the period analyzed by the Center."

http://www.enewspf.com/index.php/latest-news/analysis/16395-bp-cited-for-worst-osha-safety-violations-among-us-refiners

 

[mheslep]

What I saw on CNN was 800 and something to 8, and exxon had 1, but online all I find is that BP has 780 of them, in the last 3 years.

Here we go.

"BP accounted for 829 of the 851 willful violations among all refiners cited by OSHA during the period analyzed by the Center."

http://www.enewspf.com/index.php/latest-news/analysis/16395-bp-cited-for-worst-osha-safety-violations-among-us-refiners

That's a good starting point, but still a couple times removed from primary information, i.e. Enews PF says that some think tank says ..., who looked at someone else's information ...

 

[jreelawg]

Anyways, my point remains. What is safe for Exxon isn't necessarily safe for BP, and so how do you work this out? The laws have to apply equally to all right. So maybe there should be a three strikes rule of some kind and BP should just be ousted. I think all of their assets should be seized as U.S. property and auctioned off to other companies, profits should go to those affected, cleanup, and restoration.

 

[mheslep]

Anyways, my point remains. What is safe for Exxon isn't necessarily safe for BP, and so how do you work this out? The laws have to apply equally to all right. So maybe there should be a three strikes rule of some kind and BP should just be ousted. I think all of their assets should be seized as U.S. property and auctioned off to other companies, profits should go to those affected, cleanup, and restoration.

No, you want to brush by doing the homework and have your point remain. You may very well be right about BP's record and what we can deduce from that, but so far the background checking is a bit sloppy here. Suppose most of the 'Egregious Willful Violations' were charged against one serious refinery fire? Suppose in the category of 'Serious Citations' other refineries had ~1521 violations and BP had 30? Suppose that one or two managers in BP are at the root of BP's supposed bad safety record and leave tomorrow to go to work for Exxon?

[PLAIN]http://www.publicintegrity.org/assets/img/RefineriesChart2.png

 

[jreelawg]

Interesting. Thanks for finding that. You should note though, that other refineries are many, so BP's 30 serious violations may or may not be significant compared to other companies individually.

 

[stewartcs]

Neither of us is an expert in the subject of deepwater exploratory drilling (nor is anyone else on this forum AFAIK),...

Actually, I am.

CS

 

[stewartcs]

In the video linked, Mike Sawyer, the whistle-blowing engineer from the Atlantis, states that a similar failure on the Atlantis would make the Deep Horizon look like a hiccup. The number of 200,000 barrels per day was stated in the original CNN report commentary. I will try to find additional references. As is usual, CNN is way ahead of everyone else on this story.



They screwed up the cut. I don't really care why. For once I get to judge someone else by the results. In the real world, excuses don't matter - a fact that I live with every day as an independent contractor and engineer.

Ivan, the Atlantis isn't an exploratory drilling vessel. It is a production platform that has the capability to produce, from multiple wells, up to 200,000 BPD.

CS

 

[stewartcs]

Deep drilling itself is clearly not safe at this time. So the deep-drillling ban should continue at least until a method to handle a disaster like this one...

Well that's just not true. One incident by one company doesn't mean the entire industry is unsafe.

CS