Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

[TCups]

ACTUAL PICTURE OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL OF BLDG 3 (AT LAST!)

Thank you Anton.

Oops -- Major correction -- this video is not from Fukushima Diiachi (1970's vintage) plant. So, the photo from inside is not the current photo of Fukushima Diiachi Bldg 4. My mistake.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E1P6Q1e6gCg&feature=related

Gives you an idea of the dimensions

Here is my annotated versions of the screen shot of the inside of Building 3 and the spent fuel pool, which appears to be viewed from the east side, looking west. Neither the fuel handling machine nor the overhead crane are visible, but you can clearly see the open shaft in the northwest corner, and, for the first time, what appears to be an accessory pool within the southwest corner of the larger spent fuel pool.

If it is a cask pool, then the function might be as follows (yes, I am guessing):

1) the gate to the cask pool is closed, water is pumped out.
2) an empty, dry cask is lowered into this smaller pool and readied for loading.
3) water is pumped back in and the gate is opened.
4) fuel rods are transferred from the SFP to the cask pool, by the FHM, through the open gate.
5) the cask is capped
6) the gate is closed, water is pumped out, and the FHM moves back out of the way
7) the overhead crane takes the cask of spent fuel up, out, over and down the shaft, and out the tunnel to a waiting truck, to be trucked as quickly as possible to the larger spent fuel facility, #7
8) the process is reversed and the cask is unloaded in the large SFP7

Any first hand knowledge of these operations, anyone?

http://i306.photobucket.com/albums/nn270/tcups/Picture38.png

 

[hoyrylollaaja]

ACTUAL PICTURE OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL OF BLDG 3 (AT LAST!)

Thank you Anton.



Here is my annotated versions of the screen shot of the inside of Building 3 and the spent fuel pool, which appears to be viewed from the east side, looking west. Neither the fuel handling machine nor the overhead crane are visible, but you can clearly see the open shaft in the northwest corner, and, for the first time, what appears to be an accessory pool within the southwest corner of the larger spent fuel pool.

If it is a cask pool, then the function might be as follows (yes, I am guessing):

1) the gate to the cask pool is closed, water is pumped out.
2) an empty, dry cask is lowered into this smaller pool and readied for loading.
3) water is pumped back in and the gate is opened.
4) fuel rods are transferred from the SFP to the cask pool, by the FHM, through the open gate.
5) the cask is capped
6) the gate is closed, water is pumped out, and the FHM moves back out of the way
7) the overhead crane takes the cask of spent fuel up, out, over and down the shaft, and out the tunnel to a waiting truck, to be trucked as quickly as possible to the larger spent fuel facility, #7
8) the process is reversed and the cask is unloaded in the large SFP7

Any first hand knowledge of these operations, anyone?

http://i306.photobucket.com/albums/nn270/tcups/Picture38.png

How can you call it actual photo, if its filmed at completely different NPP?

 

[|Fred]

ah... I believed It was from the start I 've been trying to figure what else you thought id was
I'm not a ballistic & explosive expert but , I'm not convinced by your hypothesis
it does not fit imo the damage to any wall
[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/ikIW22.jpg

 

[liamdavis]

This picture worries me:
http://english.kyodonews.jp/photos/2011/04/82781.html

If the military takes these precautions - why do we still see workers on the ground in lot less protection?

I will take a stab at this. The personal pictured are operating the tug bringing a fresh water barge to the plant. They are approaching a known radiological contaminated area where winds may change the structural integrity of the plant may deteriorate or an aftershock (now >800) mat change the situation markedly in a short period with no notice. They must stay to task even in such an event since their vessel also presents a hazard to those present if not kept in control. Even if they are free of the barge at the time of a seismic event that shook loose radioactive material into the wind they are still out in the open (comparatively) and their best speed may be that of a herd of turtles.
liam

 

[|Fred]

ps: Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant is and ABWR its layout is likely to be rather even more different than the Unit 6 of Fukushima is from the rest

 

[TCups]

ah... I believed It was from the start I 've been trying to figure what else you thought id was
I'm not a ballistic & explosive expert but , I'm not convinced by your hypothesis
it does not fit imo the damage to any wall
[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/ikIW22.jpg[/QUOTE]

Hmm - I have to agree, I guess. Back to the drawing board. . .

Where do you put the epicenter of the blast?

 

[liamdavis]

That has been suggested. Even so, to transmit the blast force downward with sufficient force to blow almost all of the walls one level below the top of the SFP4, and several wall panels two levels below, and yet leave most of the superstructure of the roof girders intact, and even have the north wall of the top floor collapse inward speaks to me of a very different kind of explosion, doors opened or closed. A lot of the damage is isolated around the northeast corner of Bldg 4.

I can maybe get to that kind of damage if hot fuel drops through the bottom of one or the other pools in the top floors and causes and additional lower level blast that spreads outward around the reinforced inner walls of the primary containment. But I just can't wrap my arms around the open door theory.

I mentioned in an earlier post that there may have been oxy/acetylene torches present due to the maintenance occurring in Bldg 4. I do not know the specific gravity of acetylene (would it settle to the floor) nor the velocity of its burn rate. I do know that a correct oxy/acetylene mix in a couple of small paper cups glued together make a dandy crack! It is very similar to hydrogen, (Re; misspent youth). There may also be many other flammable materials present that would never be allowed except during maintenance. I remember that acetylene is unstable at pressures above (8-14 psi) a very low pressure and will detonate if sealed in say a milk bottle and concussed with a .22 bullet.

All of the hazardous materials may have been overlooked in the midst of a 5 minute long quake as well as sources of ignition.
liam

 

[Gilles]

I mentioned in an earlier post that there may have been oxy/acetylene torches present due to the maintenance occurring in Bldg 4. I do not know the specific gravity of acetylene (would it settle to the floor)

C2H2 = 26 , very close to the average molar mass of the air (29), no reason to separate.

 

[shogun338]

Pics of Unit # 4 .

 

[shogun338]

Pic of Unit 4 spent fuel pool and reactor .

 

[shogun338]

Pics of unit 4 .

 

[razzz]

Sorry for the double post - but this time with better pictures of >1Sv leak
Water has found its way by cable ducts from the reactor building to the sea
There seems to quite a head for the water to be ejected that forcefully and also note the steam rising - so it is pretty hot

(In my opinion this looks like a drain hole for cable drawing pit and not a crack)

[URL]http://www.asahi.com/photonews/gallery/fukushimagenpatsu2/images/0402_plant2.jpg[/URL]

[URL]http://www.asahi.com/photonews/gallery/fukushimagenpatsu2/images/0402_plant1.jpg[/URL]

[URL]http://www.asahi.com/photonews/gallery/fukushimagenpatsu2/images/0402_cement.jpg[/URL]

But the leak continues and access blocked by a couple of tons of concrete


[URL]http://www.asahi.com/photonews/gallery/infographics3/images/0403_pit2.jpg

[/URL]

Nice grab on the pics AntonL. As far as the 'stop the leak' operation goes, just backed up the concrete truck and dumped the 'mud' into the access manhole as best they could. Didn't even use a concrete vibrator, probably the contaminated discharge was/is to 'hot' no one wanted to get splashed. Concrete truck driver never gets out of his truck, pours the mud while looking at his rear view mirrors, gets done and says, "C-ya." Laborer #1, "Boss says to vibrate the concrete." Laborer #2, "Fuk-u, you go over there and vibrate it."
If the hole in the wall or crack was right there and accessible, just slide a sheet of plywood or steel plate down along the wall and see if the flow is affected or not.

The way unit 4 is leaning probably incurred more damage from the unit 3 blast as that was just a tremendous explosion(s). If unit 4 pool(s) are running low on water and hydrogen is being produced, does the volatile air mixture ignite spontaneously (like temperature reaction) or is a 'spark' ignition necessary? If the mixture needs a spark, then hydrogen could fully accumulate on all floor levels before finally igniting. I would have been throwing lit matches in there every 5 minutes to burn off little by little.

Typical to level the ground then place steel plates and pads for outriggers (stabilizing arms) to sit on with cranes, boom trucks, concrete pumpers, etc.

 

[shogun338]

Unit 4 pics .

 

[AntonL]

Nice grab on the pics AntonL. As far as the 'stop the leak' operation goes, just backed up the concrete truck and dumped the 'mud' into the access manhole as best they could. Didn't even use a concrete vibrator, probably the contaminated discharge was/is to 'hot' no one wanted to get splashed. Concrete truck driver never gets out of his truck, pours the mud while looking at his rear view mirrors, gets done and says, "C-ya." Laborer #1, "Boss says to vibrate the concrete." Laborer #2, "Fuk-u, you go over there and vibrate it."

you should take up writing movie scriptsBut tell me what sort of cabling jointing/dressing work is this? Normally cables are laid in cable trays and rise on cable ladders to which they are securely tied. Here we have a bunch of cables laid as I would expect in the wildest third world countries but not as part of the plant of a nuclear power station.
[URL]http://www.asahi.com/photonews/gallery/fukushimagenpatsu2/images/0402_plant1.jpg[/URL]

 

[georgiworld]

I came across a pretty good explanation of the Fukushima disaster by Murrray E. Miles.

http://atomicinsights.com/2011/04/fukushima-nuclear-accident-exceptional-summary-by-murray-e-miles.html

Would the members at Physics Forum please comment.

"UNIT 4 FUEL POOL

Fukushima Daiichi has one fuel pool for each reactor and a seventh common pool that has not been in trouble. They also have some older fuel stored in dry casks perhaps a quarter of a mile away from the plants. The unit 4 fuel pool is nearly full with around 200 tons of fuel in a water tank with a capacity of around 400,000 gallons.

You need to hear one more complication in the design. The fuel pool is really two pools separated by a gate. Fuel removed from the reactor goes first into the small, upper pool which is only 20 or 25 feet deep. Later they move the fuel to the big, deep pool. There was apparently only a little fuel in this upper pool at the time of the quake.

This UPPER pool broke. The three-eighths inch steel liner is cracked and will not hold water. The concrete wall in front of this upper pool fell off. Fuel was severely damaged probably by explosion. Temperature profiles measured by helicopters show clumps of hot stuff that must be fuel scattered around the floor area. This scenario is consistent with the numerous reports of fire in unit 4.

This is a real nightmare. But the main fuel pool in unit 4 appears intact and full of water. The spread of radioactivity came fortunately from a small amount of fuel."

 

[|Fred]

Michael 200 (If i recall right) made a long and full post explaining that Murray E. Miles was likely mistaken as the GE BWR used at fukushima do not have this uper pool .
(that was about 5 or 6 pages ago )

 

[|Fred]

Pic of Unit 4 spent fuel pool and reactor .

where did you get this picture ?

# 4 reactor spent fuel pool Feb 1 2005.jpg

edit: got it
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/archive/news/2011/03/16/20110316p2g00m0dm034000c.html

edit2: did they repaint the top crane in green ?

 

[razzz]

you should take up writing movie scripts


But tell me what sort of cabling jointing/dressing work is this? Normally cables are laid in cable trays and rise on cable ladders to which they are securely tied. Here we have a bunch of cables laid as I would expect in the wildest third world countries but not as part of the plant of a nuclear power station.
[URL]http://www.asahi.com/photonews/gallery/fukushimagenpatsu2/images/0402_plant1.jpg

[/URL]

I have no idea, a news article referred to it as storage. Looks like it was fabricated as a minor structure. In nuke plant construction I thought everything was major structure. Obviously this is downstream of contaminated liquids/atmosphere besides being a pathway, guess the architect figured no way in a million years a minor structure failing would...
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d7b6070-5d40-11e0-a008-00144feab49a.html#axzz1ITaAaMyW"

Just released now, that observation from overflights found hot spots in unit 4. So assemblies in transit in various locations around the interior or let loose somehow from pools and equipment was not a stretch of the imagination. Those grayed looking slag like areas are looking rather ominous now. Wonder what other observation reports are on hold?

 

[jensjakob]

TEPCO recruiting "jumpers" to go into highly radiated areas:
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/04/01/uk-japan-quake-jumpers-idUKTRE7302OH20110401

This is turning nasty...

 

[|Fred]

Where do you put the epicenter of the blast?

Good question.. The answer is beyond my faculty of analysis..

The roof of unit 1 is gone, the structural wall are intact the two crates as well.
It is my idea that The unit 3 and 4 used a reinforced design for the structural wall.
Still unit 4 roof is almost immaculate, damage is mostly collateral due to structural wall giving out on both South and Nord End.


Pure speculation based on hunch :
Unit 4 has a lot of damage in the floor bellow operating floor, I think that what happened was H gaz filling the operating floor just like in all other unit.. when the explosion occurred the Blast was propagated to the whole building thank to the water in the utility pool and the core filled with water.
In other word it would mean that some of the lower level structure (especially around the utility pool) had a weaker walls that the ceiling up to a point..

Then again it's based on no physical calculation what so ever, and It's probably a non sens ..

 

[razzz]

where did you get this picture ?

# 4 reactor spent fuel pool Feb 1 2005.jpg

edit: got it
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/archive/news/2011/03/16/20110316p2g00m0dm034000c.html

edit2: did they repaint the top crane in green ?

[PLAIN]http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/archive/news/2011/03/16/images/20110316p2a00m0na007000p_size5.jpg
The caption reads as follows:

The pool for spent fuel at the No. 4 reactor of TEPCO's Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant is pictured in this Feb. 1, 2005, file photo. (Mainichi )

 

[Godzilla1985]

Where are the IR images for building #4? Links?

 

[Lurking]

Would any of you knowledgeable people like to comment on the latest by Gunderson.
If someone already posted this today and I missed it..I do apologize.

Newly released TEPCO data provides evidence of periodic chain reaction at Fukushima Unit 1
http://vimeo.com/21881702

 

[Astronuc]

Would any of you knowledgeable people like to comment on the latest by Gunderson.
If someone already posted this today and I missed it..I do apologize.

Newly released TEPCO data provides evidence of periodic chain reaction at Fukushima Unit 1
http://vimeo.com/21881702

Gunderson has little or no credibility. I'm not sure how he gets information or how or what he analyzes.

If the core was having neutron bursts - they should not be of the magnitude of the steady-state neutron flux, since they are starting off at essentially zero power - neutron-wise. There are sources of neutrons present from the spontaneous fission of transuranics like Pu240 and Pu 242 in the higher burnup fuel. If there is water to promote criticality, then that was slows the neutrons. I don't see how there can be neutron beams emanating out to 1 mile or 1.5 km.

As for more iodine, that could mean some fuel which hasn't failed (breached) has since failed/ruptured. The exact state of the fuel is simply unknown.

The decay heat has been steadily reducing, but the temperature will fluctuate depending on the 'heat transfer'. If there is steam, the heat transfer from the fuel is poor, so the temperature will rise. If the steam is replaced by water, the heat transfer is much better, and the temperature drops, and the water is heated and may change phase (boil) from liquid to steam. Temperatures will fluctuate depending on water level and the rate at which cool water is introduced and heated or boiled. As far as I know, the cooling has not been continuous and steady.

I know there is a concern about criticality in the SFP and core. I would expect that TEPCO personnel have added borated water to core and SFP precisely to prevent recriticality.

If the core or SFP went dry, criticality would be less likely because there would be no water to moderate neutrons. If fresh water were introduced, criticality would be a concern, particularly if the fresh water were not borated, AND the control rods in the core had lost the boron, and the SFP racks had lost their inventory of boron.

Both the core and SFP were apparently flooded with seawater. Seawater is rather corrosive on stainless steel (SS304) which is typically used for control rods, in-core structures, and probably SFP racks. If the boron content of control rods or SFP racks was diminished, and fresh water introduced to the core or SFP, the criticality would certainly be a concern. Hopefully the plant personnel are taking appropriate precautions to prevent re-criticality.

FYI - http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/196.html

 

[Bodge]

Is it possible that the control rods have been partly washed away by the hot seawater and boric acid?

 

[PietKuip]

Gunderson has little or no credibility. I'm not sure how he gets information or how or what he analyzes.

What are your own credentials?

As for more iodine, that could mean some fuel which hasn't failed (breached) has since failed/ruptured. The exact state of the fuel is simply unknown.

Your hypothetical recent ruptures would also be worrying.

But Gunderson's point is based on the iodine/cesium ratio. The iodine in the fuel rods is supposed to have decayed for almost three halflives now, a factor 8. And new ruptures would also release cesium. The ratio would probably be influenced by temperature, but I have no idea by how much. Do you?

 

[TedNugget]

Street Cred:

"academic background - nuclear/astrophysics, then nuclear engineering, materials science and engineering, some electrical and aerospace engineering.
Country
PF Engineering Dept.
Interests
Science, technology, environmental preservation & sustainable development, gardening, transportation, world and ancient history
Educational Background
Graduate/Masters
Degree in
Nuclear Engineering
Profession
Nuclear Engineer"

For Astronuc from his profile..

 

[turbo]

What are your own credentials?

I wouldn't spend too much time worrying about Astro's credentials. He is a professional in the industry. You might spend a bit more effort researching the fear-mongers, though. Fairewinds is not an unbiased source, comprised of a rabble-rouser and his wife.

 

[razzz]

Not finding much on IR imaging or at least current IR imaging.

"[URL March 21, 2011
Infrared (IR) Thermal Heat Map Images of Fukushima Daiichi [/URL]

http://cryptome.org/eyeball/daiichi-npp2/daiichi-photos2.htm"

 

[Taxidermista]

Just released now, that observation from overflights found hot spots in unit 4. So assemblies in transit in various locations around the interior or let loose somehow from pools and equipment was not a stretch of the imagination. Those grayed looking slag like areas are looking rather ominous now. Wonder what other observation reports are on hold?

Sources, please?

 

[PietKuip]

I wouldn't spend too much time worrying about Astro's credentials. He is a professional in the industry. You might spend a bit more effort researching the fear-mongers, though. Fairewinds is not an unbiased source, comprised of a rabble-rouser and his wife.

How do we know that Astronuc is a professional if he does not want to give his (her?) name? It is easy enough to research Gundersen. I want to know who Astronuc thinks he is when he says that Gundersen (a retired professional) lacks credibility.

 

[turbo]

How do we know that Astronuc is a professional if he does not want to give his (her?) name? It is easy enough to research Gundersen. I want to know who Astronuc thinks he is when he says that Gundersen (a retired professional) lacks credibility.

Please drop this or reconsider and do some research on Gundersen. This is a guy who claims that an accident at Vermont Yankee could make almost all of New England uninhabitable.

 

[Godzilla1985]

Gundersen has an axe to grind (although it might be a legitimate one at that).

Astronuc, any significance on higher cadmium 106 levels found in the US? All other isotopes of cadmium unchanged, but 106 was measured higher...

 

[trinon]

How do we know that Astronuc is a professional if he does not want to give his (her?) name? It is easy enough to research Gundersen. I want to know who Astronuc thinks he is when he says that Gundersen (a retired professional) lacks credibility.

From Gundersons CV:
Bachelor's and Master's Degrees in nuclear engineering
licensed reactor operator
Chair of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant Oversight Panel
invited author on the DOE Decommissioning Handbook
part-time math professor at Community College of Vermont

His view is biased for sure, but what do we know about Astronuc's agenda?

 

[bytepirate]

has anyone tried to derive any information from this data?:

http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110404-1-4.pdf

there are many things that does not make sense to me (but i am far from being an expert):
for example: 'Reactor water level' remains unchanged since days. water is being pumped in at a rate of 116 l/min and above. reactor 2 and 3 seem to be 'open', but #1 still has pressure: where is the water (expected to be) going to (at the same rate it is being pumped in)?

'0.290MPa g(A)
0.531MPa g(B)'

is there an explanation why these two values are that much apart?

i have not followed the whole thread. if i missed something, please just point me in the right direction.