When will the world reach peak fossil fuel production?

[ThomasT]

So we are still on track for economic adjustments like we are seeing in Greece right now.

Do you really think so? I don't see the US as having Greece-type economic problems ... ever.

 

[apeiron]

Do you really think so? I don't see the US as having Greece-type economic problems ... ever.

I was thinking of the world, or that part of the world which is used to having expectations of wealth.

 

[mheslep]

Since the 1980's the US had drilled about 220,000 gas wells so the 150,000 number equates to about 25 years of drilling (certainly not an overnight fix). Also with gas prices where they are now, it would take a lot of incentive and recovery for anyone to keep pace with historical rates of drilling (especially when drilling techniques are far more expensive).

Recent drilling rates are much higher as that EIA data shows: 20.5 thousand gas wells per year 2007-9. Yes these frac wells are much more expensive, but the US industry as a whole is also drilling 3X fewer feet of dry hole than they were back in (say) the 1960s, and that's against today's higher drilling rate.

By 100 bbl/day are you talking "barrel of oil equivalent" (BOE)? ...

I was referring to actual oil, and was estimating how many shale oil wells would be required for domestic production to meet consumption. The N. Dakota (Bakken) per well average is 86 bpd.

Thanks for the well sourced replies. More later ...

 

[ThomasT]

No, in fact, those unconventional sources are a sign of peak oil. But understand, peak oil is more of a misnomer for cheap oil.

I don't understand. These are, afaik, vast oil resources. Peak oil is about exploitable resources, isn't it?

 

[MarcoD]

The problem is exponential growth with limited resources. If it is exponential, then there is a doubling time, which implies a time where you will use exactly the same amount of resources as throughout the whole of history, as well as consume the last resources during that period.

 

[mheslep]

No, not falling. Recovering perhaps, but definitely not falling.

Yes, and falling. Product supplied as of last week was down to 18.054 mbpd (4 week average), or 1.2 mbpd less than the same time last year. The last time US petroleum consumption was below the current level was March of 1997
http://205.254.135.24/dnav/pet/hist_chart/WRPUPUS24.jpg
http://205.254.135.24/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=wrpupus2&f=4

 

[ThomasT]

The problem is exponential growth with limited resources.

But there's not exponential growth wrt consumption of fossil fuels, is there? Yes, consumption is increasing. But so can production. At least, as far as I can tell, for the next century ... and maybe a lot longer.

 

[SixNein]

I don't understand. These are, afaik, vast oil resources. Peak oil is about exploitable resources, isn't it?

The textbook definition is the peak production of oil.

And there is reason to believe we might have peaked out on production. For example, oil prices have been rapidly increasing over the last decade while production has been hanging out on a plateau. Economics would suggest a constrained supply.

And the military says this:

By 2012, surplus oil production capacity could entirely disappear, and as early as 2015, the shortfall in output could reach nearly 10 million barrels per day
..
..
..
While it is difficult to predict precisely what economic, political, and strategic effects such a shortfall might produce, it surely would reduce the prospects for growth in both the developing and developed worlds. Such an economic slowdown would exacerbate other unresolved tensions, push fragile and failing states further down the path toward collapse, and perhaps have serious economic impact on both China and India."

http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/JOE_2010_o.pdf

Make no mistake... the problem is quite serious.

 

[CaptFirePanda]

Recent drilling rates are much higher as that EIA data shows: 20.5 thousand gas wells per year 2007-9. Yes these frac wells are much more expensive, but the US industry as a whole is also drilling 3X fewer feet of dry hole than they were back in (say) the 1960s, and that's against today's higher drilling rate.

Those numbers are for dry (eg. non-productive) exploratory and developmental wells (both oil and gas). Looking at the producing numbers, the footage is fairly substantial. It is good to know we are drilling less for dry holes based on technological advantages, but there is certainly a need to drill a lot of footage (and, in some cases, well over historical numbers)

I was referring to actual oil, and was estimating how many shale oil wells would be required for domestic production to meet consumption. The N. Dakota (Bakken) per well average is 86 bpd.

Thanks for the well sourced replies. More later ...

You're welcome. I didn't notice the jump to oil.

Anyway, there are currently around 500 (I'm picking a high number here) wells drilled per year in the Bakken (overall, there are ~5,000-7,000 oil wells drilled per year in the US, but I cannot break out the shale oil wells at this point. I suggest that they represent a small portion of this number). Hitting that 150,000 mark would be a pretty significant.

I would also caution against the average production rate. One, you are including historical data for oil not necessarily produced from shales (the Bakken isn't all shale). Also, this doesn't show the natural and rapid decline in production of these wells. Wells peter out quickly and are replaced by new wells in a short time frame (likely 1-2 years).

I'll comment further on the the consumption in the US (I need sleep!). Suffice it to say, the recession isn't over and recovery will not be a smooth line. The long term trend is still upwards and, unless some form of technology that I haven't heard of has offset consumption since ~2008, the trend will continue upwards.

 

[mheslep]

That's all well and good, but since the 1980's the gap between US production and consumption has widened significantly.

Since 2005 the gap has closed significantly as those graphs show, and are continuing to close. US oil imports have dropped ~25% since the peak back then.

The over-riding reason behind those recent drops in consumption/import numbers is the extremely significant recession that we experienced in 2008.

That conclusion is not justified, especially given the recession was Fall 2008 and imports have has been falling since 2005. Yes economic slow downs deserve some of the blame for energy imports and consumption, but other factors apply apply including improvements in economic energy intensity and increase in domestic supply:
1. US energy intensity (energy per unit of economic output) has been cut in half since 1980,and improved 10% the period 2007 to 2010.
2. US domestic crude production has been rising since ~2007 (up 1 mbbl/day), as have natural gas liquids (up ~500kbbl/day)
3. Ethanol production has doubled in the last couple years (see graph from earlier post), now 1 mbbl/day.
Those three things contribute strongly to the reduction in imports and consumption.

I could substitute any sort of energy source in there but it doesn't make your point any more valid. All I have to do is expand the picture to global consumption because, as we know, the US is not the only consumer of hydrocarbons in the world and there are at least 2 developing countires that will more than pick up any slack US citizens are willing to give.

A fair point. Note though that energy prices have a way to go before they are constant around the world, and exports to the highest bidder immediate. Natural gas for instance is priced overseas at several multiples of the of the US price (for now). Bakken oil sells at a $30/bbl discount locally (for now). I doubt a squeeze in supply meeting demand becomes serious enough to stop a build out in more energy infrastructure.

(I like this one at 500 bbls/acre-year). I don't know what may or may not work, but once an approach is proven I have little doubt of industrial ability to scale up rapidly - as shown by corn ethanol.

As I've mentioned, land-use issues will inevitably arise with respect to any of these sorts of technologies. Whether they are taking up arable land or otherwise, there will be significant limitations on how large they can grow.

The depends on the efficiency of the biofuel method and the consumption at the time. That 500 bbl/acre-year engineered bacteria approach (should it work) requires 13 million acres to meet all of US current consumption (18 mbbl/day). That compares well to the 90 million acres in use currently for all US corn crops, not that such an approach needs arable land.

 

[ThomasT]

The textbook definition is the peak production of oil.

And there is reason to believe we might have peaked out on production. For example, oil prices have been rapidly increasing over the last decade while production has been hanging out on a plateau. Economics would suggest a constrained supply.

And the military says this:


http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/JOE_2010_o.pdf

Make no mistake... the problem is quite serious.

From the graph, it doesn't seem to me that the price of oil has anything to do with supply and demand. Maybe you can explain it to me.

So, what, exactly, is the problem? As far as I can tell there's no current shortage of oil. And prices rise and drop more or less arbitrarily.

 

[SixNein]

From the graph, it doesn't seem to me that the price of oil has anything to do with supply and demand. Maybe you can explain it to me.

So, what, exactly, is the problem? As far as I can tell there's no current shortage of oil. And prices rise and drop more or less arbitrarily.

There are many different types of oil fields. For the most part, we have been getting most of our oil from conventional oil wells. These are very easy to extract oil from, and they have the highest EORI. The production on this type of field has peaked and is entering decline. Part of the problem is replacing the lost production with other sources be it shale, ethanol, or tar sands. These are more intensive to produce and have lower EORI. In a basic nutshell, the industry will need to flat our run in order to stand still.

The other part of the problem is dealing with global demand:

The number of registered cars, buses, vans, and trucks on the road in China reached 62 million in 2009, and is expected to exceed 200 million by 2020, though by 2050 it will be surpassed by neighbouring India and be pushed to second place in total automobiles.[

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automotive_industry_in_the_People's_Republic_of_China

There is also the issue of growing internal demand in exporting nations.
In a basic nutshell, the ultimate problem is gas prices are going climb.

 

[SixNein]

In a basic nutshell, the ultimate problem is gas prices are going climb.

The ultimate question is how deep are we in the muck? We won't know until we find out how fast we can get these unconventional sources up and running and at what levels of production.

I seriously doubt we can match convention production with unconventional sources. EORI on these sources really seems to indicate that they are not going to keep up.

 

[SixNein]

I was in the middle of a detailed response message when the power went out and I lost my work. Ironic that it happened while I was posting about energy developments! Anyway, the main issue, imo, is that people can't expect that current consumption patterns are going to magically cause solar power, fossil fuel supply, or any other aspect of energy resourcing to behave in ways they expect it to. People act as if the energy sources have to meet their cultural expectations instead of the other way around. If solar doesn't work it night, it may be that people are going to have to adapt their cultural patterns to go without electricity at night. It may not be necessary to do this right away or all at once, but it makes more sense to me that if you estimate that eventually it will be inevitable that you would rather transition slowly than wait for the sh*t to hit the fan, so to speak.

Very good point and likely imo. There is simply no way we can meet demand for everyone in the world to consume energy like Americans.

Currently, I believe the political-mechanical issue is whether free-markets are suited to adapt to energy production and consumption needs for the future. Presumable with valid knowledge about the future they would be, but the problem is that market interests themselves exert influence on future-knowledge in a way that suits short-term profit-motives and consumer-habits. In short, consumers are willing to pay to be told what they want to believe, even if that means making the disaster worse in the long run. Many people simply don't believe there's any disaster even coming - that it is just a trick on the part of people who want to generate cultural change.

The biggest question is whether government should allow solar developments to get priced out of the market, or whether some combination of subsidies and business-model intervention could push the solar-energy industry in the direction of making technologies more accessible, affordable, and therefore widespread. Of course, if existing energy-interests decide that growth of solar is going to interfere with their ability to maintain infrastructure with a narrower customer base, they will probably focus on preventing solar from gaining market share, just because they need the money to continue funding their operations, which they have a stake in maintaining.

Great post

 

[SixNein]

it is relatively common knowledge that world reserves today are larger than they were in the past.
.
.
.
The only standard is the prescisely defined proved reserves, which are subject to regulation and verification.

Correction... there is regulation and verification in the US.

The same is not true of the international community. OPEC countries are unaudited and report whatever they damn well please. In fact, they have motivation to over-report their reserves.

Outside of looking at their fudged numbers, for example, see the numbers in red here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_reserves#OPEC_countries

We see stuff like this:

The cables, released by WikiLeaks, urge Washington to take seriously a warning from a senior Saudi government oil executive that the kingdom's crude oil reserves may have been overstated by as much as 300bn barrels – nearly 40%.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/feb/08/saudi-oil-reserves-overstated-wikileaks

 

[SixNein]

Interesting
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v481/n7382/full/481433a.html

 

[ThomasT]

There are many different types of oil fields. For the most part, we have been getting most of our oil from conventional oil wells. These are very easy to extract oil from, and they have the highest EORI. The production on this type of field has peaked and is entering decline. Part of the problem is replacing the lost production with other sources be it shale, ethanol, or tar sands. These are more intensive to produce and have lower EORI. In a basic nutshell, the industry will need to flat our run in order to stand still.

I see.

The other part of the problem is dealing with global demand:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automotive_industry_in_the_People's_Republic_of_China

There is also the issue of growing internal demand in exporting nations.
In a basic nutshell, the ultimate problem is gas prices are going climb.

I forgot about increasing demand in China, India, etc. . Ok, the picture/problem is getting clearer for me. Usable petroleum products are harder and increasingly more expensive to produce, and demand for them continues to increase. Hence, higher prices.

Any predictions on what it will be in the US in, say, 2020?

 

[SixNein]

I see.

I forgot about increasing demand in China, India, etc. . Ok, the picture/problem is getting clearer for me. Usable petroleum products are harder and increasingly more expensive to produce, and demand for them continues to increase. Hence, higher prices.

Any predictions on what it will be in the US in, say, 2020?

Right, the unconventional sources are harder to produce. And in particular, there is really no chance of getting the kind of rates we need. A lot of people think about volume in the ground, but don't really think about volume to the market. In other words, how much volume can one get out of the ground and to the market with any given oil field per year. The volume to the market determines how much oil we have to use for any given year. Tar sands for example have plenty of volume in the ground, but the rates are limited in ways that conventional oil is not due to processing the sand. On top of that, the EROI is much lower. So the rates we get out of the tar sands are much lower. At the end of the day, the peak of conventional oil wells signal a peak of oil production. Now put that on top of increasing demand, and it doesn't take much to see one has a really big problem.

The 2020 price will depend a lot on the state of conventional oil wells, politics, and demand. There is quite a bit of uncertainty on the conventional well reserves because there is no accountability on the figures provided by oil producing nations. In a basic nutshell, we don't have access to trustworthy data. So projections vary from now to 2040 on world production decline. But by looking at current world production for crude, it seems to have leveled off for the last 9 years. What production gains we have had comes from other liquids. And that is one of the reasons we've seen so much speculation on oil in the market.

Here is a link with a break up on liquids:
http://www.theoildrum.com/files/Screen shot 2012-02-13 at 9.02.36 AM.png

 

[SixNein]

A study by a German military think tank has analyzed how "peak oil" might change the global economy. The internal draft document -- leaked on the Internet -- shows for the first time how carefully the German government has considered a potential energy crisis.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,715138,00.html

The government was warned by its own civil servants two years ago that there could be "significant negative economic consequences" to the UK posed by near-term "peak oil" energy shortages.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jun/15/peak-oil-warning

The world is much closer to running out of oil than official estimates admit, according to a whistleblower at the International Energy Agency who claims it has been deliberately underplaying a looming shortage for fear of triggering panic buying.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/09/peak-oil-international-energy-agency

 

[DrClapeyron]

China is ramping up production of solar pannels.

China Encourages Solar-Product Makers to Expand Amid Supply Glut
By Bloomberg News - Feb 24, 2012 8:29 AM CT

China set targets for increasing production capacity at key polysilicon and solar cell makers, part of the government’s plan to ensure its companies survive a slump in prices.

China wants each “leading” company to have 50,000 tons a year of polysilicon capacity by 2015 and targets 5 gigawatts for each of its top solar-cell makers, according to a five-year plan posted on the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology website today.

And in other news BP is finding it difficult to compete with Chinese solar pannel manufacturers.

BP Plans to Withdraw From Solar-Energy Venture in Australia
By James Paton - Feb 24, 2012 1:59 AM CT

BP Plc (BP/), Europe’s second-largest oil company, plans to withdraw from a venture seeking Australian government funds to build a solar-power project in the state of New South Wales.

“We’ve indicated that we wish to leave the consortium and that we won’t be part of the new bid process,” Jamie Jardine, a Melbourne-based spokesman for BP, said by mobile phone today.


...

The company decided to exit the global solar business after 40 years because it has become unprofitable, Mike Petrucci, the chief executive officer of BP’s solar unit, told staff in an internal letter in December. The industry faces oversupply and price pressures after Chinese competitors increased production.

 

[apeiron]

And in other news BP is finding it difficult to compete with Chinese solar pannel manufacturers.

Comparing China vs US energy strategies ought to tell us a lot about where the world will be going in next 30 years.

A Chinese political scientist told me it boils down to China being a nation run by engineers and the US a nation run by lawyers.

 

[mheslep]

I think this may be at the heart of it. We need everyone to switch to electric cars. And then even if we do that, trucks, planes, farm equipment and military hardware still needs the grunt of diesel.

So we are still on track for economic adjustments like we are seeing in Greece right now.

Electric motors have more than enough 'grunt' for any heavy duty transportation task one cares to imagine, as we all are reminded (or should be) every time we board the electric subway that accelerates 50-200 tons from 0 to 60 mph in 10secs or so. The limitation brought on by batteries lies with long distance range and perhaps extreme temperature cases, for now.

 

[mheslep]

But by looking at current world production for crude, it seems to have leveled off for the last 9 years. What production gains we have had comes from other liquids. ...

Here is a link with a break up on liquids:
http://www.theoildrum.com/files/Screen shot 2012-02-13 at 9.02.36 AM.png

But why look at just crude? During the same 9 years all liquid fuels increased 10-11 mbpd. Consumption is largely agnostic about source.

 

[SixNein]

But why look at just crude? During the same 9 years all liquid fuels increased 10-11 mbpd. Consumption is largely agnostic about source.

We look at just crude because we are interested in the production of those conventional oil wells. If we were to combine all of that information, we would arrive at Simpson's paradox, and we would draw incorrect conclusions about their state because of the lurking variables.

 

[apeiron]

Electric motors have more than enough 'grunt'...

Energy density is the issue...
http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/support-files/biodiesel_deer_future.pdf

 

[mheslep]

Energy density is the issue...
http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/support-files/biodiesel_deer_future.pdf

Yes, of which range is a linear function. At some point though I hope these 50:1 joule/kg comparisons shown in the front matter of these presentations go away, as heat engines inevitably through away more than half of that energy. Then of course diesel and gasoline engines don't run by themselves, they require the additional mass and volume of a fuel pump, oil pump, water pump, an air intake system, exhaust system, starter, large radiator, transmission with four or more gears, differential, on and on, none of which are required in an EV. Apparently a 4:1 range ratio, 400 miles to 100, is the practical ratio today.

 

[CaptFirePanda]

That conclusion is not justified, especially given the recession was Fall 2008 and imports have has been falling since 2005.

From the plot it is obvious that the numbers have not been in decline since 2005 and looking at the raw data confirms this (with minor dips lasting no longer than a year).

Yes economic slow downs deserve some of the blame for energy imports and consumption, but other factors apply apply including improvements in economic energy intensity and increase in domestic supply:
1. US energy intensity (energy per unit of economic output) has been cut in half since 1980,and improved 10% the period 2007 to 2010.

I would suggest this is a factor of technology, rather than consumption. As we have seen, consumption has been increasing while production decreasing since 1980.

2. US domestic crude production has been rising since ~2007 (up 1 mbbl/day), as have natural gas liquids (up ~500kbbl/day)

Definitely an increase (although it is closer to 0.7 mbbl) and much of this can be attributed to the Bakken. Unfortunately, as we know from every other source of hydrocarbon, production peaks and then drops off - more so with respect to the shale plays as, without constant hydraulic fracturing and drilling, production drops off rapidly.

3. Ethanol production has doubled in the last couple years (see graph from earlier post), now 1 mbbl/day.
Those three things contribute strongly to the reduction in imports and consumption.

They contribute, yes; whether they contribute strongly is a very different thing. They offset some increases in consumption, but they do not come anywhere close to offsetting the historical rise in consumption and the drop in production. Ethanol is, at best, a stop gap and it doesn't account for much of the overall hydrocarbon picture.

A fair point. Note though that energy prices have a way to go before they are constant around the world, and exports to the highest bidder immediate. Natural gas for instance is priced overseas at several multiples of the of the US price (for now). Bakken oil sells at a $30/bbl discount locally (for now). I doubt a squeeze in supply meeting demand becomes serious enough to stop a build out in more energy infrastructure.

Think of it as a a feedback loop. In order to maintain supply to match demand, one needs to expend energy. Greater energy must be spent in order to meet greater demand. As production increases, resources are depleted quicker. As resources are depleted, more energy must be expended in order to drill up and find new resources. So, in order for us to keep pace with growing demand, we must spend energy to speed up production and to fill any voids left by depleted resources. We begin to exploit unconventional sources more and more and our dependence shifts from the more conventional sources (which are all on the decline). To get energy, we must spend energy and the energy we need to spend will only increase.

The US is not an isolated case in the energy cycle. Despite any growing supply from within, consumption still outpaces domestic production by about 40% (compared to 20% in 1980). It is quite apparent that new technologies and new discoveries are not abating the US need for imported hydrocarbons. We can nickle and dime the numbers until the end of time, but the long term historical trends are such that the US relies rather heavily on foreign production of hydrocarbons. In order to bridge that 40%, there will need to be some sort of technological epiphany or the fundamentals of geology/thermodynamics will need to be turned on their collective ears. In the face of a huge global shift in energy consumption, the US will need to make some pretty significant strides in the next decade or so.

The depends on the efficiency of the biofuel method and the consumption at the time. That 500 bbl/acre-year engineered bacteria approach (should it work) requires 13 million acres to meet all of US current consumption (18 mbbl/day). That compares well to the 90 million acres in use currently for all US corn crops, not that such an approach needs arable land.

These forms of biofuel generation are still in their infancy. For as long as ethanol has been used and produced in the US, it still accounts for a fraction of US fuel.

 

[mheslep]

That conclusion is not justified, especially given the recession was Fall 2008 and imports have has been falling since 2005.

From the plot it is obvious that the numbers have not been in decline since 2005 and looking at the raw data confirms this (with minor dips lasting no longer than a year).

To what data are you referring?

http://205.254.135.24/dnav/pet/hist_chart/MTTNTUS2a.jpghttp://205.254.135.24/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mttntus2&f=a

 

[MarcoD]

Energy density is the issue...
http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/support-files/biodiesel_deer_future.pdf

The picture on page 11 didn't look too bad to me. Sure, you lose cargo space, but not that much. Is there anything known about the size, or durability, of the engine which would drive a hydrogen based truck?

 

[CaptFirePanda]

To what data are you referring?

http://205.254.135.24/dnav/pet/hist_chart/MTTNTUS2a.jpghttp://205.254.135.24/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mttntus2&f=a

This is one of my problems... initially we were discussing consumption, then you jumped to supply numbers and now net imports. There are, of course, subtle differences between them all (nickle and diming, as I mentioned).

So, I'm trying to keep track, but obviously it's just as confusing for me.

 

[mheslep]

This is one of my problems... initially we were discussing consumption, then you jumped to supply numbers and now net imports. There are, of course, subtle differences between them all (nickle and diming, as I mentioned).

So, I'm trying to keep track, but obviously it's just as confusing for me.

ok, understood.

...

I would suggest this is a factor of technology, rather than consumption. As we have seen, consumption has been increasing while production decreasing since 1980.

Well there have been several ups and downs. Here is the consumption data (all liquids) back to '63 this time. Increase up to the '79 Iranian crisis, decline to ~83 then increase, slight decline in 90-91, and then decline again since ~2006-7.
http://205.254.135.24/dnav/pet/hist_chart/MTTUPUS2M.jpg

Note oil consumption per capita (link up thread) has declined pretty much continuously, showing that more efficient cars/trucks/airplanes/ships, the elimination of oil based electric generation and so on have made a difference in consumption.

Think of it as a a feedback loop. In order to maintain supply to match demand, one needs to expend energy. Greater energy must be spent in order to meet greater demand. ... As resources are depleted, more energy must be expended in order to drill up and find new resources. So, in order for us to keep pace with growing demand, we must spend energy to speed up production and to fill any voids left by depleted resources. We begin to exploit unconventional sources more and more and our dependence shifts from the more conventional sources (which are all on the decline). To get energy, we must spend energy

Yes I am familiar with the ERoEI concept.

and the energy we need to spend will only increase.

I don't agree that it will only increase. Yes tar sands initially require more energy than conventional, but from what I read tar sand production energy is declining especially in the last year. I doubt tar sands production energy costs will ever reach conventional, but neither do I see a runaway energy production problem. More like a step increase.

The US is not an isolated case in the energy cycle. Despite any growing supply from within, consumption still outpaces domestic production by about 40% (compared to 20% in 1980).

And compared to ~65% in 2005-6.

It is quite apparent that new technologies and new discoveries are not abating the US need for imported hydrocarbons.

One can argue that new production/efficiency is not the entire reason for the closing gap, or that current conditions won't hold in the future, and I'm happy to see those arguments. But as written that statement is simply not true. US oil imports are falling, and have been since 2005, and now so are gas imports.

...These forms of biofuel generation are still in their infancy...

Yes, and may never go anywhere. I'm simply pointing out that it is not justifiable to say that land use always rules out any kind of way forward for biofuels. I agree land use rules out a corn ethanol future, but not some of the other far more efficient schemes on the table, and which at least don't violate any laws of physics.

 

[CaptFirePanda]

Well there have been several ups and downs. Here is the consumption data (all liquids) back to '63 this time. Increase up to the '79 Iranian crisis, decline to ~83 then increase, slight decline in 90-91, and then decline again since ~2006-7.

Looking at the raw data, the decline coincides with 2008 as 2007 shows a fairly decent increase.

Note oil consumption per capita (link up thread) has declined pretty much continuously, showing that more efficient cars/trucks/airplanes/ships, the elimination of oil based electric generation and so on have made a difference in consumption.

This stat can also be atttributed to many other factors that may or may not be at play here (eg. wealth distribution, age distribution, etc...) I'm not saying they would skew the results, I'm just pointing out that overall consumption is still on the rise and it outpaces domestic production.

Yes I am familiar with the ERoEI concept.

I think the idea of the "ERoEI concept" overshadows basic thermodynamics. One can fixate until the end of time on distinct ERoEI values while losing sight of the thermodynamic quandry.

I don't agree that it will only increase. Yes tar sands initially require more energy than conventional, but from what I read tar sand production energy is declining especially in the last year. I doubt tar sands production energy costs will ever reach conventional, but neither do I see a runaway energy production problem. More like a step increase.

The bulk of oil sands production has come from mining operations to date. Along with that, however, are the SAGD operations. These produce volumes much less than mining operations do (on a one to one comparison), but collectively will account for greater amounts of total contribution to oil sands production. These operations require drilling, thermal processes to create steam, pipelining, etc... and are far less concentrated than mining operations. So, even if energy requirements are decling now they will increase again. SAGD operations will likely account for ~80% of bitumen produced throughout the course of oil sands development.

Thus, we can keep adding up incremental steps of energy increase, which may seem somewhat trivial on their own, but become far more significant when viewed collectively. Futhermore, this goes beyond oil sands. It encompasses the full range of unconventional resources. Energy use will never be statci for a certain process (eg. it will likely decrease over time), but we are in a situation where we are finding more and more resources that require greater energy to produce.

And compared to ~65% in 2005-6.

Taking snapshots in time of these sorts of things is misleading. Overall, historical trends are what describe the system best. We do, of course, take anomalies into consideration and determine if they are part of a trend. On their own, however, they are mostly meaningless.

One can argue that new production/efficiency is not the entire reason for the closing gap, or that current conditions won't hold in the future, and I'm happy to see those arguments. But as written that statement is simply not true. US oil imports are falling, and have been since 2005, and now so are gas imports.

They are falling, but they have only been falling for the last 2-3 years of a 61 year upward trend. As I mentioned above this kind of aberration does not mean much of anything until it becomes a long-term trend. At the moment, it can be explained away by many other factors.

Yes, and may never go anywhere. I'm simply pointing out that it is not justifiable to say that land use always rules out any kind of way forward for biofuels. I agree land use rules out a corn ethanol future, but not some of the other far more efficient schemes on the table, and which at least don't violate any laws of physics.

I don't think I said land-use always rules out the concept of biofuels (if I did, I apologize). I think I indicated that land-use issues will be an impediment to these sorts of operations. There are many sectors vying for space and it is very difficult to justify large extents of land for low relatively volumes of fuel.

 

[mheslep]

...
This stat can also be atttributed to many other factors that may or may not be at play here (eg. wealth distribution, age distribution, etc...) I'm not saying they would skew the results, I'm just pointing out that overall consumption is still on the rise and it outpaces domestic production.

? You mean that, what, the average linear consumption trend for the last several decades is up? Sure, but I hope we agree that recently this is not the case, that the recent consumption figures are
US Consumption, 4 wk average, all oil, mbpd
Feb 2007 21.8 (all time high US consumption)
Feb 2008 20.6
Feb 2009 19.5
Feb 2010 19.3
Feb 2011 19.4
Feb 2012 18.1
i.e. off 17%, otherwise I'm wasting my time here against some kind of dogmatic belief unchangeable by data.

The bulk of oil sands production has come from mining operations to date. Along with that, however, are the SAGD operations. These produce volumes much less than mining operations do (on a one to one comparison), but collectively will account for greater amounts of total contribution to oil sands production. These operations require drilling, thermal processes to create steam, pipelining, etc... and are far less concentrated than mining operations. So, even if energy requirements are decling now they will increase again. SAGD operations will likely account for ~80% of bitumen produced throughout the course of oil sands development.

Perhaps, but in the future we don't know if SAGD will be used over (say) VAPEX that does not require steam. With very cheap natural gas to make steam no doubt SAGD will continue for awhile, but there's no rule mandating that will be the case.

They are falling, but they have only been falling for the last 2-3 years of a 61 year upward trend. As I mentioned above this kind of aberration does not mean much of anything until it becomes a long-term trend. At the moment, it can be explained away by many other factors.

I respect long term trends. The flip side of long term trends is that reversals never seen before have significance. That's why I see a six year reversal 25% off the peak as significant.
US net imports all oil mbpd
2005 12.55
2006 12.39
2007 12.03
2008 11.11
2009 9.67
2010 9.44
2011 8.52 (12 month rolling average)

I don't think I said land-use always rules out the concept of biofuels (if I did, I apologize). I think I indicated that land-use issues will be an impediment to these sorts of operations. There are many sectors vying for space and it is very difficult to justify large extents of land for low relatively volumes of fuel.

<shrug>I don't know that commercial interests are vying for the vast tracks of barren land in the US, at least they have not so far. Certainly there are groups that want these areas left barren and pristine.

 

[CaptFirePanda]

? You mean that, what, the average linear consumption trend for the last several decades is up? Sure, but I hope we agree that recently this is not the case, that the recent consumption figures are
US Consumption, 4 wk average, all oil, mbpd
Feb 2007 21.8 (all time high US consumption)
Feb 2008 20.6
Feb 2009 19.5
Feb 2010 19.3
Feb 2011 19.4
Feb 2012 18.1
i.e. off 17%, otherwise I'm wasting my time here against some kind of dogmatic belief unchangeable by data.

I mean the long term trend. Interesting how the all time high winds up shortly before the 2008 dive.

Perhaps, but in the future we don't know if SAGD will be used over (say) VAPEX that does not require steam. With very cheap natural gas to make steam no doubt SAGD will continue for awhile, but there's no rule mandating that will be the case.

Well SAGD is quite prevalent currently and will continue to be for some time. Whether or not VAPEX ever comes to fruition is up for debate. There are other technologies out there as well, but there is a rather solid line between what is economic and what isn't.

I respect long term trends. The flip side of long term trends is that reversals never seen before have significance. That's why I see a six year reversal 25% off the peak as significant.

Six years reperesents 10% (or less) of the time in which this upward trend has been taking place. It also coincides very well with the most recent reccession (do I sound like a broken record yet?). Listing the early 80's gives you a similar trend, but imports steadily increased until 2008. I see the "reversal" as somewhat short term and a similar return to business as usual will follow.

<shrug>I don't know that commercial interests are vying for the vast tracks of barren land in the US, at least they have not so far. Certainly there are groups that want these areas left barren and pristine.

Whether it is commercial, environmental, social, etc... interests, they will still be at play.

 

[mheslep]

...I see the "reversal" as somewhat short term and a similar return to business as usual will follow.

Yes so I gather, but I don't understand why.

I've cast about for some energy indicator from the '08 recession that is independent of conservation measures and I think I have one. Vehicle Miles Driven is an indicator tied closely (?) to economic output, i.e. the recession. VMD has dropped about 3% since the 2008 recession began, so there is some indication, I think, of the impact the recession had on US oil consumption.
http://www.bts.gov/publications/multimodal_transportation_indicators/february_2012/html/highway_vehicle_miles_traveled.html

That's 3% against an oil import cut of 25%. I'd certainly agree that, should the economy get strong again and unemployment return to normal, the US will see a 3% bump or more of VMD (unless the price of gas goes well over $4/gal). However there are some things that are not going return to business as usual regardless of the economy:

• Automobile mpg. New vehicles have improved mpg by 8% since 2007. Fleet on the road is improving mpg ~2% a year. Those vehicles will not return to old mpg figures should the economy boom.
• Heating oil cuts by 45%: people in Maine are not going to rip out the insulation and destroy their heat pumps and high efficiency wood stoves to switch back to oil.
• Shale oil, Bakken. Like you I don't know how long it will last, but for the next decade or so shale is going to continue to be large, and we can expect other US shale formations to start producing large volumes too. Shale is out of the bottle and won't be put back in.
• Shale gas. We will continue to see a million bpd of liquids cast off from gas, at least.
• Ethanol. Will continue at the current 1 mbpd, at least
• Naphtha for plastics. Has largely come from oil, is now rapidly vanishing and is being replaced by cheap natural gas sourced ethane at 1 mbpd.

etc