When will the world reach peak fossil fuel production?

[nismaratwork]

Seems to be priced sufficiently to make, for example, these alternatives economically viable: tar sand oil in Canada, some biofuels, PHEVs/EVs, more fuel efficient ICE vehicles.

I agree, but if you argue that those are a decade or so overdue (the middle, less so), then we're still behind the 8 ball on this. That just sends the debate back to "Go" however, and this is NOT my area of... you know I was going to say expertise, but I'll say "competence" and just be honest.

 

[apeiron]

I agree, but if you argue that those are a decade or so overdue (the middle, less so), then we're still behind the 8 ball on this. That just sends the debate back to "Go" however, and this is NOT my area of... you know I was going to say expertise, but I'll say "competence" and just be honest.

This is the crux. Are things being left too late because a) political leadership does not get it/feels paralysed, or are we b) needlessly worrying because those in charge have already worked out all the angles and can see a path through?

I know what I believe from a lifetime seeing political decision making at close quarters (option a of course!).

But hopefully mheslep will return as promised with a cornucopian model of the situation that is convincing. I would like not to have to worry about peak cheap energy and only worry about global warming and global over-population .

 

[nismaratwork]

This is the crux. Are things being left too late because a) political leadership does not get it/feels paralysed, or are we b) needlessly worrying because those in charge have already worked out all the angles and can see a path through?

I know what I believe from a lifetime seeing political decision making at close quarters (option a of course!).

But hopefully mheslep will return as promised with a cornucopian model of the situation that is convincing. I would like not to have to worry about peak cheap energy and only worry about global warming and global over-population .

Oh yeah, I don't think anyone is going to be sad if the cornucopian model is TRUE. I'd like to live in an ice-cream castle in heaven when I die too; I'm not placing my bets on it.

 

[PhilKravitz]

This is the crux. Are things being left too late because a) political leadership does not get it/feels paralysed, or are we b) needlessly worrying because those in charge have already worked out all the angles and can see a path through?

I think there are more cases.

1) leadership does not get it
2) leadership already has it figured out
3) leadership knows it is an issue and sees no solution
4) leadership knows it is an issue and sees no easy solution

My guess is #4. About three years ago Lawrence Livermore National Labs (US) was advertising for an economist to study the total life cycle cost of all future energy generation systems. I would love to know the results of that study.

 

[CAC1001]

You know, we could probably significantly reduce fuel consumption (and hence petroleum) and also shave trillions out of healthcare expenditures, if Americans would lose some weight!

 

[nismaratwork]

You know, we could probably significantly reduce fuel consumption (and hence petroleum) and also shave trillions out of healthcare expenditures, if Americans would lose some weight!

Yeah, that's what will change the course of fossil fuel history...

 

[apeiron]

Some more modelling that perhaps gets under the skin of the peak oiler vs cornucopian debate.

http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2011-01-17/no-peak-oil-yet-limits-hubbert-model

This study contrasts the story for US oil production and US gas production. The one is peaked as Hubbert's curve predicted, the other still seems to be responding to cornucopian hopes - as prices rise, this stimulates innovation (such as fracking) that increases supply.

But...

 

[mheslep]

http://usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/cars-trucks/daily-news/101221-US-Demand-for-Gasoline-Dropping/"

America's demand for gasoline has declined four years in a row and will not reach the 2006 level again, even when the economy fully recovers,” USA Today says.

furthermore

’'People wildly underestimate the effect that all this* is going to have on gasoline demand,’” says Paul Sankey, an analyst at Deutsche Bank who spoke with the AP. Sankey says that “by 2030 America will use just 5.4 million barrels a day, the same as in 1969.

He's referring there only to US motor gasoline consumption (not all petroleum derivatives) which has been hovering under 9 million barrels a day for a while now.
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist_chart/MGFUPUS2a.jpg

*'this' being:
o ICE cars and trucks becoming more fuel efficient
o blending of ethanol
o people driving less
o higher prices
o advent of hybrids and EVs
o waning popularity of SUVs

 

[nismaratwork]

http://usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/cars-trucks/daily-news/101221-US-Demand-for-Gasoline-Dropping/"


furthermore

He's referring there only to US motor gasoline consumption (not all petroleum derivatives) which has been hovering under 9 million barrels a day for a while now.
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist_chart/MGFUPUS2a.jpg

*'this' being:
o ICE cars and trucks becoming more fuel efficient
o blending of ethanol
o people driving less
o higher prices
o advent of hybrids and EVs
o waning popularity of SUVs

Is there any indication that the petroleum market isn't finding an amenable customer in China? GM seems to think it's a good place to sell cars, and I think it's the definition of a growing market. Is there some indication that China won't pick up the slack, and then some?

 

[mheslep]

Is there any indication that the petroleum market isn't finding an amenable customer in China? GM seems to think it's a good place to sell cars, and I think it's the definition of a growing market. Is there some indication that China won't pick up the slack, and then some?

There's some. Chinese bought 21 million electric bikes/scooters last year with 100 million total on the road.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1904334,00.html

 

[nismaratwork]

There's some. Chinese bought 21 million electric bikes/scooters last year with 100 million total on the road.
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1904334,00.html

Yes, and they don't exactly have to gentrify much of the population to exert astounding purchasing power. Given that corporations have only very loose national ties in many cases, and are naturally addicted to money... do the math. China is the cocaine dealer of choice for junkies, if you substitute, "money" for cocaine, and "the US" for junkies.

 

[Greg Bernhardt]

One thing on this though, energy isn't so much what concerns me as usage of petroleum for materials. I mean everything from tires to plastics to laundry detergent, you need petroleum to make. Even if we could power our cities all on solar power, we still need petroleum for making things, right?

This is the case that this movie makes. Has anyone seen it? The guy talks about the countless petroleum products that can't be easily made with other materials. Most cars are full of plastic. Who cares if you can't afford to drive your car if can't afford to buy one any longer. mheslep thinks we can recycle enough, but I highly doubt we can recycle enough to meet future demand.

http://www.collapsemovie.com/

 

[mheslep]

This is the case that this movie makes. Has anyone seen it? The guy talks about the countless petroleum products that can't be easily made with other materials. Most cars are full of plastic. Who cares if you can't afford to drive your car if can't afford to buy one any longer. mheslep thinks we can recycle enough, but I highly doubt we can recycle enough to meet future demand.

Apparently petrochemical feedstock is about http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_cons_psup_dc_nus_mbblpd_a.htm" since 2004; I can only speculate as to why. In any case plastics are all carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen. Maybe some of our chemists can address synthesis from the basics, but I can't imagine it is all that difficult given sufficient energy. Maybe the movie will show otherwise (thanks).

 

[Greg Bernhardt]

but I can't imagine it is all that difficult given sufficient energy. Maybe the movie will show otherwise (thanks).

I fully accept you know vastly more about the subject than me. However is there a key in what you just said there? "given sufficient energy". Where are we going to get that energy? :)

 

[mheslep]

I fully accept you know vastly more about the subject than me. However is there a key in what you just said there? "given sufficient energy". Where are we going to get that energy? :)

Well right, that was https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3067871&postcount=198", or some of the other couple hundred posts in this thread.

 

[PhilKravitz]

The issue for the US that imports so much energy is net export oil. There is a fine talk about this issue at
http://mediasiteson.sandia.gov/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=db3a600e-e93f-43ae-80d8-0f1cfbb328fe
It makes the case that the top five exports will have zero oil available for export in about 2031. That is not to say they have zero production. It is to say that they increase their domestic use and are at this point using all their production for themselves. So the next 20 years will be interesting.

 

[mheslep]

The issue for the US that imports so much energy is net export oil. There is a fine talk about this issue at
http://mediasiteson.sandia.gov/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=db3a600e-e93f-43ae-80d8-0f1cfbb328fe
It makes the case that the top five exports will have zero oil available for export in about 2031. That is not to say they have zero production. It is to say that they increase their domestic use and are at this point using all their production for themselves. So the next 20 years will be interesting.

That comes about from the assumption that the Saudi's will continue to not develop their largely untouched remaining oil reserves, and continue instead to hold production at current rates, while at the same time extrapolating a Saudi domestic increase in oil consumption at ~6% per year out through the 2030's, a trend counter to what is seen now in the developed world. I don't think either one of those assumptions are warranted.

 

[PhilKravitz]

That comes about from the assumption that the Saudi's will continue to not develop their largely untouched remaining oil reserves,

No. Their assumption is that Saudi does not have large untouched reserves. Just as Matt Simon's made the point in his book "Sunset in the Desert".

 

[mheslep]

No. Their assumption is that Saudi does not have large untouched reserves. Just as Matt Simon's made the point in his book "Sunset in the Desert".

From one the Sandia slides, 21:00

Conventional Wisdom - The Economist Quote About Saudi Arabia

Saudi Aramco's proved reserves alone could keep the world supplied for several decades. But it is only exploiting ten of its 80 or so fields, so will be able to pump at the present rate for about 70 years even if it never discovers another drop of oil

Economist Magazine, August 10, 2006

 

[nismaratwork]

From one the Sandia slides, 21:00

Aramco?... you mean, the company that becomes defunct if Saudi Oil dries up? I'm not sure if this is evidence of something, or just a prospectus.

 

[PhilKravitz]

The counter is the Hubbert curve fits to the actual Saudi production data.

Yes it could be that they have secret fields, the same has been said of the US. Time will tell.

 

[mheslep]

The counter is the Hubbert curve fits to the actual Saudi production data.

Yes it could be that they have secret fields, the same has been said of the US. Time will tell.

The point of the Sandia brief, as I quickly went through it, was that the Saudi fields are not unknown nor secret but known and purposely not developed. As quoted above, they are exploiting only 1 in 8 of their known fields. Yes if they keep this up this artificial limitation internal demand make eventually overtake supply.

 

[nismaratwork]

The point of the Sandia brief, as I quickly went through it, was that the Saudi fields are not unknown nor secret but known and purposely not developed. As quoted above, they are exploiting only 1 in 8 of their known fields. Yes if they keep this up this artificial limitation internal demand make eventually overtake supply.

Unless of course that's just Aramco's fantasy... and really, when is a company going to tell its investors: "Hey guys, the reaper is literally breathing down our necks! Bail now!"?

 

[apeiron]

The issue for the US that imports so much energy is net export oil. There is a fine talk about this issue at
http://mediasiteson.sandia.gov/Mediasite/SilverlightPlayer/Default.aspx?peid=db3a600e-e93f-43ae-80d8-0f1cfbb328fe
It makes the case that the top five exports will have zero oil available for export in about 2031.

This is indeed a great talk - in a "may as well curl up and die right now" kind of way.

There was one really good policy suggestion in the Q&A. Because energy consumption is GDP, it makes sense to replace payroll tax with an energy consumption tax. So this would create the direct market signal that the situation needs. You can fill up your Hummer, but it is going to cost so much you might have to take the new neighbourhood tramtrain instead. So no taxes except on your fuel use.

And it was a little weird of mheslep to pull out the Economist quote out of the presentation as clearly that was the conventional wisdom the whole presentation debunks.

If Saudi has vast secret reserves, then that does not look reflected in the production curves, as Brown argues in slide 12. All other past and current scenarios fit the data (Brown claims) so Saudi would have to have been quietly carrying out some outlier production policy all this time. Are the Saudis really that politically sophisticated?

Overall, the presentation is very bad news. Top 5 exporters projected to cease exporting by 2031. And fuel price rises will be geometric as a consequence (from $100 a barrel, to $200, then $400, etc). Brown says the rich would bid up the price of remaining exports and so there is an accelerating feedback mechanism as part of the end game.

Of course all sorts of things would be happening at that stage. For instance, top exporters like Russia and Saudi might be having crash efficiency campaigns that would prolong their ability to supply. On the other hand, they would probably also decide to limit export so as to be able to supply their own folk.

 

[mheslep]

[...]
And it was a little weird of mheslep to pull out the Economist quote out of the presentation as clearly that was the conventional wisdom the whole presentation debunks.

Brown's presentation is all about pushing the idea that internal consumption eventually will net out exports to zero. He produces nothing almost nothing new on production, that is to the counter the notion as espoused by the Economist, that the Saudi's are exploiting only "ten of its 80 or so fields."

If Saudi has vast secret reserves, then that does not look reflected in the production curves, as Brown argues in slide 12. All other past and current scenarios fit the data (Brown claims) so Saudi would have to have been quietly carrying out some outlier production policy all this time. Are the Saudis really that politically sophisticated?

The current Saudi operation requires no secrecy or Machiavellian planning. They could simply choose a level of production to maintain or to slowly increase world prices.

We have (here) on this subject one respectable reference, that from the Economist on Saudi production, and no references at all to contradict it.

 

[apeiron]

The point of the Sandia brief, as I quickly went through it, was that the Saudi fields are not unknown nor secret but known and purposely not developed. As quoted above, they are exploiting only 1 in 8 of their known fields.

I'm still scratching my head about this. Saudi reserves are indeed a state secret. People are reduced to using google maps satellite pictures to count oil wells and get some idea of the actual production trends. (http://www.theoildrum.com/tag/ghawar ). So the first point is that we are not dealing with "knowns" here, just trying to make sense of a lot of contradictory messages.

Here is as close to an honest answer as I've seen (http://www.energybulletin.net/node/50234 and http://www.energybulletin.net/node/50364) - which is a vote of confidence that Saudi can maintain 10 million barrels a day over a reasonable term, but the IEA goal of pushing Saudi to 15 mbd by 2020 (and that Saudi should already be at 12 mbd) is not do-able. And we have to remember that Saudi is in fact down around 8 mbd, and that during the 2008 price spike it appeared not to be responding to this price signal and so led some to feel it had in fact peaked.

- http://tomweston.net/saudioil.txt
- http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-05/saudi-arabia-s-2010-oil-production-exceeded-opec-quota-by-4-3-u-s-says.html
- http://www.silverbearcafe.com/private/saudireserves.html

And the second point - the implication that there is a ton in the ground because only 1 in 8 fields is being tapped - I think you will find that all the big fields are indeed in production and the rest are small fry. That was the Matt Simmons argument.

Or do you have do you have a source that backs up the impression Saudi are only tapping an eighth of what they have?

 

[mheslep]

I went back and caught all of Brown's narrative. Ug. I did not find it instructive.

 

[mheslep]

Somewhere in the presentation early on Brown states, "the area under the [Hubbert] curve gives the ultimate recoverable reserves". I'm not inclined to argue with Brown per se, but I grant the point seems common in the peak oil discussion. So here's an example showing my problem with the assertion. Below is the coal production in the UK from 1900 to ~now.

The earlier history shows an increase similar to this century's decrease; ~1850 had 50 mt/year, about the same as todays, with production peaking in 1913 at 260 mt/year. Taken together this makes a nice 'Hubbert' curve from 1845, peaking in 1913, and tailing off to today. Roughly, the area under that curve (by linear approximation), or the total recoverable coal per Brown, in the UK should have been ~16,000 mt from beginning to end, leaving only dwindling scraps now.

That conclusion is wildly wrong. Various http://www.coal.gov.uk/media/860AD/Response%20to%20Energy%20Review%20-%20Appendix%202.pdf" coal in the UK. These surveys don't speculate on coal at sci fi depths either, they're limited to no deeper than 4000 ft. Economics, not depletion, has done away with UK coal production. We can speculate on several reasons: the rise of North Sea oil, cheaper US and Chinese coal, expense of exporting coal solids, perhaps mines planned poorly long ago mines, now collapsed and flooded, that would still be economic if constructed properly to begin with, and so on.

 

[apeiron]

We have (here) on this subject one respectable reference, that from the Economist on Saudi production, and no references at all to contradict it.

Again, the issue is not the raw number of Saudi fields (well it is insofar it is a state secret) but the size of them. So this is what you need to provide evidence for. Otherwise the statement seems intentionally deceptive.

Wiki says...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_reserves_in_Saudi_Arabia

Although Saudi Arabia has around 100 major oil and gas fields, over half of its oil reserves are contained in only eight giant oil fields, including the Ghawar Field.

Despite its large number of oil fields, 90 percent of Saudi Arabia's oil production comes from only five fields and up to 60 percent of its production comes from the Ghawar field.[7]

Since 1982, the Saudis have withheld their well data and any detailed data on their reserves, giving outside experts no way to verify Saudi claims regarding the overall size of their reserves and output.

So we can see the powerlaw distribution of reserves that makes a "1 in 8" comment meaningless.

If Saudi has managed to hide a few more Ghawars up its sleeve, that would not only be a triumph of secrecy unparalleled, but it would also look rather out of line with basic statistical probability here.

A little more source is required, no matter how respected you find the Economist.

 

[mheslep]

In response to Brown's main point, internal consumption will rapidly grow to eat internal production of todays oil exporters, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/canada/Oil.html" contrary to Brown's assertion in the talk (maybe it was true then).

[PLAIN]http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/canada/images/oil_production.gif

That is, Canadian net exports have increasing mostly continuously since ~1990. To go off and speak at Sandia on a net exports theory and ignore this fact is reckless.

 

[mheslep]

Again, the issue is not the raw number of Saudi fields (well it is insofar it is a state secret) but the size of them. So this is what you need to provide evidence for. Otherwise the statement seems intentionally deceptive.
[...]
A little more source is required, no matter how respected you find the Economist.

Then take it up with the Economist, not me.

 

[apeiron]

We can speculate on several reasons: the rise of North Sea oil, cheaper US and Chinese coal, expense of exporting coal solids, perhaps mines planned poorly long ago mines, now collapsed and flooded, that would still be economic if constructed properly to begin with, and so on.

You can throw in other non-reserve factors too, such as pits were part of the social fabric and spent seams were kept going with subsidies just to provide continuity of local jobs. Thatcher came in and with the bonus of north sea oil was able to take on the mining unions in a power show-down.

But that is beside the point. Hubbert curve thinking is all about the varieties of friction that accumulate and force a shift from a first phase of easy extraction followed by a second of diminishing returns.

Anyway, back to what you were saying about all the untapped Saudi reserves which are known and should give us comfort...

 

[apeiron]

Then take it up with the Economist, not me.

No fair. You cherry-picked this slide from the presentation and gave it to us out of context.

It seems to me a clear reason why "mainstream" sources can't be trusted - the quote is basically spin.

So you are saying you cannot find support for the 1 in 8 statement and want to close the discussion? OK, I can understand that.

 

[mheslep]

You can throw in other non-reserve factors too, such as pits were part of the social fabric and spent seams were kept going with subsidies just to provide continuity of local jobs. Thatcher came in and with the bonus of north sea oil was able to take on the mining unions in a power show-down.

Exactly, agreed.

But that is beside the point. Hubbert curve thinking is all about the varieties of friction that accumulate and force a shift from a first phase of easy extraction followed by a second of diminishing returns...

Not according to Brown in this talk. He clearly states the production curve produces "ultimate recoverable reserves". That might indeed occur sometimes, but as a rule he's simply wrong.

 

[apeiron]

That is, Canadian net exports have increasing mostly continuously since ~1990. To go off and speak at Sandia on a net exports theory and ignore this fact is reckless.

The Canadian story is a little indeed, err, special given Nafta.

One implication of this “proportionality clause” is that although as shown in Trends in Canadian Petroleum Production and Consumption, Canada is a net petroleum exporter, it still has to import petroleum to cover the excess (i.e., the excess over net production minus domestic consumption) petroleum it sends to the USA. Up till now that had not been a problem, because importing petroleum from Europe, the Middle East and from the USA, has been cheaper than shipping oil from Western Canada.

http://crash-watcher.blogspot.com/2010/11/canadapetroleum-superpower-or-super.html