Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail

In summary, Chalmers argues that while physical explanation is sufficient for explaining structures and functions in many domains, it is unable to fully explain conscious experience. This is because conscious experience is not just a matter of structures and functions, but also involves the subjective experience of being aware. This cannot be reduced to purely physical processes, as it is conceptually coherent that these processes could exist without experience. While physical explanations have been successful in many other domains, they are unable to fully explain consciousness. This is because consciousness is a unique and puzzling phenomenon that cannot be fully understood through reductionist methods.
  • #71
Canute

Experiences are not third-person observable. It therefore follows that if experiences exist then science cannot explain them.

You made a totally unsupported assumption.No,the actual approach argues that consciousness does exist.The whole point is that there is no reason now to think that science cannot explain 'qualia' as being an emergent phenomena of the brain.I offered you an example of why Mary's chamber or other arguments fails to prove soundly that science cannot explain subjective feelings.The fact that we do not have now a detailed view,if possible certitudes,as you and fliption seem to request,is irrelevant.Of course you must also have some basic knowledge in the philosophy of science otherwise if you'll continue to accuse that science make final claims we arrive nowhere of course.
 
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  • #72
I notice that you completely ignore the issue I raised in my last post. We're not going to get very far with this discussion if you don't even acknowledge the arguments against your view and just assert that there aren't any.
 
  • #73
Originally posted by metacristi
It must not only 'resolve the philosophical problems' (anyway the fundamental qualia would be a tautology in this case) and accommodate all reliable experiments made so far.It must also make new testable predictions where the fundamental qualia to be an absolutely necessary theoretical construct.Otherwise it is of no scientific use,there is absolutely no reason to think that the usual approach is not enough to explain subjective experience.


Ever heard of String theory? It makes no testable predictions yet I'm sure it gets more time then your arguing it should deserve.
Anyway even it makes new predictions is not enough to think that qualia is indeed fundamental (as I argue below we must prove this practically).

This is my question. Same question, different words. How exactly is it possible to prove that something is fundamental? At what point does science lean in the direction that something is fundamental? You're insisting that it be proven but yet when I ask the question of how such things are determined, there is no objective answer. So it seems it cannot be proven. Surely, we aren't going to make certain theories impossible when we still have so much to learn are we?
No,I do not know of any such theory apart from philosophy.Which for the moment is of no use for science.There is even a joke on this made by scientists about the utility of philosophy in cognitive sciences: 'Science tries to find a black cat in a dark chamber whilst philosophy tries to find a black cat in a dark chamber where there is no black cat'...

LOL, there were also many philosophers in college that made jokes about the shallowness of physicists. I couldn't say either way, you understand? But I do remember them doing it. I've learned that everyone is a bit biased and I need to think for myself.

Science is based on observed facts only.And all we observe form empirical evidence so far is that mind is a product of the brain.
How? What is an example of something that you could witness that would tell you that mind comes from brain?

Besides there is no reason to believe that qualia is fundamental even if such a theory would be successful.Scientists have reasons to believe only in confirmed facts (even if only indirectly).So we still have to prove empirically that qualia is fundamental.

Why is it that you must prove that qualia is fundamental in order to entertain a theory and you don't have to prove anything with regard to the "mind from brain" theory? With this theory, stating fallible truths seems to be enough.

It seems as if you are saying one requires more evidence than the other because of some sort of evidence we have today that makes one case stronger than the other. I'm not clear on what this evidence is. If you can answer my question above asking for examples that would be good.

Actually it has nothing to do with that argument,I haven't used the appropriate words,mea culpa.That means simply 'we do not know for the moment,but there is no good reason to believe that qualia is fundamental,there are plenty of other acceptable possibilities we are aware of'.On the contrary positing that qualia is fundamental would be not only unscientific but illogical.

It's saying the same thing from my point of view. The result is that there is no clear line. Someone can always claim that we just need to learn more. As I feared, this is a purely subjective determination. The irony is that this requires someone at some point to exercise a philosophical thought.

Also, you are claiming that qualia as fundamental is not only unscientific but illogical. Now THIS is what we're discussing in this thread. Surely you don't need a laboratory to show why it's illogical so explain here why this is so. No one else has been able to do it. Perhaps you can.


So that you are fully entitled to be skeptical.Or me.But if you make the positive claim that the actual hypothesis is wrong you must back this with sufficient arguments,experimentally verifiable.Or,if you do not accept the empiricism of the scientific method,you must provide another method,proved superior,on empirical grounds.

Unfortunately, the scientific method apparently cannot say when it has reached it's limit. Even if it has. We have left that up to a subjective call. A subjective call that it doesn't seem you want to acknowledge. If you don't acknowledge it then we must have a more objective and clear answer to my original question.

To sum it all up, I find it interesting that we're willing to accept uncertainties in our pet theories so that we don't have to deal with the philosophical questions. But other theories must be proven before they are even accepted as a theory. I don't even think this is what a theory is but I'll stop now :smile:.
 
  • #74
Originally posted by metacristi
You made a totally unsupported assumption.No,the actual approach argues that consciousness does exist.The whole point is that there is no reason now to think that science cannot explain 'qualia' as being an emergent phenomena of the brain.I offered you an example of why Mary's chamber or other arguments fails to prove soundly that science cannot explain subjective feelings.The fact that we do not have now a detailed view,if possible certitudes,as you and fliption seem to request,is irrelevant.Of course you must also have some basic knowledge in the philosophy of science otherwise if you'll continue to accuse that science make final claims we arrive nowhere of course.

I hope I haven't mis-understood but I will clarify just in case. I'm not claiming that lack of a detailed view means that the theory is wrong. Any reasonable person understands that it takes time to learn and gain knowledge. I simply asked for some guidelines on when a major assumption change becomes warranted. The answer we have so far is that there are no such guidelines.

Also, perhaps this hasn't been communicated well but I don't think anyone else sees any more merit to the current scientific theories over the one being suggested here. You seem to think that it is on higher ground but I don't think anyone else sees it that way. If you answer some of the questions in previous posts you may be able to communicate how current theories actually explain things and make predictions. That would clear a lot of things up.
 
  • #75
Canute


I notice that you completely ignore the issue I raised in my last post. We're not going to get very far with this discussion if you don't even acknowledge the arguments against your view and just assert that there aren't any.


What arguments Canute?Your proclamation that,by definition,science cannot explain consciousness because subjective experiences are totally private?Let's be rational.In this case we would not even have sufficient reasons to think that other persons outside ourselves are conscious.You see we must reside in the majority of cases,here included,on some sufficient experimental reasons to think that something is approximatively correct.Science only need sufficient arguments.Certitudes are very rare.How do we decide that other persons are conscious?Simply by using the analogy argument,given also the existence of extended research that other people's brains have approximatively the same structure,and by observing their behaviour or asking them what they feel.We do not have to measure subjective feelings to decide that other people are conscious instead of being zombies.That's why the construction of an android of the type mentioned in my previous posts is a sufficient reason that they are not zombies,the analogy argument+strong experimental evidence [offer us sufficient reasons],coherent also with all previous accepted knowledge.Those who claim they are zombies must prove that experimentally.

I think we must review the state of affairs before going further.It's clear that now we have only a simple conjecture,we are far away from having any sufficient reason to believe it is approximatively correct (anyway no final claims are made).However the actual conjecture is theoretically and empirically evolving and there is no good reason now,logical or experimental,to consider it wrong or that an improved version,including all actual knowledge derived from experiments, cannot explain consciousness eventually.You and others object that subjective experiences cannot be 'measured' by science therefore science cannot explain consciousness no matter how detailed a scientific successful theory can we obtain.This is a pseudo problem for it is no reason to think that there are not physical states behind,approximatively the same,which create approximatively similar mental states in different persons.Anyway as I've argued before in case we will have detailed theory or an android whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being there are sufficient empirical and logical grounds to consider it approximatively correct.

Imagine that we will obtain sometime a detailed computational emergentist hypothesis (it is totally possible there are not good reasons to think otherwise) which makes also clear predictions of how conscious experience arise from brain working (how 'qualia' arise from brain's working included,though not confirmed for the moment).If it is capable to explain how brain works at the neural network level,with many confirmed predictions,being not falsified yet,in the absence of any credible scientific alternative there are sufficient grounds to have a high degree of confidence in it.Additionally the discoveries in AI could strengthen the conclusions.Maybe we will never be able to confirm the predictions about subjective experiences directly (but who can be sure of that?).Even so there would still exist sufficient empirical and logical reasons (not to say overwhelming evidence) backing the existing hypothesis and practically no empirical or sound logical evidence against.There would be more than sufficient empirical and logical reasons to think it is approximatively correct.

Simply postulating that 'you cannot confirm the predictions about how subjective feeling arise therefore science cannot explain conscious experience' cannot count as an argument against.Bascally there are no good reasons to think it is correct.First science is still open to new data,we accept our knowledge is still fallible though assigning a high degree of confidence in its approximative truth (we have sufficient reasons for that),secondly how can you back rationally that we will not be able to do that?By definition?Maybe consciousness can be simulated (many supporters of 'weak' AI hypothesis believe that it can) or who knows maybe we will be able to put in evidence thoughts if they are physically based,that is interact with usual matter.Basically it is conceivable that we can test those predictions.And it would be far from being a miracle to confirm the predictions made by our hypothesis of how subjective experiences arise...

Even assuming that we decide not to have a high degree of confidence in such a detailed hypothesis of consciousness (in this case we are entitled to doubt in the majority of cases,we base our knowledge mainly on sufficient reasons derived from all observed facts) the hard fact remain: it would still remain the best we managed,basically with no alternative,if no competing scientific approach (at least respecting the requirements of the scientific method,though inferior for the moment) does not exist.With scientists entitled to prefer the best empirically based hypothesis to all other explanations,for all our practical purposes.This does not imply also a high degree of confidence in its approximative truth.But it would be hard enough to explain it's remarkable empirical success at least at the levels we can measure directly,especially if we could build,based on it,an android whose behaviour is indistinguishable from that of a human being.

In all cases we would have no experimental grounds to claim that science cannot explain consciousness and surely no reason to believe that qualia is fundamental.Simply putting again and again the old cliche 'you cannot account for the subjective experiences' neither falsify the best existing scientific hypothesis (maybe true in absolute though possible we will never know that) nor strengthen the credibility of 'fundamental qualia' (un)scientific (at that moment at least) hypothesis.
 
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  • #76
Hey Hypnogouge, this is a little reply to the 1st post you put up... I have read the other 2 pages, but I want to bypass most of those arguments and explain Chalmers problem (and Dennett’s) in a new way...

A Defense of Materialism:

The real problem with all of this explaining consciousness through a reductive style is the explanation paradigm they use. The call it "reduction", claiming to "reduce" consciousness to a physical process of the brain.

But this is very misleading. It is in fact backwards. In presuming a mind, a consciousness, a subjective experience to exist, you are running into trouble. By trying to understand and explain this mind, consciousness or experience and then attempt to put it into little categories that will entirely explain it in order for it to be reducible, you are also running into problems. How in all hell are you meant to categories a subjective experience accurately and wholly? all kinds of problems, such as the problems of other minds, and presuming they do exist, if the they exist in the same manner of yours comes up. there is no way to do a top down reduction of mind. It leads to dualism, confusion, and ultimately the functionalist fallacy. (for, if mind is something reducible, if it is even possible to talk of it outside physical boundaries and talk and categories it as a cognitive [not neurobiological] process, then we must be able to write a program that imitates it and call a computer a mind, no?)

THE SOLUTION

We are looking at this backwards. Instead of trying to reduce the un-catergorisable into a physical state, we should start at the bottom and work up. Start with brain activity. in fact, start with a single neuron, doing its thing. It receives information, it fires or does not fire depending on previous experience, conditioning and action potential. What results from this single neuron? a result. a new chemical state, and subsequently a change in experience.

Now, if you get every lobe and section of your brain simply doing what it does: receiving information and then passing on the new information: we experience our world. why? cause our brain is taking in physical stimulus from the physical world and physically processing it. "the mind" is simply the result of this process. in fact, the mind does not even need to have a physical effect on the body at all in order for us to think that it has. We justify our minds to ourselves as it seems to us that we have control over our thoughts, and it seems that what we are doing is a result of personal want feelings and motivations. take a bottom up approach, and all you are doing is reacting on a higher level to a causation pattern that was determined by the moving of an atom in the realm of physics below biology.

Does a cell in the arm know that it is a cell in the arm? no. I just receive its information, does what it does to it, and then send out new signals to those cells around them. yet we have a unified feeling of body. I would argue the mind is the same. we have a unified experience of mind, but what it really is billions of neurons doing its things and passing the information on to the next one. the bi product is consciousness. and it has no causation at all.

This is an eliminative materialist approach supported by the likes of the churchlands. do not be deceived by the top down approach. the mind as we think of it does not exist and is not reducible simply because it is not there like that. a bottom up process takes care of the gap and takes care of dualism. I can try to explain this a little better if you are interested in hearing more about it. I am in a bit of a hurry, I might have rushed through the explanation a bit. :) sorry.
 
  • #77
I think it explains things perfectly, but I am eager to hear a reasonable atttempt to find fault with it. It is so easy to accept a theory as unchallengable when no one challenges it...

Bring on the criticisms!
 
  • #78
That's interesting because I don't think it explains anything heh. But perhaps I didn't fully understand it.

How do we explain the "sense of body and mind" that you spoke of?

If there is nothing to reductively explain, then how do we explain that we have a sense of something needing an explanation?

It's seems similar to Dennett in that it doesn't solve the problem. It merely defines it away by claiming it doesn't exists. But if it doesn't exist then we have at the very least an illusion with no reductive explanation.
 
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  • #79
I MUST BE DENSE!

honestly, how can we get so caught up in this minutia?

take a recently deceased brain, bombard it with chemicals and particles and prayers. what happens? nada!

take a plant, stimulate it with a charge and you can measure a reaction to the stimulant. break off a piece, apply another charge. what happens? nada!

the missing ingredient? life force! who da hell knows EXACTLY what it is? but, it is there! for easy of communication, i like to call it, consciousness.

lets not waste time on debating its existence, let's invest time and energy trying to understand it and its properties.

i withdraw from discussing this further.

peace,
 
  • #80
Originally posted by metacristi
Canute

What arguments Canute?
Ok I give up. You need to read the literature. The whole of the current issue of the international 'Journal of Consciousness Studies' is given over to the debate on whether first-person data can be considered scientific. There is a reason for this. It's not as simple an issue as you think.
 
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  • #81
Dark Wing

Start with brain activity. in fact, start with a single neuron, doing its thing. It receives information, it fires or does not fire depending on previous experience, conditioning and action potential. What results from this single neuron? a result. a new chemical state, and subsequently a change in experience.
I think that this is where your argument goes wrong. You assume here that the existence of states of experience is strictly dependent on brain states before you actually present your argument for the idea.

Also by saying this you are suggesting that conscious experience is something different to matter, and this seems to be dualism of some sort, which is a tricky position to take.

It isn't unreasonable to say that that states of experience are affected by brain states, the anecdotal (non-observed) evidence is overwhelming. But there is no evidence that consciousness is ontologically dependent on brain. (Although the day to day human experience of it clearly is for the most part).

It's a topic full of traps.

Canute
 
  • #82
Canute

Make first the difference between a purely philosophical argument and the truth about natural facts first and only after accuse me of being ignorant.By the way it's very useful,in situations like this,to read from time to time what have to say the alternative views.Otherwise there is a great danger to end in dogmatism.
 
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  • #83
Bring on the criticisms!

1.There are a lot of unexplained phenomena at the neural network level.No matter the type of physicalism,this or Dennett's type of physicalist functionalism.Nothing to do with qualia.We have only observed that some brain states in the neural network correlate with some mental states but it's clear we are far apart from having sufficient reasons to think that all mental states are correlated with brain states.There is still an afwul lot of work to do.

2.We are far away from having a holistic,successful,theory of consciousness.There is no good reason now to think that the findings in neurology represent more than some necessary conditions for the appearance of conscious experience not sufficient ones.

3.The emergentist approach does not make any predictions about the level of complexity when the emergent phenomenon of consciousness appears.Anyway what good reasons are to believe that a degree of complexity close to those of human beings will really produce conscious experience in androids or at least a behaviour indistinguishable from that of a human being?

4.Mental states seem to be more than the firing of some neurons in the neural network of the brain (OK a strictly philosophical objection but valuable).

5.All physicalist models proposed so far are only inferences from the (too) incomplete scientific conjecture of today.Neither deduced nor absolutely necessary to account for the known facts.There is no good reason to believe now that the layer model of Dennett or his neural darwinism theory are something more than mere philosophy.

As a conclusion the actual reductionist view (at the neuronal level) and all related doctrines are simple conjectures for which we cannot assign a high degree of confidence now.Though they are theoretically and empirically evolving all unbiased scientists will recognize that we are rather at the beginnig of the road.There is basically no constraint for a would be rational person to believe in its actual (approximative truth).At most it is the best we could achieve so far so that,on pragmatic grounds entirely,all rational persons will prefer it to other existing (non scientific) hypotheses for all their practical purposes.Nothing more.I meant data inferred from empirical facts not the philosophical doctrines themselves,of course.
 
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  • #84
Originally posted by metacristi
Canute

Make first the difference between a purely philosophical argument and the truth about natural facts first and only after accuse me of being ignorant.
Why?

Though they are theoretically and empirically evolving all unbiased scientists will recognize that we are rather at the beginnig of the road.There is basically no constraint for a would be rational person to believe in its actual (approximative truth).At most it is the best we could achieve so far so that,on pragmatic grounds entirely,all rational persons will prefer it to other existing (non scientific) hypotheses for all their practical purposes.Nothing more.I meant data inferred from empirical facts not the philosophical doctrines themselves,of course.
Oh c'mon, you're not being honest in your thinking. You haven't addressed one single objection to your view yet. I'll leave you to your strange notion of science and philosophy which, if you ever bother to check, you'll find no scientist or philosopher shares.
 
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  • #85
Originally posted by metacristi
1.There are a lot of unexplained phenomena at the neural network level.No matter the type of physicalism,this or Dennett's type of physicalist functionalism.Nothing to do with qualia.We have only observed that some brain states in the neural network correlate with some mental states but it's clear we are far apart from having sufficient reasons to think that all mental states are correlated with brain states.There is still an afwul lot of work to do.

You jump from "there is a lot of unexplained phenomena at the neuron level" to "there is no qualia". but there are some very distinct correlations. depression is a great example here. Yes, there is a great deal of work to do, but that means nothing. Its not an argument against the idea, and I was wanting to talk of this idea as a poosible way of the contingent world, not as an idea that is already proved.

If we have found very strong links to some, then its worth searching for more. Many reaserchers of perception will argue for the exsistance of the "grandmother cell", where there is a very specific cell in the brain designed only to respond to your grandmothers image. Infact, a lot of the cortex is set out like that: one cell only responding to very very specific information. If that be the case, then is it not at least plausable that one CAN develop a one to one "reduction" to the brain? but in saying they are correlated, then you are still assuming that these states exsist in their own right, and IMO they do not.

2.We are far away from having a holistic,successful,theory of consciousness.There is no good reason now to think that the findings in neurology represent more than some necessary[i/] conditions for the appearance of conscious experience not sufficient[i/] ones.[b/][quote/]

You can't pull the neccesary card here. Mainly because youcannot prove that somthing is neccacary, you can only prove that it is contingent, as this is a contingent universe. Kant tried his whole life to prove somthing to be a neccesary truth, and built a lovley glass cathedral, sure. But just because it is not neccasary does not mean that's the only way it can be done within our own know universe.

Even if they are "sufficiant" and not the only way it can be done within our universe, so what? you want to talk about what "consousness" is... why not start with an explanation of what it could be inside us, and then start to expand the field to include anything you want it to be, including AI if you think immitation is good enough to attribute the real thing to. it all depends on how strictly you moniter your explanation, and what you hope to achieve from such a definition.

3.The emergentist approach does not make any predictions about the level of complexity when the emergent phenomenon of consciousness appears.Anyway what good reasons are to believe that a degree of complexity close to those of human beings will really produce conscious experience in androids or at least a behaviour indistinguishable from that of a human being?[b/][quote/]

the android approach ignores the biological causation of human consiousness. they can never be consious in the way humans are, simply because if they are consious then they are so by diffrent means. there is no emergant phenomena. we are tricked into thinking there is, as we have a wholistic experience of our world. there is only brain activity, and we think we have a mind. eliminative materialism.

4.Mental states seem to be more than the firing of some neurons in the neural network of the brain (OK a strictly philosophical objection but valuable).[b/][quote/]

seems... but how easily tricked is our experience? how much as we convinced that we are of one mind, and this mind is a thing?

To explain this I will introduce the split brain patient. (if you don't know much about this sort of thing, then read up on it, I know there have been a few threads on this around the place latley so i won't go into extensive detail) They beleiev that they have a unified mind, a unified sense of mind. UNTILL they are put in a test situation where only certian information (say the word "pen") is given to the RH,while nothing is given to the LH. the experimentor will then ask the subject to pick up the object described by the word. while stating "what word?" they will reach out and grab the pen of a tray of objects. Lesson? this so called "emergant phenomena" obviously cannot pass through severed neural passages. thus is closly tied to neural activity. even though the patient seems to believe that he is of one mind, of "unified spirit" it is clear that this is an illusion. why? there is no place in the mind where things come together like that. there is no place where a unified mind that takes all the information received and melds it into an experience. infact, such a mind does not exsist. only neurol activity does, and that is incredibly complex.

5.All physicalist models proposed so far are only inferences from the (too) incomplete scientific conjecture of today.Neither deduced nor absolutely necessary to account for the known facts.There is no good reason to believe now that the layer model of Dennett or his neural darwinism theory are something more than mere philosophy.[b/][quote/]

its speculation that leads to fallacy as they all start from the worng end. I do not neccesarily agree with Dennett. Infact, i am more in favor with the Churchlands, as I said before. Dennett has a lot to answer for, especily with Cog now on the loose.

As a conclusion the actual reductionist view (at the neuronal level) and all related doctrines are simple conjectures for which we cannot assign a high degree of confidence now.Though they are theoretically and empirically evolving all unbiased scientists will recognize that we are rather at the beginnig of the road.There is basically no constraint for a would be rational person to believe in its actual (approximative truth).At most it is the best we could achieve so far so that,on pragmatic grounds entirely,all rational persons will prefer it to other existing (non scientific) hypotheses for all their practical purposes.Nothing more.I meant data inferred from empirical facts not the philosophical doctrines themselves,of course.

well, that's your opinion. To me, its taken from a neurobiological point of view, and I have been studing this for years, and am about to start my thesis. There is a lot of hope in the neuro biological world that this can be the case,and there have been major steps taken to show that its very plausable. all lesion studies, all studies on the visual cortex in particular (especily for a unified theory of mind reaserch) is very pointed towards the brain being the causer and the activator of every step of a consious state, and even the unconsious state. But I won't go down this line if there is no interest in it.
 
  • #86
Originally posted by Fliption
That's interesting because I don't think it explains anything heh. But perhaps I didn't fully understand it.

How do we explain the "sense of body and mind" that you spoke of?

If there is nothing to reductively explain, then how do we explain that we have a sense of something needing an explanation?
We explain the sense of mind and body on account of it arises from the brain functions. The brain does its thing, as the whole body does, and the sense of mind and body is an emergent property of that process. I don't believe anyone has been able yet to explain why Hydrogen and Oxygen combine to create 'wetness' yet, it is just sort of accepted that due to the properties of the molecule, wetness is a consequence. And so, we have no idea how the parts of the brain come together to result in this felt experience of unified consciousness, but it most certainly does... The key to this explanation though, is that this emergent property is the least important thing. It is just a side effect...an after thought. Consciousness itself has no relevence at all. The brain is all that matters.

When u concentrate on the brain, then the experiences assosciated with certain stimuli will start to be explained in terms of "Oh, so that brainstate is what it is like to see red"


But I am half guessing, it is up to dark wing to come back and give you a real reply to this.
 
  • #87
Originally posted by Another God
We explain the sense of mind and body on account of it arises from the brain functions. The brain does its thing, as the whole body does, and the sense of mind and body is an emergent property of that process. I don't believe anyone has been able yet to explain why Hydrogen and Oxygen combine to create 'wetness' yet, it is just sort of accepted that due to the properties of the molecule, wetness is a consequence.

First let's make very clear what we mean by 'wetness' of water. For your analogy to be successful, you must be talking about the physical consistency (ie fluidity) of water, NOT the subjective experience of wetness-- otherwise you are not talking about something analogous to the mystery of consciousness, but rather you are just talking about the mystery of consciousness itself in disguised form.

So, if our question is just how hydrogen and oxygen combine to form a fluid, we do indeed have a pretty straightforward physical explanation. The physical structure of H2O molecules and the function of their electrostatic attraction, in suitable conditions, creates a bonding structure in a substance that is dense but not rigid. H2O molecules are free to tumble over one another, so to speak, and the macroscopic expression of this is fluidity.

This is an example of reductive explanation at its best. It works because it tells us how structure and function on one level (macroscopic) is entailed by structure and function on another level (microscopic).

However, this approach breaks down with consciousness. Subjective experience is not a structure; it does not occupy space; it is not objectively observable; and so on. The problem is not a mystery of how emergent phenomena in general work-- the emergence of fluidity from bonding structure, for example, is fairly straightforward. The problem is one of ontology-- how can something with the nature that we ascribe to physical objects entail something with the nature that we ascribe to subjective experience? There is good reason for thinking that there is nothing in our currently accepted ontology that entails the existence of consciousness a priori. The simple response is that we need to expand our ontology.

And so, we have no idea how the parts of the brain come together to result in this felt experience of unified consciousness, but it most certainly does... The key to this explanation though, is that this emergent property is the least important thing. It is just a side effect...an after thought. Consciousness itself has no relevence at all. The brain is all that matters.

Not sure exactly what you're trying to say here.

When u concentrate on the brain, then the experiences assosciated with certain stimuli will start to be explained in terms of "Oh, so that brainstate is what it is like to see red"

That's still not an explanation, it's an identification. The question remains, why or how is it that this brain state entails the experience of the color red? What properties of this brainstate could possibly account for such a thing?
 
  • #88
Originally posted by Dark Wing
Hey Hypnogouge, this is a little reply to the 1st post you put up... I have read the other 2 pages, but I want to bypass most of those arguments and explain Chalmers problem (and Dennett’s) in a new way...

OK

THE SOLUTION

We are looking at this backwards. Instead of trying to reduce the un-catergorisable into a physical state, we should start at the bottom and work up. Start with brain activity. in fact, start with a single neuron, doing its thing. It receives information, it fires or does not fire depending on previous experience, conditioning and action potential. What results from this single neuron? a result. a new chemical state, and subsequently a change in experience.

What do you mean by experience here? There are many neurons whose activities don't activate some kind of experience (hence, the unconscious mind).

But more importantly, WHY a subsequent change in experience? Why any experience to begin with?

Now, if you get every lobe and section of your brain simply doing what it does: receiving information and then passing on the new information: we experience our world. why? cause our brain is taking in physical stimulus from the physical world and physically processing it. "the mind" is simply the result of this process.

OK, let me see if I have your argument straight.

Step 1. The physical brain processes information.
Step 2. Then a miracle occurs...
Step 3. "The mind" is simply the result of this process.

I think you need to be more explicit in step 2. :smile:

My argument is not that conscious experience is not causally linked in some way with the brain. My argument is that any explanation invoking only physical processes in the brain is insufficient to solve the problem before us, even though it is still necessary to refer to such brain activity for a theory of human consciousness.

To put it simply, while embracing your bottom-up approach: why should processes in the brain give rise to consciousness at all? Why do these processes not take place like nice materialistic experience-less machines? Why AREN'T we zombies?

I don't believe that the bottom-up approach can answer this question, even in principle, starting from a materialist ontology (see my posts in Faulty expectations of a theory of consciousness). I agree that bottom-up is really the most useful paradigm to take, precisely because I think it shows more forcefully that materialism can't explain consciousness. (ad hoc tack-ons don't count)
 
  • #89
OK, yep, I'm back where I started on this matter. I do agree completely hypnagogue, and now that I have had a chance to think about this again, I remember why.

Having put some thought into this I came to the conclusion that when you say "Why should it?" you mean what I would prefer to say "How does it [give rise to consciousness]?". Because upon thinking about this problem earlier this year, I came up with a possibly 'why' answer. I considered the problem evolutionarily (as I feel compelled to do), and the answer that I came up with, was it was a better survival strategy to create a mind which believed it existed rather than a mind which went about computing its functions. Sure out mind still does that, but now that we believe that we exist, we REALLY don't want to die... we are even fearful of dying... etc. The survival game is much more real.

How it went about achieving that phenomenon...well, that is precisely what you are asking.
 
  • #90
Dark Wing

You can't pull the neccesary card here. Mainly because youcannot prove that somthing is neccacary, you can only prove that it is contingent, as this is a contingent universe. Kant tried his whole life to prove somthing to be a neccesary truth, and built a lovley glass cathedral, sure. But just because it is not neccasary does not mean that's the only way it can be done within our own know universe.
Even if they are "sufficiant" and not the only way it can be done within our universe, so what? you want to talk about what "consousness" is... why not start with an explanation of what it could be inside us, and then start to expand the field to include anything you want it to be, including AI if you think immitation is good enough to attribute the real thing to. it all depends on how strictly you moniter your explanation, and what you hope to achieve from such a definition.

Probably you speak of Hume's problems of induction and causality.Yes strictly speaking we cannot be sure that something is really necessary.But in science there is a well defined notion of determinism and causality.Otherwise there would not exist the notion of scientific knowledge.We can infer,based on all observed facts,in the limit of error of our measurement devices,a number of causes which produce a physical phenomenon using a mixture of the well known methods of agreement,difference,equal variations and rest.There is no need for certitudes,there might be more (whose effect cannot be put in evidence empirically),science is concerned only with necessary and sufficient conditions that can be inferred based on all we are able to observe and measure.For example if in the presence of certain initial conditions (indistinguishable experimentally between tests) we always obtain a certain effect (also indistinguishable experimentally) we can assume we found the necessary and sufficient causes which produce a certain effect and from here to propose a scientific explanation that must be tested further.If after these extensive tests the hypothesis is not falsified and we manage to obtain a relevant experimental sample (successful tests in all relevant sort of conditions on a certain domain of definition) then we can have a high degree of confidence in the (approximative) truth of our conjecture (on that domain of definition).

In the case of our problem we cannot say we have all relevant causes that can be inferred from experiments.And this is not because of some measurement limitations,simply the brain is a so complex phenomenon that we have not managed to find all relevant mechanisms which produce conscious experience.All unbiased scientists will recognize this.Hence we cannot propose for the moment a holistic theory of consciousness of the kind of the inverse square law of gravitation (or Coulomb's law) in physics for example.All we can propose is a certain conjecture,which is evolving theoretically and experimentally indeed for the moment (all newly discovered mechanisms fit with the conjecture),but which is far from the needed holistic view in order to have a high degree of confidence in its (approximative) truth,if sustained by a relevant experimental sample of course.

Nothing indicates for the moment that the computational emergentist approach is really (approximatively) true.There is no good reason to think now that neural network is enough to explain conscious experience.Quantum consciousness approaches,even some types of interactionist dualism (see Eccles',a neurologist,proposal-by the way he is a Nobel prize winner),are still feasible,compatible with all research done in the neurological field though for the moment at least we cannot label them scientific (but nothing impede the proposal of such a scientific hypothesis in the future).This does not mean the actual experimental data is not valid,on the contrary,only that it might just not be enough.Maybe QM is involved,maybe much more,the split between these proposals might be at a very subtle level impossible to be put in evidence today.Of course there is also the possibility that eventually we will have sufficinet reasons to have a high degree of confidence in the computationalist approach but now it's not the case.

the android approach ignores the biological causation of human consiousness. they can never be consious in the way humans are, simply because if they are consious then they are so by diffrent means. there is no emergant phenomena. we are tricked into thinking there is, as we have a wholistic experience of our world. there is only brain activity, and we think we have a mind. eliminative materialism.

In case that such an android,with the brain constructed based on microswitches (having a level of complexity similar to that of a human being) will not have a behaviour indistinguishable from a human being there will exist sufficient empirical reasons against the actual computational emergentist approach.In other words will be sufficient reasons to conclude that the actual hypothesis was disproved.Indeed one of its pillars is that human mind is an emergent phenomenon due to complex interactions of the neural network in the brain.We would expect from the actual conjecture (it is a prediction of it in fact) that an android,build using the same pattern as the human brain,based on microswitches,to produce conscious experience whose first external sign to be a behaviour indistinguishable from that of a human being.Otherwise there are no good reasons to think that a computational emergentist theory in general (not only the actual variant,disproved in case that will happen what I said above) could be really enough.Exactly this is the purpose of the 'zombies' philosophical argument,to show that such androids cannot be conscious as human beings are.The above scenario will be a relevant experimental confirmation of those objections,leading inevitably to the demise of the actual variant of the computational emergentist approach.And I hardly see what alterantive scientific computational emergentist hypothesis could be proposed instead...

well, that's your opinion. To me, its taken from a neurobiological point of view, and I have been studing this for years, and am about to start my thesis. There is a lot of hope in the neuro biological world that this can be the case,and there have been major steps taken to show that its very plausable. all lesion studies, all studies on the visual cortex in particular (especily for a unified theory of mind reaserch) is very pointed towards the brain being the causer and the activator of every step of a consious state, and even the unconsious state. But I won't go down this line if there is no interest in it.

I do not think it is a question of opinion here.It's about hard facts.We need a holistic hypothesis of consciousness which to make clear predictions about the way the whole mechanism works which to be tested extensivley further.We cannot make generalizations when we know we have only a theory which accounts for parts of a mechanism.I'm afraid hope alone cannot raise the degree of confidence and the probability that the actual conjecture is true.Of course eventually we might have sufficient empirical reasons to have a high degree of confidence in the actual conjecture.But till then we have an awful lot of work to do.Hasty generalizations now are at least non rational.At most some people,this is not obligatory for all would be rational persons,can base from all known empirical facts a rational belief that the actual conjecture is (approximatively) true.Of course belief does not mean we have sufficient empirical reasons now to make the positive claim that it is (approximatively) true...
 
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  • #91
Dark Wing

You jump from "there is a lot of unexplained phenomena at the neuron level" to "there is no qualia". but there are some very distinct correlations. depression is a great example here. Yes, there is a great deal of work to do, but that means nothing. Its not an argument against the idea, and I was wanting to talk of this idea as a poosible way of the contingent world, not as an idea that is already proved.

If we have found very strong links to some, then its worth searching for more. Many reaserchers of perception will argue for the exsistance of the "grandmother cell", where there is a very specific cell in the brain designed only to respond to your grandmothers image. Infact, a lot of the cortex is set out like that: one cell only responding to very very specific information. If that be the case, then is it not at least plausable that one CAN develop a one to one "reduction" to the brain? but in saying they are correlated, then you are still assuming that these states exsist in their own right, and IMO they do not.

I have not intended to say that 'there is no qualia'.I only wanted to stress that we still have a lot of work to do even in the so called 'easy' problem (to use the terminology of Chalmers) without talking of the possible existence of a fudamental qualia irreducible to the functioning of the brain (the 'hard' problem).But from what you say I deduce that you accept the mere conjectural status of the actual hypothesis,without making the claim that it is very close to the actual truth (in absolute).

Neither do I deny the possibility that qualia might appear as an emergent property of the complex functioning of the neural network of the brain (as the actual main view conjectures) without the need to postulate also that qualia needs something more or that consciousness is made of a different,though possible capable to interact with usual matter,'substance' (as epiphenomenalism+interactionist dualism assume).Or that the actual conjecture cannot be improved.The only problem I see now is that we are far away from having the reasons which to entitle us to have a great degree of confidence in the actual view (namely the actual variant of the emergentist approach).I have nothing with the actual view strictly technically speaking.Apart from criticising some of scientists' too optimistic expectations sometimes of course.Indeed it is still an open question whether the actual view will be confirmed with sufficient reasons practically.So far there is no known emergent phenomenon that is conscious or at least proto conscious.
 
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  • #92
metacristi, the objection here can be stated very simply.

1. Any purely physical explanations of consciousness will leave us free to rationally imagine a result to the contrary. That is, you can give me any theory T that tells me brainstate X or computation Y leads to conscious aspect Z, but I can still rationally imagine X or Y taking place without Z occurring as well. That is, if I imagine X or Y taking place without Z occurring as well, T cannot explain to me definitively why I am wrong, other than to say simply "that is just not how it is observed to be in nature."

2. Explanations that exhaust the necessary and sufficient conditions for a phenomenon leave us with a conceptual necessity-- that is, having fully understood the explanation, it is impossible for us to rationally imagine otherwise. For instance, having understood the facts about the microscopic bonding structure of H2O molecules, it is impossible for me to rationally imagine that a large collection of H2O molecules in a container at STP could exist without the properties of water being the macroscopic result-- the latter is a conceptual necessity following from the former. (If I do imagine otherwise, the conventional scientific explanation can explain to me step by step how I am wrong, rather than baldly asserting so.)

3. It follows from 1 and 2 that any physical theory of consciousness is does not include some necessary or sufficient causes. We have every reason to believe that explaining brain processes is necessary in explaining the details of human consciousness, so that leaves us to conclude that explaining brain processes (or computational processes) is not sufficient. There is something missing from the physical account.

There is simple but powerful intuition behind this claim. Any successful explanation of a phenomenon P in terms of a set of composite phenomena C must explain the mechanisms whereby the existence of C necessitates that P follows. For this to be possible, there needs to be some sort of combinatory effect in the phenomena C that somehow 'add up' to P. For instance, in the case of water, we have the structure and functions of H2O molecules adding up to the macroscopic structural and functional properties of water.

Now, in the traditional materialist ontology, we have our characters spacetime, matter, energy, and so on, with various associated properties. It is not clear at all that any of these materialist characters, as we traditionally conceive of them, have the right characteristics to somehow 'add up' to consciousness, no matter how they are arranged.

Indulge me in an analogy that is bound to be imperfect, but, I think, useful. In nature we observe two things of a fundamentally different character: material reality and consciousness. Without yet assuming that these two are distinct, we can still notice fundamental differences in our conceptions of these two things. All things in objective material reality have spatial extension; consciousness does not have spatial extension. All things in objective material reality are defined in terms of extrinsic or relational properties (for instance, mass is a relational property defined in terms of an object's resistance to acceleration); at least some elements of consciousness are defined in terms of intrinsic or inherent properties (for instance, the subjective experience of red is defined only in terms of its own redness). And so on.

A simplistic mathematical analogy would involve two sets of numbers with fundamentally different properties; for our purposes, let's say material reality as we conceive of it is represented by the real numbers and that consciousness is represented by the imaginary numbers. If we set out to explain consciousness starting from a materialist ontology alone, it is a bit like we are starting off assuming that only real numbers exist and then trying to show that we can somehow combine some set of reals to yield an imaginary. In the end it is a doomed exercise, because no combination of reals can add up to i. It is fundamentally a futile addition of zeroes in the imaginary component. Likewise, I believe that no combination of physical processes alone can account for consciousness, because the materialist ontology leaves out a critical element. Any attempt to do so is fundamentally a futile addition of zeroes in the 'experience' component. The solution to our mathematical problem is to recognize that we can't derive i from the reals; rather, we just add it in as a fundamental character in our mathematical ontology and proceed. Likewise, the solution to our problem of consciousness is to recognize that we can't derive experience from physical processes; rather, on some level, we just have to add some new fundamental character into our natural ontology and proceed.
 
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  • #93
It looks as if I don't need to respond to your response AG. I was just going to add that if emergent properties can hide mysteries than there would be no need to replace consciousness with an illusion. We could just simply say that consciousness DOES exists and it is an emergent property of physical processes. But I think we're straight on all that now.
 
  • #94
hypnagogue

The scientific method provides the best methodology known of establishing the truth about natural facts.This is a fact accepted by all serious philosophers and scientists.But it is not considered infallible nor the best methodology ever possible.That's why scientific knowledge is always fallible,it never makes definitive claims,being always provisional.Scientists are always open to make the finding that something is missing.But this finding must be based entirely on experiments.Not on mental experiments.They are useful only to show that certain arguments are incoherent logically or,though not always conclusive,imply a contradiction with some already accepted knowledge (there is another use,not relevant here,to show that some assumptions still hold even in cases that cannot be experimented for the moment;Heisenbergs mental experiments is one example-though I strongly doubt that we are entitled to conclude from here that HUP can be extended to all singular events).

Secondly we are entitled rationally to assign different degrees of confidence in the approximative truth of a certain assumption about natural facts upon the number of relevant successful experimental confirmations.Providing a systematic observation (done with the best measurement devices) and the existence of a relevant sample of successful tests,on a certain domain of definition and in the limit of what can be observed,we are even entitled to have a very high degree of confidence.This is exactly the rational base of why we are entitled to assign a much higher degree of confidence in the scientific explanations than in the so called 'common truths' (assumptions about facts inferred from very superficial observations).

Since science is entirely concerned with observed facts,if we managed to find all relevant causes for a certain phenomenon that can be put in evidence empirically at a certain moment,based on which to propose a detailed and widely tested theory,not falsified yet,especially in the absence of any other scientific alternative hypothesis,we would be fully entitled to have a very high degree of confidence that it is approximatively correct.This does not imply certitudes,technically we are still open to doubt,but the existence of those sufficient causes fully entitle some people to think that it is actually very close to the truth,maybe the best theory possible and so to RELY on the theory not merely to prefer on the ground that it is the best approach at a certain moment.

If we could propose a detailed successful holistic theory of consciousness,extensively tested,we would be exactly in such a situation.The only requirement is that the theory should also make clear predictions about the mechanisms that create subjective experience.In spite of the fact that for the moment those predictions might not be confirmed empirically because we cannot 'measure' subjective experiences (who can be sure that this will ever be so?) all the above mentioned conditions are present so that scientists would be rationally entitled,backed by sufficient reasons,to rely on that theory.Of course this is not obligatory for all rational persons but it would be a strong base for the conclusion.Not to mention the possible construction of an android whose behaviour is indistinct from that of a human being using it.This does not imply that they (scientists) would not be open to new facts,on the contrary,but for that they would need sufficient reasons to think that there exist something extra.And this sufficient reasons must be based necessarily on empirical facts.Even without accepting that the theory is close to the actual truth,that is without relying on it,merely preffering it to all other hypotheses on pragmatic grounds,we would still need empirical facts to believe that something extra is involved.

So that,even if in absolute maybe subjective experiences involves something 'inbuilt' in the fundamental reality,from all empirical facts known+the low number of puzzles in the theory or no puzzle at all+the existence of an explanation for the subjective experiences inside the existing paradigm (though not confirmed practically for the moment)+the absence of an alternative scientific hypothesis there is no good reason to think that something extra is involved.Indeed the fact that there are some not confirmed yet predictions never constitute a falsification of the existing paradigm.Even if there are final limitations or we will not be able to confirm the predictions about how subjective experiences arise for a very long time there are no good reasons to believe that those predictions are wrong if the above presented situation does not change.

Returning at your philosophical argument,assuming also that we had a detailed theory of consciousness as above,from the fact that you can imagine that there can exist zombies (X,Y=the causes of subjective experience as proposed by the existing approach are present but Z=qualia no) means nothing practically.Maybe is so but we have no good reason to believe that for the moment.Scientists are still open to the possibility that this approach is correct but they need further experimental arguments.Or,as many physicalists/functionalists would object,you should first prove empirically that there exist androids or humans (with the behaviour indistinct from that of a human being) who/which do not have qualia.
 
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  • #95
metacrista, you've repeated your points about the emperical method and levels of certainty many times. I understand it. But it doesn't appear that you grasp what is actually being said here. I don't believe anyone is claiming that science can't eventually have an understanding of consciousness. Hypnagogue's point is that some of our assumptions will have to change before this can happen.

This is not an opinion, or even an irrelevant mathematical truth that you need to observe in order to verify, as I understand it. It is impossible for you to reductively understand consciousness under the current scheme. Let me give an analogy to see if I can help you see the way this dialogue appears to me.

Let's assume that I've told you that once I have painted a white wall the color black, then it is no longer white. We're assuming 2 things:
1) the wall was white
2) I paint it black

therefore the wall is no longer white.

Now you come along and say, "we can only know that the wall is no longer white if we observe it to be true." This makes no sense because by definition it is true. Because if the wall is still white upon emperical study, then assumption 2 would be wrong and I could not have painted it black. So if we know that both assumptions are true, then we don't have to verify that the wall is no longer white. We know it isn't, by definition. Regardless of how long you observe a black wall, it will never be white!

The only way you can ever succeed in finding a wall that is both white and black is if you change the definitions. Or as Hypnagogue says with regards to consciousness, change the natural ontology.

So no matter how hard you look at a black wall, it is always white. Likewise, no matter what you find emperically under the current assumptions, you will never get rid of the hard problem of consciousness. Go ahead and think of all the possible scientific explanations for consciousness you can think of and let all that are participating show you how they don't(cannot) address the real issue of consciousness by definition.
 
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  • #96
Originally posted by metacristi
But this finding must be based entirely on experiments. Not on mental experiments.They are useful only to show that certain arguments are incoherent logically or,though not always conclusive,imply a contradiction with some already accepted knowledge

Well, I believe my 'mental experiments' have shown that it is logically incoherent to assume that we can sufficiently explain consciousness entirely in terms of the currently accepted materialistic ontology. Conclusion, we need something more than the currently accepted materailistic ontology to explain consciousness.

Returning at your philosophical argument,assuming also that we had a detailed theory of consciousness as above,from the fact that you can imagine that there can exist zombies (X,Y=the causes of subjective experience as proposed by the existing approach are present but Z=qualia no) means nothing practically.Maybe is so but we have no good reason to believe that for the moment.Scientists are still open to the possibility that this approach is correct but they need further experimental arguments.Or,as many physicalists/functionalists would object,you should first prove empirically that there exist androids or humans (with the behaviour indistinct from that of a human being) who/which do not have qualia.

That argument of mine is not meant to assert that it is an actual possibility that a normally functioning human brain can be non-conscious. What I am interested in is being able to explain consciousness. If a theory leaves me room to rationally imagine a consequence different from what it predicts, it is a pretty lousy (or at least, incomplete) theory. A good, complete theory will not leave any room for the imagination; it will force my rationally thinking mind to accept its arguments, piece by piece, until I inevitably arrive at its conclusion. I contend that any purely materialistic (as we currently conceive of the word) theory of consciousness can never be a good, complete theory in this way. If I am right, I think that alone is very powerful evidence that materialism is missing a piece of the puzzle, regardless of empirical concerns.
 
  • #97
Originally posted by Fliption
metacrista, you've repeated your points about the emperical method and levels of certainty many times. I understand it. But it doesn't appear that you grasp what is actually being said here. I don't believe anyone is claiming that science can't eventually have an understanding of consciousness. Hypnagogue's point is that some of our assumptions will have to change before this can happen.

Thanks Fliption, that is an eloquent way of saying exactly what I am trying to say.
 
  • #98
Might any exchange of information be considered a form of consciousness?
 
  • #99
Originally posted by hypnagogue
What do you mean by experience here? There are many neurons whose activities don't activate some kind of experience (hence, the unconscious mind). But more importantly, WHY a subsequent change in experience? Why any experience to begin with?

without experience, and without sense of self we would not be able to form societies, or live in a way that was benificial to self at all. In short, we would not survive if you did not have a sense of consiousness. And all that has to reflect is an ability to interact with one's environment. anything that has the ability to interact with the environment comes into question here. from simple conditioning of cells to pheromone interaction with insects to our higher level social interaction:we need it to predict and controll our world.

So you ask: why? why is it neccesary for it to be the case that we have consiousness?

Its not. The question ends up chasing a dark end, why?

example. when you strike a match you have fire. Why? because friction on phosphorous happens to cause a spark. Why? its not neccesary. Its just happens to be the case in this contingent world. to try and explain it further and further down becomes meaningless. So the brain: we happen to have an attribute of semantics. we can create and derrive meaning from our world. evolutionary advantage? yes. enables us to live better with in a society and interact with our fellow species. maybe it is the case that there were a few zombie nations out there, and they were wiped out. Its concievable. But not in this contingent universe.

Instead, here, when there is neural activity, you have mind. or at least a heightened ability to interact with the environemtn, an ability that goes beyond just neurol activity, but very basic nervous activity on a celluar level. and that's all the brain is: a highly advanced nervous center.

OK, let me see if I have your argument straight.

Step 1. The physical brain processes information.
Step 2. Then a miracle occurs...
Step 3. "The mind" is simply the result of this process.

I think you need to be more explicit in step 2. :smile:
ha ha, very good. Infact, i am saying that step 2 does not exsist. it is not the result, it is not the emergant property, it is the process itself. eliminative materialism.

example. Ancient civilisations believed that lightning was a result of thors hammer striking down the mountian tops of Valhalla. We have recently learned that it is infact the depolerisation of electricity. that IS lightning. there is no need for the extra explanation. just a description of the system. Just like a brain that is functioing in certian area's will convince some that they must have a mind, some emergant property of a closed physical domain. when in fact, its just the dopamine pathway activating again. Do we know where exacly the feeling of consiousness is caused? most of the litrature is suggesting the fronal cortex, and they can stimulate all kinds of area's of that with regularity to make a subject feel diffrent things. one surgon kept stimulating a section, and the patient kept laughing: when asked what was so funny, he would say it was the picture of a horse on the wall, or the lab coat of the doctor etc. we don't need that extra explanation, but we can't handle the thought that we are just physical beings. There is no emergant property. there is no majical step from consiousness. its just a contingent fact then when we are stimulated in certianways we will feel like thus.

My argument is not that conscious experience is not causally linked in some way with the brain. My argument is that any explanation invoking only physical processes in the brain is insufficient to solve the problem before us, even though it is still necessary to refer to such brain activity for a theory of human consciousness.

thatis because there is no problem of consiousness. it is a battle of words we are dealing with here. i will see if i can find a good Wittgensteign quote to put in here on this exact topic to show you what i mean by that. although its halpful to theorize with words like "mind" and "consiousness" it will often just lead to semantic confusion, and that's the last thing we want here.

To put it simply, while embracing your bottom-up approach: why should processes in the brain give rise to consciousness at all? Why do these processes not take place like nice materialistic experience-less machines? Why AREN'T we zombies?

there are many answers to that. maybe because of the nature of the contingent world we live in, maybe its for evolutionary reasons. who can explain evolution? Just as a match and fire has its explanation limit, so des the mind and consiousness. you have to start withan underlying fact somewhere.
 
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  • #100
hypnagogue



Well, I believe my 'mental experiments' have shown that it is logically incoherent to assume that we can sufficiently explain consciousness entirely in terms of the currently accepted materialistic ontology. Conclusion, we need something more than the currently accepted materailistic ontology to explain consciousness.

From all I've read so far no philosophical argument has succeeded,in a sound way,to show that the physicalist approach is indeed incoherent.No one is convincing.This is not only my conclusion it is the conclusion of many serious philosophers.Even Chalmers agree that the logical possibility of zombies does not entail their experimental possibility.I'm afraid we are here in a stalemate,at the logical level,comparable with that regarding the argument pro/con the existence of a personal God.One must first believe in the existence/nonexistence of God in order to accept the arguments pro/con God existence.And of course belief is never a proof.Only hard evidence could make the difference.


That argument of mine is not meant to assert that it is an actual possibility that a normally functioning human brain can be non-conscious. What I am interested in is being able to explain consciousness. If a theory leaves me room to rationally imagine a consequence different from what it predicts, it is a pretty lousy (or at least, incomplete) theory. A good, complete theory will not leave any room for the imagination; it will force my rationally thinking mind to accept its arguments, piece by piece, until I inevitably arrive at its conclusion. I contend that any purely materialistic (as we currently conceive of the word) theory of consciousness can never be a good, complete theory in this way. If I am right, I think that alone is very powerful evidence that materialism is missing a piece of the puzzle, regardless of empirical concerns.


As I've explained numerous times before the mere possibility that we will never be able to confirm experimentally the explanations of a very successful otherwise physicalist theory on how subjective experiences appear is not a proof,per se,that there is something more fundamental.

No respectable scientist will argue that a scientific theory explaining very well all observed facts (being very detailed with respect to what we observe) is indeed the best possible theory.For that we should prove first that there are possible only a finite number of alternative hypotheses,logically coherent,compatible with facts and that only one of them has not been disproved yet.This is quasi impossible to do in practice.That's why scientists are always prepared to find that their theories are incomplete or disproved provided new data,though some of them (or possible all of them) might have a great confidence in their approximative truth.So that we can never assume that we exhausted all necessary and sufficient conditions.Not even in your example with the water.Thus there is no logical necessity to believe that it is impossible for us to rationally imagine otherwise,the actual explanation being simply the best we could achieve so far using the best methodology available in front of all observed facts nothing more.

Besides for a certain set of observed facts could exist,possible,an infinity of logical explanations that can be imagined.For example in the case of water we can postulate that the forces at work which hold atoms of H and O toghether are due partly to some invisible quantum leprichauns.This is fully possible though we cannot observe them now.Of course it is the epistemological privilege of science,based on observed facts only,which makes the difference and entitle us to assign a way higher degree of confidence in the truth of the scientific theory.It is always hard facts which make the difference,still this does not mean the leprichaun hypothesis was disproved.Provided new relevant experimental data...it will become science.Exactly this is the case with qualia.But for the moment there is no good reason to think that qualia is fundamental so what's the point of changing something in the scientific method itself?I'm afraid logic alone is not enough to settle things.

[We would be entitled to change some assumptions in the scientifc method itself only if the best existent theory of mind will become theoretically and empirically stagnant for a long time,in spite of the effort of the best minds on Earth and the existence of generous fundings for research,with a lot of anomalies and puzzles piling up,in the absence of any serious scientific alternative hypotheses.In this case I think it is more rational to assume that there is something extra we cannot put in evidence instead of postulating indefinitely that the actual approach will be able to explain away the puzzles later.But of course not even in this case would we be entitled to claim that qualia is fundamental.]
 
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  • #101
For science consciousness is a paradigm-shaking problem. Even now, comfortably into 21st century, no logically plausible scientific theory for its existence has yet been proposed. Many researchers remain hopeful that given more time a scientific explanation will be devised. However the longer the problem remains unsolved the more likely it becomes that the logical arguments against the possibility of a devising a scientific explanation hold, and that we cannot explain a strictly first-person phenomena in strictly third-person terms in principle. It seems reasonable to suppose that this is the ause of our inability as yet to conceive of one single scientific experiment that would prove anything at all about it.

My impression is that most of those people who believe that the current scientific model of the universe is correct also tend to believe that recently attempted explanations of consciousness based on low frequency oscillations in the brain, quantum coherence in micro-tubules, supervenience, hetero-phenomenology and so on are so nearly plausible that we must be on the brink of success, and that soon we will make the inevitable breakthrough.

However this view is based on faith rather than evidence of progress. We are no closer to explaining the origins of consciousness than Parmeneides was, and no current scientific theory that claims to explain consciousness, or even claims to explain how it might be explained, stands up to logical scrutiny.

There is no scientific definition of consciousness, no scientific test for its presence or absence, no scientific means of measuring it and no scientific proof of its existence. There is no place for it in the scientific model, no scientific theory requiring it as a postulate, and no scientific description of its properties that does not completely contradict our ‘folk-psychological’ experience of it. If it were not for first-person anecdotes there would be no scientific reason to believe that it exists.

Yet any day now we are expected to succeed in constructing a scientific explanation of it. This is surely ridiculous. The infamous ‘explanatory gap’ is not a crack in the pavement, it is a chasm of Hollywood special effects proportions, and it is no narrower today than it ever was.
 
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  • #102
I think we must settle once and forever some things (I already explained them but it seems no one really understood in spite of some claims here).Science itself does not make any positive claim that an explanation in physical terms is surely possible.It has at basis an axiom stating that nature can be understood indeed.However this axiom was introduced because it is absolutely necessary for its internal logical consistence.If we do not assume that nature can be understood why bother then to do scientific research?And since there is no proof that human mind is above nature the axiom still stands even in this case (it postulates that we can find a holistic,detailed,explanation of consciousness in which to have a high degree of confidence).But it is considered also fallible,the finding of sufficient empirical or logical reasons leading to its demise.I indicated above some necessary conditions when we would be entitled to do that (this is not sufficient of course for an action would depend also on the philosophical views held by the majority in the scientific community).But certainly we cannot do that now,the actual objections are not sound.This fallibilistic scientific approach of why consciousness can be understood is entirely different from the physicalist approach that science can surely have a detailed theory entirely on phisical terms.At most this view can count as a philosophical view in spite of the fact that there are no serious arguments against now.And from what I know the majority of physicalists accept this.
 
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  • #103
Originally posted by metacristi
Science itself does not make any positive claim that an explanation in physical terms is surely possible.It has at basis an axiom stating that nature can be understood indeed. However this axiom was introduced because it is absolutely necessary for its internal logical consistence.If we do not assume that nature can be understood why bother then to do scientific research?
This is self-contradictory. Science makes no postive claims that consciousness can be naturalised, yet science takes it as axiomatic that everything can be naturalised. It makes no sense.
 
  • #104
OK Dark Wing, I see where you are coming from, and I think we are now at a critical point in our discussion. I agree that, on some level, consciousness is contingent or is the result of some compository contingent entities; at some point, it cannot be explained any further other than to say that it is just a brute fact of nature.

However, there are distinctions to be made with regards to your match analogy. Strictly speaking, that a flame results from striking a match is not a contingent fact. It is the necessary result of a certain pattern of matter and energy acting according to the laws of physics, which themselves are the true contingent entities here. (Once we have accepted the contingency of the laws of physics, matter/energy etc., the flame of the struck match follows as a necessary consequence.) Accordingly, we can exhaustively explain the process in more basic terms; by that I mean that by using only a physical explanation involving the contingent laws of physics and matter/energy, we will come to see that the process of the match catching fire as a result of being struck is conceptually necessary. Given the contingent laws of physics as we know them, it could not be any other way.

We cannot say the same for consciousness. Given the same set of fundamental, contingent materialistic entities-- laws of physics, spacetime, etc.-- and working our way up from there, we will not arrive at consciousness as a conceptual necessity, as contrasted with the case of the flaming match. Starting with materialistic assumptions and working our way up, we should predict that everyone is a zombie and that conscious does not exist; the only reason materialism is even willing to speak of consciousness (and, luidcrously, even that is a relatively new occurence in contemporary science) is because it cannot be denied that consciousness exists. It is a round peg sitting admidst a dominant theory composed of square holes, but that round peg just cannot be discarded.

Another way of saying this is that consciousness cannot be sufficiently explained with a materialistic reductive explanation, whereas a flaming match can. It is impossible to rationally conceive, given the contingent entities of materialism (the laws of physics, matter/energy etc.), that a match struck under certain conditions could not catch fire. It is quite possible to rationally conceive, given the contingent entities of materialism, that brain processes could occur without consciousness.

So while we can derive the flaming match from the basic contingent entities granted to us in materialism, we cannot derive the existence of consciousness from these same characters. Anything that a natural theory a) does not regard as a contingent entity and b) cannot derive from those things it does regard as contingent entities, I submit, is inexplicable in terms of that theory. We need more contingencies, more fundamental entities, than materialism is willing to give us.

Even your identification of brain processes with consciousness implies an expansion of ontology, despite efforts to present it as materialism. If you disagree with me on this point, then I would be interested to know exactly what set of materialistically contingent entities (mass? charge? velocity? angular momentum? warping spacetime? electromagnetic force?) can together coherently account for consciousness.

(By the way, would you say that the flame on the tip of the match "just is" the process of striking the match?)

there are many answers to that. maybe because of the nature of the contingent world we live in, maybe its for evolutionary reasons.

It is surely, on some level, because of the nature of the contingent world we live in. I am just trying to say that the contingencies that we already recognize in materialism do not suffice to account for consciousness.

"Evolutionary reasons" I personally have no regard for; evolution can only bring consciousness about if it is possible for consciousness to exist in nature in the first place, and exactly how we can coherently account for the existence and functioning of consciousness in nature is what we are discussing. Putting it off to evolutionary reasons presupposes that we need to explain has already been explained.
 
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  • #105
Canute


This is self-contradictory. Science makes no postive claims that consciousness can be naturalised, yet science takes it as axiomatic that everything can be naturalised. It makes no sense.

Are you able to understand that otherwise the scientific quest become incoherent even before trying to understand the smallest fact about nature (consciousness included)?That's why that axiom was introduced,it is absolutely necessary.Otherwise we would arrive at [quasi] absurdities.It would imply that [we would have no reason to think that something in nature can be understood and still by pursuing the scientific quest to see that we can understand a lot of things.]By the way there is no claim that we can understand exactly how nature works.The idea is that the principles that define the functioning of the universe can be discovered.But since we openly accept that our scientific theories are always provisional there is no claim that we know the truth in absolute.Basically we cannot realize when we find the true laws of nature.That's why in science and philosophy there is a clear distinction between scientific laws and the true laws of nature if really there are such laws.

[edited to make clearer the explanation]
 
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