- #806
saviourmachine
- 96
- 0
That certainly isn't true. I'm still watching over your shoulder(s). Stay focused, I'd say.Doctordick said:
Go ahead.
In summary: I think that this claim is realistic. It is based on the assumption that we have a complete understanding of physical reality, and that all things can be explained in terms of physical processes. I think that this assumption is reasonable, based on our current understanding of physical reality. Does our ability to mathematically describe physical things in spacetime give us sufficient grounds to admit or hold this claim? Or is there more to physical reality than a mere ability to matheamtically describe things?I don't really know. I think that there could be more to physical reality than a mere ability to mathematically describe things. It is possible that there is more to physical reality than just a description in terms of physical processes. In summary,
- #807
Jonny_trigonometry
- 452
- 0
I apologize for being such a hot-head. I needed to cool off for a bit; viewing my previous additions to this subject is kind of embarassing...
here is my reasoning:
When confronted with the world we live in, and when we choose to only understand objectively, we notice many patterns/characteristics that seem to pervade into almost every discrete "system" that catches our interest. We can measure some general things that we observe like mass, charge, heat capacity, electrical conductivity, length, temperature, color, etc. These things are the product of reducing any system into more general components that depend on each other. This is a tantalizing beckoner of the idea that possibly everything can be reduced to pure physics. The general rules we define start our investigation into more general rules that may or may not fully determine the outcome of the rules above them. Science won't accept any explanation that may not be correct, unless it's the best known explanation for that particular discrete system of interest. Ultimately, as we seek to reduce all known physical processes to the most basic and general explanations we can, physics directs our curiosity towards the final say: the four fundamental forces. These forces are how every physical process evolves. So the question "can everything be reduced to pure physics?" depends on your definition of everything, and it also depends on your willingness to accept that there is nothing more general than the four fundamental forces. If you define everything as everything but consciousness and personal experiance, and you willingly accept that there is nothing more general driving the final say in physics (the four fundamental forces), then yes, "everything" can be reduced to "pure physics".
here is my reasoning:
When confronted with the world we live in, and when we choose to only understand objectively, we notice many patterns/characteristics that seem to pervade into almost every discrete "system" that catches our interest. We can measure some general things that we observe like mass, charge, heat capacity, electrical conductivity, length, temperature, color, etc. These things are the product of reducing any system into more general components that depend on each other. This is a tantalizing beckoner of the idea that possibly everything can be reduced to pure physics. The general rules we define start our investigation into more general rules that may or may not fully determine the outcome of the rules above them. Science won't accept any explanation that may not be correct, unless it's the best known explanation for that particular discrete system of interest. Ultimately, as we seek to reduce all known physical processes to the most basic and general explanations we can, physics directs our curiosity towards the final say: the four fundamental forces. These forces are how every physical process evolves. So the question "can everything be reduced to pure physics?" depends on your definition of everything, and it also depends on your willingness to accept that there is nothing more general than the four fundamental forces. If you define everything as everything but consciousness and personal experiance, and you willingly accept that there is nothing more general driving the final say in physics (the four fundamental forces), then yes, "everything" can be reduced to "pure physics".
- #808
Jonny_trigonometry
- 452
- 0
I just noticed something else; to answer yes or no is to make an unfalsifiable statement (with our current understanding). To answer the question based on different definitions of "everything" and "pure physics" than the definitions of the questioner is unscientific, and should be completely resolved first. When you mean, "everything" do you also mean ideas(things that don't exist within the universe, ie. don't take up space or time)? Was this whole question devised to trick people into trying to prove an unfalsifiable statement?
- #809
Billy T
- 308
- 0
Added later by edit - Sorry I did not see the thread title, only the poll question, so first part of original post tht was here has now been removed. I had complained about the use of word "everything", but remainder of post below is still ok and shows how hard it is to use words to express ideas which have various definitions in use. For expample what constitutes "ownership" etc. in the case of the car thief discussed below. - end of edit.
There has also been considerable discussion about beliefs that are false (Ok concept on first consideration) and about knowledge that is false (not OK as would not be “knowledge,“ if false)
On the first - Consider a thief who believes he is stealing a car (because he has just broken in and hot wired the ignition as he does several times each month to support himself). But let us suppose that the car belonged to a man who recently died with a yet unread will that gives the car to anyone who would take it from the garage, which the thief has already done. Is the thief’s belief that he has successfully stolen another car true or false? Would the dog eating the unread will change your answer? What if it just was not found till 50 years later when the house was torn down?
On the second - One can not have sure knowledge that there even is a physical world. One can not really get far from Descartes thinking experiencer with complete confidence. Thus no certain knowledge about the physical world is possible.
I guess my point is let's not be too “picky,” think that facts or beliefs are by necessity either true or false nor rewrite a question others have already voted on.
There has also been considerable discussion about beliefs that are false (Ok concept on first consideration) and about knowledge that is false (not OK as would not be “knowledge,“ if false)
On the first - Consider a thief who believes he is stealing a car (because he has just broken in and hot wired the ignition as he does several times each month to support himself). But let us suppose that the car belonged to a man who recently died with a yet unread will that gives the car to anyone who would take it from the garage, which the thief has already done. Is the thief’s belief that he has successfully stolen another car true or false? Would the dog eating the unread will change your answer? What if it just was not found till 50 years later when the house was torn down?
On the second - One can not have sure knowledge that there even is a physical world. One can not really get far from Descartes thinking experiencer with complete confidence. Thus no certain knowledge about the physical world is possible.
I guess my point is let's not be too “picky,” think that facts or beliefs are by necessity either true or false nor rewrite a question others have already voted on.
Last edited:
- #810
saviourmachine
- 96
- 0
What are you more certain about than about your knowledge about the existence of the physical world?Billy T said:
Are you certain about the uncertainty of your knowledge about the existence of the physicial world?
- #811
moving finger
- 1,689
- 1
Reminds me of the joke :saviourmachine said:What are you more certain about than about your knowledge about the existence of the physical world?
Are you certain about the uncertainty of your knowledge about the existence of the physicial world?
I used to be indecisive - now I'm not so sure.
I think the point Billy T is making is that our supposed "certain knowledge" about anything and everything is based on assumptions and axioms. Take away the assumptions and axioms and we have "certain knowledge" of... nothing.
Of course I cannot be certain about the truth of that, since I can be certain about nothing.
MF
- #812
Canute
- 1,568
- 0
This is not right. Sure, we cannot be certain of the veracity of the evidence of our senses, or of our reasoning. But this does not mean we cannot have certain knowledge. There is such a thing as direct knowledge, or non-intuitive immediate knowledge. I just came across this essay and I'd say it's worth a read in this context
http://friesian.com/immedi-1.htm
http://friesian.com/immedi-1.htm
- #813
moving finger
- 1,689
- 1
What is not right?Canute said:
How does one come to obtain such knowledge if not via senses or reasoning?Canute said:
Please explain what you mean by “direct knowledge”? How is this knowledge imparted to us?Canute said:
With respect, a very long and IMHO a very boring and obscure text. Can you summarise the message?Canute said:
MF
(BTW - Did I tell you that I KNOW there are fairies at the bottom of my garden?)
- #814
Canute
- 1,568
- 0
Your comment that you can be certain about nothing.moving finger said:
What one can be sure of knowing is what one is, once one has dug underneath what one appears to be. This is to say no more than that you know what state your consciousness is in. This is what is meant by 'non-intuitive immediate knowledge'. This can be understood in terms of Aristotle's observation that true knowledge is identical with its object. In more mystical terms this can be restated as saying that certainty entails 'becoming' ones knowledge rather than standing apart from it, and thus doing away with any mediation between oneself and ones knowledge. In more Buddhist terms it can be restated as saying that certain knowledge is knowledge attained by means of non-conceptual experience.
Urgh. In a word, no. It is neither boring nor obscure in my opinion, but I agree that it is not easy reading. To some extent it is an argument that Aristotle was right about knowledge, that only unmediated knowledge can be certain. Also it argues that immediate knowledge is not the same thing as intuitive knowledge. Intuitive knowledge, by the everyday usage of 'intuitive', is not certain and therefore not knowledge. Best I can do without doing a days work on it I'm afraid.
Really? No, you didn't mention it. I suspect you're lying, especially since in your last post you said that you didn't know anything. if so then this entails that there might be fairies at the bottom of your garden, since you do not know that there aren't any. But it is impossible to know that there are fairies at the bottom of your garden, since it is impossible for you to know that your garden exists.
- #815
Philocrat
- 612
- 0
METAPHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS
To make an explantory statement, we need to include the EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS (ES) of the explainer in the statemtent. Infact, even if we fail to do so as is typically or usually the case in all our reports and conversations, it is still fully metaphysically enforced and semantically and epistemologically presupposed. Don't feel irritated by this, guys, for that is unfortunately the case. Consider for example the following statements:
(1) I am alive
(2) The sun is shining
(3) The grass is green
(4) If I am sitting then, I am neither standing nor lying down
(5) The sun has always been shining, thefore the sun will shine tomorrow
(6) All politicians are liars, Mr. X is a politician, therefore Mr. X is a Liar
And so on. What I am saying here is that although none of these statements mentions or declares the epistemological status of its speaker or reporter or maker, yet such epistemological status is fully metaphysically enforced and semantically and epistemologically presupposed in it. This means that when the epistemological status of a given maker of any statement of fact is not mentioned, it is still passively so. When such statements are recast as follows, then this immediately renders the epistemological status of the speaker relevant in the overall analysis and derivation of their truth values. In other words the epistomological status of the speaker or reporter metaphysicallly contributes to the semantic and truth values of a given statement of fact or proposition.
(1) I can know everything, therefore I am 100% certain that I am alive
Or, alternatively, "If the Epiistemoloical status of my being is such that I can know every, then it is impossible for it to be false that I am alive.
(2) If the ES of my being is such that I can never fall into error of judgement, then I am 100% catainn that the sun is shining.
(3) The ES of my being is such that I am sometimes wrong in my judgement, therefore it is likely or possibly true that The grass is green
(4) If the ES of my being is such that I can only do one of three things at a time and not all three at once, then if I am sitting, I am neither standing nor lying down.
(5) The ES of my being is such that I always, and not sometimes, see the sun shine. Then I am 100% certain that the sun has always been shining, thefore the sun will shine tomorrow.
(6) The ES of my being is such that I always know everything: Then I am 100% certain that "all politicians are liars, Mr. X is a politician, therefore Mr. X is a Liar" is true.
And so on. Of course, these recast statements metaphysically force you to commit yourself to the inevitable inclusion of the ES of their reporters or speakers in your analytical derivation of their semantic values and truth values. Without this metaphysical enforcement, some of these statements (if not all of them) are as good as being semantically meaningless and epistemologically truth-valueless.
NOTE: The metaphysical contribution of the ES of the reporter or speaker to the semantic value and the truth-vlaue of a given proposition or statement of fact is an issue that, even if we wanted to, we can no longer avoid reductively. Science must now fully address and take charge of this fact.
To make an explantory statement, we need to include the EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS (ES) of the explainer in the statemtent. Infact, even if we fail to do so as is typically or usually the case in all our reports and conversations, it is still fully metaphysically enforced and semantically and epistemologically presupposed. Don't feel irritated by this, guys, for that is unfortunately the case. Consider for example the following statements:
(1) I am alive
(2) The sun is shining
(3) The grass is green
(4) If I am sitting then, I am neither standing nor lying down
(5) The sun has always been shining, thefore the sun will shine tomorrow
(6) All politicians are liars, Mr. X is a politician, therefore Mr. X is a Liar
And so on. What I am saying here is that although none of these statements mentions or declares the epistemological status of its speaker or reporter or maker, yet such epistemological status is fully metaphysically enforced and semantically and epistemologically presupposed in it. This means that when the epistemological status of a given maker of any statement of fact is not mentioned, it is still passively so. When such statements are recast as follows, then this immediately renders the epistemological status of the speaker relevant in the overall analysis and derivation of their truth values. In other words the epistomological status of the speaker or reporter metaphysicallly contributes to the semantic and truth values of a given statement of fact or proposition.
(1) I can know everything, therefore I am 100% certain that I am alive
Or, alternatively, "If the Epiistemoloical status of my being is such that I can know every, then it is impossible for it to be false that I am alive.
(2) If the ES of my being is such that I can never fall into error of judgement, then I am 100% catainn that the sun is shining.
(3) The ES of my being is such that I am sometimes wrong in my judgement, therefore it is likely or possibly true that The grass is green
(4) If the ES of my being is such that I can only do one of three things at a time and not all three at once, then if I am sitting, I am neither standing nor lying down.
(5) The ES of my being is such that I always, and not sometimes, see the sun shine. Then I am 100% certain that the sun has always been shining, thefore the sun will shine tomorrow.
(6) The ES of my being is such that I always know everything: Then I am 100% certain that "all politicians are liars, Mr. X is a politician, therefore Mr. X is a Liar" is true.
And so on. Of course, these recast statements metaphysically force you to commit yourself to the inevitable inclusion of the ES of their reporters or speakers in your analytical derivation of their semantic values and truth values. Without this metaphysical enforcement, some of these statements (if not all of them) are as good as being semantically meaningless and epistemologically truth-valueless.
NOTE: The metaphysical contribution of the ES of the reporter or speaker to the semantic value and the truth-vlaue of a given proposition or statement of fact is an issue that, even if we wanted to, we can no longer avoid reductively. Science must now fully address and take charge of this fact.
Last edited:
- #816
Philocrat
- 612
- 0
UPDATE: what does the current result of the survey tell us?
Does this result suggest anything significant, or are the data from this result rigged or fictitious? For a start the explanatory capacities of Physics and Multidisciplinary tend to run head to head. This seems to me to suggest that not only can other disciplines participatively explain the world, but also physics (with all its explanatory power) cannot write them off altogether.
Well, that is the question. For explaining the world in its entirity is one thing, and getting rid of the remaining explanatory layers of the world (obviously done through other existing disciplines) is another thing. It seems to me to be almost impossible to do this. Or if it is possibe at all, this would kick-start a chain of events that would adversely interfer and completely change the human nature and the way we relate to the wider world. Infact, the "PHYSICS OF MAN' would experience a fundamental intervention and overhauling.
NOTE: From the result of this survey, it is no longer clear whether we are anticipating or advocating a form of "ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM" or a NON-ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM. Can physics eliminatively reduce everything to physics? If physics succeeds in doing this, does this render all other explanations in other disciplines WHOLLY redundant? Note also that "Non-eliminative Reductionism" under normal circumstances is supposed to acknowledge and retain all the explainable layers of the world as formulated and set forth by their corresponding disciplines. Should this be the norm or the case, it is therefore peculiar and strange that we even bother with the whole notion of reductionism in the first place. Physics must therefore make clear, at least at this metaphysical level, which of these two fundamental categories of reductionism that it is advocating.
Does this result suggest anything significant, or are the data from this result rigged or fictitious? For a start the explanatory capacities of Physics and Multidisciplinary tend to run head to head. This seems to me to suggest that not only can other disciplines participatively explain the world, but also physics (with all its explanatory power) cannot write them off altogether.
Well, that is the question. For explaining the world in its entirity is one thing, and getting rid of the remaining explanatory layers of the world (obviously done through other existing disciplines) is another thing. It seems to me to be almost impossible to do this. Or if it is possibe at all, this would kick-start a chain of events that would adversely interfer and completely change the human nature and the way we relate to the wider world. Infact, the "PHYSICS OF MAN' would experience a fundamental intervention and overhauling.
NOTE: From the result of this survey, it is no longer clear whether we are anticipating or advocating a form of "ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM" or a NON-ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM. Can physics eliminatively reduce everything to physics? If physics succeeds in doing this, does this render all other explanations in other disciplines WHOLLY redundant? Note also that "Non-eliminative Reductionism" under normal circumstances is supposed to acknowledge and retain all the explainable layers of the world as formulated and set forth by their corresponding disciplines. Should this be the norm or the case, it is therefore peculiar and strange that we even bother with the whole notion of reductionism in the first place. Physics must therefore make clear, at least at this metaphysical level, which of these two fundamental categories of reductionism that it is advocating.
Last edited:
- #817
metacristi
- 265
- 1
It seems to me very likely that this will be the case, at least a long time from now. For example it is unlikely that biology or economics could be 'reduced' to a theory of everything in physics. However this does not mean that our inability to make the reduction implies that, in absolute, that TOE (very probable not complete, probably needing auxiliary assumptions to cope with the 'higher level' sciences) cannot handle the higher level sciences (biology, economics etc).
The explanation can be that the phenomena are so complex (or chaotic) that we are unable to offer a clear explanation or solve the equations which appear (a good example today: it becomes cumbersome, basically impossible, to solve Schrodinger's equations for very complex systems, still there is basically no good reason to think that the standard formalism of QM cannot handle them, that the standard formalism does not hold for them).
This is particularly important in the case of consciousness studies, the brain is one of the most complex systems in the universe (some philosophers even believe that its functioning involves chaotic events which, though deterministic in nature, cannot be predicted accurately). Some other philosophers of science think that there are good reasons to believe that the phenomenon of 'multiple realizations' plays an important role (the multiple realization implies that different, at least slightly different, brain states can produce basically identical mental states).
Upon them the actual incapacity to bridge the gap between the functional 'top-down' and the 'bottom-up' approaches might be due, apart from the huge complexity of the brain (or the chaotic features), exactly to the 'multiple realization' phenomenon, very difficult to account of, probably even for the technology of the foreseable future. As a conclusion 'greedy reduction' (at the laws of physics) might be possible, in theory at least, but it is unlikely that we will be able to do that at least in the foreseable future.
Last edited:
- #818
Philocrat
- 612
- 0
metacristi said:
Yes, this is a fair summary of the problem as faced both by science and by philosophy. But as I have already pointed out somehwere above, TOE only makes sense if we have a clear and worthwhile reason (or reasons) for it. So, the key question still remains: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF REDUCING EVERYTHING TO PHYSICS? I have made an attempt to make sense of the possible answer to this question by suggesting a few useful reasons for the whole notion of reductionism in the first place.
BIOLOGY: That by reductively rearranging or reprogramming genes in the living organisms we can structurally and functionally improve them. Enhance their functionality, extend their lifespans and make them live longer, reduce or eliminate decaying etc.
PHYSICS: That by reducing things to smaller and smaller scales we may be able to see what we could not see at the macroscale. For example, nanoscale rearrangement of things could improve their structures and functions. We may create self-sufficient, super-sized, super-structured, super-functioning entities. Supper-activities such as inter-state migration, teleportation, time travel etc, may be rendered possible in the forseeable future.
COSTS: By understanding the world to ever smaller and smaller scale we can reduce costs of things, make higher quality things for less money. This would help the human race create and sustain a more progressive society? Is this true?
MANAGABILITY: That the world is easier to manage if we understand it at every explainable or reducible layer. For every layer that is successfully explained or reduced, we are better off knowledgewise. It is to the human advantage to understand the world at every level. Makes sense, but reducibility and its possibility is another matter.
Well, there are hundreds of other reasons that may be given for reductionism, but these are just a few ones that are currently being suggested. Valid or not valid, but the standard assumption is that we do have worthwhile reasons for reducing everything to physics.
THE POSSIBILITY OF TOE
The standard assumption is that everything can be reduced to physics. If we can do this, reduce every layer of the world or discipline to pure physics, what happens to each of this reduced layer or discipline? Would the reductive process itself involve physical reorganisation or rearangement of each reduced layer or discipline? Or perhaps total re-engineering of things in world? I distinguished between ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM (ER) and NON-ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM (NER) as the two main fundamental metaphysical categories of the whole notion of reductionism. Personally, I am not quite sure which of these two types that Physics is advocating. What do you think about this? Do you think that physics is advocating the ER or NER? Can physics eliminatively reduce everything to physics?
Coversely, if we cannot reduce the multi-layered world to physics for all sorts of reasons already given on this thread and elsewhere, would this trigger the advocates of TOE to re-examine their ambition and reasons for it? Would we then turn our attention to us, the proposers and the perceivers of these ideals?
I personally do not rule out its possibility and I retain this position in a rather optimistic way and I think it would be a total disaster to view it otherwise. For all the reasons given and ungiven, TOE is essential if the whole notion of "HUMAN PROGRESS" is to be entertained at all. We just need to know these things if we are to move an inch on the path of progress. Who knows, the whole human survival may very well depend on it.
------------------------
Save our world from destruction...Stay GREEN!
Last edited:
- #819
saviourmachine
- 96
- 0
moving finger said:
It's semantics indeed. Like DoctorDick's comparison with a dictionary. "Certain knowledge" is defined in other terms from the dictionary, so it does mean what it means because it means that to us. That doesn't say anything about its "existential state". Whatever that is! Because I also said now something limited to our "verbal world".<off-topic>
By the way, it's interesting to see the difference between the texts of DoctorDick and Philocrat. Both of you I find difficult to follow. DoctorDick, because your texts have such a small "definition density". With common words you tackle difficult concepts, without using many terms that are in use in contemporary science and philosophy. It's like you're writing assembly code.
Philocrat, because your texts have such a big "definition density". You use many new definitions that nobody before, ever thought of creating words for. I guess you've immediately a word for the problem I've with understanding you both. It's like you're writing a high-level programming language that nobody knows.Does anybody feel that the same way?
- #820
metacristi
- 265
- 1
Nice post philocrat. Certainly, at least for the moment, the main view in the scientific community is that of ER, this based on the previous success of the actual scientific methodology (nonwithstanding that minimal). The fact that the components and processes of this universe can be isolated and profitably analyzed in isolation (that is reductionism) has proved to be too successful in the past to be abandoned at once. Besides there is a widespread acceptance among scientists that science (the actual methodology) is always objective and can surely lead us to the truth.
So even if scientists could not prove in a clear way that everything can be reduced to physics (to a certain TOE in physics for example) that would not discourage them to try further to reduce all higher level sciences to that TOE (possibly by adding some extra auxiliary assumptions, that it by extending the physical theory). Of course for all our practical purposes scientists will use the models provided by the higher level sciences, for example now chemistry is doing very well though there are enough reasons to think that it can be reduced entirely at physics (the best existing physical theory, QM). This is valid even if full reduction would be achieved (for simplicity reasons, exactly as we still use Newtonian mechanics for the majority of our practical purposes).
Neither will it be easily accepted in the scientific community that the goal of science is socially dependent, dependent on scientists finally. For this would imply that scientists have to recognize that we do not know that science really lead us to the truth, that high coherence and simplicity of theories + the practical successes of science do not also involve that science approaches truth (see the problem of 'success' of science, hotly debated in the philosophy of science; unfortunately, in spite of what many scientists believe now, we do not have yet sufficient reasons, beyond all reasonable doubt, to think that 'empirical success' involve approaching truth, in absolute).
The only way to really shaken the belief in reductionism were its failure at the level of physics itself. Something still possible, in quantum physics we already accept that the distinction perceiver-percieved is not so clear, the contextual approaches are much more valued now (the measurement device does influence the object under 'scrutiny'), basically there is still possible a return to Chew's 'bootstrap' (holistic) approach characteristic to the physics of the 60s. Sure this does not automatically mean that all higher level sciences cannot be reduced, at least in theory, for example, to the 'quantum fields' approach but certainly this would have an impact, scientists would be forced to recognize at least that full reduction might be impossible.
Last edited:
- #821
Canute
- 1,568
- 0
One small point. The association of physics with reductionism does not seem to be a necessary one, so the failure of one does not necessarily entail the failure of the other. In my view it doesn't matter whether one analyses the universe reductively or holistically. The answers come out the same in the end. There's a New Age idea floating around that reductionism is to be avoided. Its supporters seem to have missed the fact that most 'mystical religions' adopt very reductionist methods of analysis, and Buddhist analysis is far more reductionist than science in this respect, albeit that it is also more holistic.
- #822
Philocrat
- 612
- 0
metacristi, could you be kind enough to expand upon the following items:
Would this include (a) The Eperimenter-Experiment Relations, (b) Secondary qualities (smell, taste, qualia, etc), (c) Forms, (d) Scale of Reference, (e) Observer-Object Relations, etc.? Will such an extended system embrace Metaphysics as viable tool of Explanation and Disambiguation?
Sorry that I am not aware of this holistic conept. I am aware of the PARTS-WHOLE Relations that I have exhaustivelly examined over the years, both programtically and naratively. What I uncovered in those examinations just sent a chill down my spine. This is what forced me to make the fundamental distinction between (a) Open System, (2) Semi-closed/Semi-open system and (3) Closed system a few pages above on this thread. I summarised it as guidelines for mathematicians and logicians so that we don't risk falling into the metaphysical trap of making another Category Mistake with regards to this notion of Parts-Whole Relation. So, the lesson to learn here is that anyone who takes upon him or herself to embark upon the critical examination of this relation, must pay absolute attention to these three fundamental metaphysical categories involved. Our current world tends to occupy a range between (1) and (2) and I am not quite sure whether the current mathematics and logic clearly account for them. This is still within the scope of debate. However, (3) is ruthlessly diffcult to comprehend. The more I think about it, the more it seems mathematically and logically far removed from reality. It is as metaphysically and epistemologically hair-raising as it can get. This is one issue that I would not mind at all being enlightened on by anyone who knows it any better.
Pardon me that I have not read anything about what you are referring to. Please let me know whether hollistic implies a methology for a complete description of the Parts-Whole Relations.
Would this include (a) The Eperimenter-Experiment Relations, (b) Secondary qualities (smell, taste, qualia, etc), (c) Forms, (d) Scale of Reference, (e) Observer-Object Relations, etc.? Will such an extended system embrace Metaphysics as viable tool of Explanation and Disambiguation?
Sorry that I am not aware of this holistic conept. I am aware of the PARTS-WHOLE Relations that I have exhaustivelly examined over the years, both programtically and naratively. What I uncovered in those examinations just sent a chill down my spine. This is what forced me to make the fundamental distinction between (a) Open System, (2) Semi-closed/Semi-open system and (3) Closed system a few pages above on this thread. I summarised it as guidelines for mathematicians and logicians so that we don't risk falling into the metaphysical trap of making another Category Mistake with regards to this notion of Parts-Whole Relation. So, the lesson to learn here is that anyone who takes upon him or herself to embark upon the critical examination of this relation, must pay absolute attention to these three fundamental metaphysical categories involved. Our current world tends to occupy a range between (1) and (2) and I am not quite sure whether the current mathematics and logic clearly account for them. This is still within the scope of debate. However, (3) is ruthlessly diffcult to comprehend. The more I think about it, the more it seems mathematically and logically far removed from reality. It is as metaphysically and epistemologically hair-raising as it can get. This is one issue that I would not mind at all being enlightened on by anyone who knows it any better.
Pardon me that I have not read anything about what you are referring to. Please let me know whether hollistic implies a methology for a complete description of the Parts-Whole Relations.
Last edited:
- #823
Philocrat
- 612
- 0
Canute said:
Canute, I remember that you tried once somewhere on this PF to educate me on the Buddhist Reductive System. Could you be kind enough to give it another go and expand upon the following item:
------------
...Buddhism is reductionist while being holistic...
------------
It just sounds redically paradigmatic in scope. Is it REDUCTIVE MONISM, or perhaps a sort of methodology for eliminatiing parts from a whole? I can at least appreciate and deal with the notion of CAUSAL RELATIONS of things and the multidisciplinary attempts to schematically explain them. Is the holistic approach a methodology for completely weaving these causal relations together?
----------
Save our Planet from Destruction ... Stay GREEN!
Last edited:
- #824
Bobby R
- 11
- 0
(QUOTE=Canute) When you say: "I am aware that..." are you not saying "you are conscious that..."? And does this help understand consciousness?
Canute said:
- #825
Doctordick
- 634
- 0
I apologize to anyone who has been following this thread. I have taken a few weeks off because it is clear to me that no one on this forum has any comprehension of what I am trying to communicate. Everyone on this forum and I are operating on totally different levels.
At this point I also have become convinced that your real reason for refusing to allow me to use the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" to refer to the two different kinds of presumed true facts because the usage is too short and difficult to stir into confusion. As I said earlier, I will use the adjective "knowable" to denote the fact that the term being modified by that adjective is, in fact, something which is real in the sense that no acceptable explanation can ever fail to include it: i.e., any explanation will be deemed false if the "knowable" thing is denied by the explanation. I will use the adjective "unknowable" to denote the fact that the term being modified by that adjective is, in fact, a figment of our imagination: i.e, one of those things we think we know but we are wrong about. When I use those two terms, that is exactly what I mean. You have said that you understand the fact that these two possibilities exist and if you cannot consistently convert those two terms (when I use them) to those two categories, then we will just call the conversation off.
My definition of an explanation, that it is a defined method of establishing expectations based on known information, is stated the way it is because the definition does not require the known information be defined and thus avoids the issue of the vagueness of the language used to express that information. I can use the simple concept of a set to refer to "what is to be explained". What is to be explained is "A" and "A" can be any set of elements and the elements can be anything. The central issue in a real explanation is that the known information can change thus, as we are not all knowing, "A" , in general, can never be assumed to be completely known. We need to be able to refer to exactly what we know (or think we know) and we need a way to refer to changes in what we know (or think we know) without actually defining either. That is the essence of my definitions of sets "B" and "C" in the complex post.
Try and follow a thought experiment regarding the following problem: I have some set "A" in my head and I am going to take arbitrary collections of elements of "A" (sets "B") and give them to you. Based on "C" (the entire collection you have so far received) you are to come up with a method of establishing your expectations: i.e., your estimate as to the probability of getting any conceivable specific "B". On a small scale this is a problem given to students all the time: if I gave you a "one" and then gave you a "two" and then a "three", you would probably put a high probability on getting a four. But this problem becomes far more difficult when the number of elements involved become far in excess of number you can think of simultaneously on a conscious level. It is my intention to lay out an analytical method of achieving that result which can be extended to any finite number of elements.
What is important here is to come up with a method of establishing expectations without specifically defining the elements of A. Definitions are very seldom well though out as they are almost always arrived at intuitively. No one knows how intuition manages to achieve the results it does and the process cannot be analytically defended in any detail at all. Defining things before we have any idea as to the rules which determine what elements will occur is a very dangerous intellectual step. On the other hand, we need to have some way of referring to these elements or we cannot think about them at all. So we need a labeling method which does not establish any definition of these elements. I propose that attaching a numerical label to each element of interest is an easy solution. There are an infinite number of such labels and none of the labels need carry any implications as to what it is that is being labeled.
However, establishing such a set of numerical labels does provide one with a list of numbers which maps directly into a referenced set "B" above. Likewise "C" becomes a collection of such lists. This allows one to express the problem to be solved in a very simple manner: if your expectations can be expressed as yes, I expected that "B" or no, that "B" was a surprise or any probabilistic range between the two, then the method used to generate that expectation can be seen as a mathematical function. That is, the set of numbers which constitute the list labeling that "B" are the arguments of the function and the value of the function is your expectation. Since the number of elements in "B" is finite and the number of "B"s in "C" is finite, the function can be seen as a tabular function with a finite number of entries.
Knowing that function (writing down the lists for each "B" you were given) constitutes an explanation per the definition I have put forth. It amounts to the explanation, "it's in the list so I expect to see it". It is at least an exact explanation of the elements you have been given. The tabular function can be thought of as the rule which determines whether or not a particular "B" is possible; some one asks you if you expect to see a certain "B" all you have to do is assign the numerical labels (in what ever way you assigned them) and then check to see if that set is in your table. Now I am not proposing this procedure as a reasonable way to solve a real problem, I am putting it forth to point out an interesting facet of the representation.
Suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you all the elements but one from some "B" and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given. Your table is very close to answering that question. Can anyone out there think of a way to make that result possible in every case?
Think about that question for a while. The correct answer is very enlightening.
Have fun – Doctor Dick
Without even looking, I know the truth of that comment depends on the meanings of the words making up the comment and thus is not an exact statement in any sense at all. I am interested in "exact analysis", a concept apparently foreign to the perspective of everyone posting on this forum.Canute said:
If you had been reading my posts carefully you would have realized by now that I am not happy with any definitions except the very few I have decided are essential. It is my opinion that if one goes forth presuming they understand any human language correctly they have left exact science in their wake. The only human language which even approaches the status of exact is the language of mathematics and even that language has some subtle problems. From my perspective anyone who is "happy" with any definition has failed to look at the problem of definition carefully.Canute said:
And here we arrive at the crux of your post. You would rather stir that pot of vague terms than think about the issue I have brought up. It seems that you would rather keep the issue of a difference between "things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, wrong" and "there were things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, right" as insignificant as possible. I think you do this because to admit that the issue is significant would require you to think about it and that is one thing you want to avoid at all costs. I would say that you think you know a lot of things that you don't really know but you would rather muddy the issue than admit there could be any truth to that idea. As I said earlier, you have a habit of taking very dogmatic positions.Canute said:
At this point I also have become convinced that your real reason for refusing to allow me to use the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" to refer to the two different kinds of presumed true facts because the usage is too short and difficult to stir into confusion. As I said earlier, I will use the adjective "knowable" to denote the fact that the term being modified by that adjective is, in fact, something which is real in the sense that no acceptable explanation can ever fail to include it: i.e., any explanation will be deemed false if the "knowable" thing is denied by the explanation. I will use the adjective "unknowable" to denote the fact that the term being modified by that adjective is, in fact, a figment of our imagination: i.e, one of those things we think we know but we are wrong about. When I use those two terms, that is exactly what I mean. You have said that you understand the fact that these two possibilities exist and if you cannot consistently convert those two terms (when I use them) to those two categories, then we will just call the conversation off.
Thank you saviormachine, I will try to stay focused. On reason I presumed you were backing away is that the last post from me, which you failed to respond to contained a lot of important relationships. I doubt you understood it all and proceeding without understanding is pretty well a waste of time. But don't let that bother you; we can always get back on track later. I will try to communicate to Canute on that step.saviourmachine said:That certainly isn't true. I'm still watching over your shoulder(s). Stay focused, I'd say.Doctordick said:
Go ahead.Doctordick said:
My definition of an explanation, that it is a defined method of establishing expectations based on known information, is stated the way it is because the definition does not require the known information be defined and thus avoids the issue of the vagueness of the language used to express that information. I can use the simple concept of a set to refer to "what is to be explained". What is to be explained is "A" and "A" can be any set of elements and the elements can be anything. The central issue in a real explanation is that the known information can change thus, as we are not all knowing, "A" , in general, can never be assumed to be completely known. We need to be able to refer to exactly what we know (or think we know) and we need a way to refer to changes in what we know (or think we know) without actually defining either. That is the essence of my definitions of sets "B" and "C" in the complex post.
Try and follow a thought experiment regarding the following problem: I have some set "A" in my head and I am going to take arbitrary collections of elements of "A" (sets "B") and give them to you. Based on "C" (the entire collection you have so far received) you are to come up with a method of establishing your expectations: i.e., your estimate as to the probability of getting any conceivable specific "B". On a small scale this is a problem given to students all the time: if I gave you a "one" and then gave you a "two" and then a "three", you would probably put a high probability on getting a four. But this problem becomes far more difficult when the number of elements involved become far in excess of number you can think of simultaneously on a conscious level. It is my intention to lay out an analytical method of achieving that result which can be extended to any finite number of elements.
What is important here is to come up with a method of establishing expectations without specifically defining the elements of A. Definitions are very seldom well though out as they are almost always arrived at intuitively. No one knows how intuition manages to achieve the results it does and the process cannot be analytically defended in any detail at all. Defining things before we have any idea as to the rules which determine what elements will occur is a very dangerous intellectual step. On the other hand, we need to have some way of referring to these elements or we cannot think about them at all. So we need a labeling method which does not establish any definition of these elements. I propose that attaching a numerical label to each element of interest is an easy solution. There are an infinite number of such labels and none of the labels need carry any implications as to what it is that is being labeled.
However, establishing such a set of numerical labels does provide one with a list of numbers which maps directly into a referenced set "B" above. Likewise "C" becomes a collection of such lists. This allows one to express the problem to be solved in a very simple manner: if your expectations can be expressed as yes, I expected that "B" or no, that "B" was a surprise or any probabilistic range between the two, then the method used to generate that expectation can be seen as a mathematical function. That is, the set of numbers which constitute the list labeling that "B" are the arguments of the function and the value of the function is your expectation. Since the number of elements in "B" is finite and the number of "B"s in "C" is finite, the function can be seen as a tabular function with a finite number of entries.
Knowing that function (writing down the lists for each "B" you were given) constitutes an explanation per the definition I have put forth. It amounts to the explanation, "it's in the list so I expect to see it". It is at least an exact explanation of the elements you have been given. The tabular function can be thought of as the rule which determines whether or not a particular "B" is possible; some one asks you if you expect to see a certain "B" all you have to do is assign the numerical labels (in what ever way you assigned them) and then check to see if that set is in your table. Now I am not proposing this procedure as a reasonable way to solve a real problem, I am putting it forth to point out an interesting facet of the representation.
Suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you all the elements but one from some "B" and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given. Your table is very close to answering that question. Can anyone out there think of a way to make that result possible in every case?
Think about that question for a while. The correct answer is very enlightening.
Have fun – Doctor Dick
- #826
Tournesol
- 804
- 0
Canute said:
If you are referring to the issue of universals , bare particulars, etc, it does nothing of the kind.
If you stipulate that knowledge means certainty, it turns out that we don't know anyhthing. Which is a bit drastic.
If 'know' is stipulated to mean 'best available hypothesis' that is entirely consistent.
- #827
Bobby R
- 11
- 0
Bobby R said:
As you say said:
- #828
Daminc
- 39
- 0
I've been trying to follow this thread but, quite frankly, I got p*ssed of with DoctorDicks attitude. Canute, you've got a lot more patience than I :)
One of the questions/debates, whatever you want to call it, referred to the meaning of certain words, one of which was 'understanding'.
I've found this definition through a previous research regarding 'communication':
This, in my opinion, is something that DoctorDick (as well as many other people including myself) has to think about.
One of the questions/debates, whatever you want to call it, referred to the meaning of certain words, one of which was 'understanding'.
I've found this definition through a previous research regarding 'communication':
This, in my opinion, is something that DoctorDick (as well as many other people including myself) has to think about.
- #829
eNathan
- 352
- 2
If so, we have no free will
- #830
Faust
It's interesting how the original question (Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?) ended up as a debate on communication. Perhaps it's only natural, since the meaning of the question itself is too obscure to have, in my opinion, any relevance. Just thinking about the question from a few different perspectives revealed the potential for confusion, which probably explains why this is the longest running thread here.
Let's start with "can". "Can" everything be reduced to pure physics? Possibly so. "Can" everything be reduced to dogmatic religion? Certainly so. "Can" the whole world be an illusion? Some people say so. The real point for me is, so what? What if something "can" be represented or misinterpreted as being something else? What does that really mean? "Can" the greatest romantic novel, the most profound philosophical teatrise, the most exact scientific theory, be reduced to a collection of the 26 letters of the English alphabet? Of course it can, but the question remains: so what?
I won't even get into the mess of what "everything" is supposed to mean, whether it must be limited to our sensory perceptions of the world or also include abstract ideas such as logic, commonsense, intuition, morals, aesthetics. Or what "reduced" means, whether it means the establishment of a cognitive model for sensory perceptions or the unification of the various academic disciplines. Or what "pure physics" means, whether it is just a bunch of mathematical symbols entirely devoid of meaning in any natural language, such as English, or whether those symbols require an interpretation in terms as vague as "uncertainty", "duality", "relative", which are so often used by modern physicists.
All in all, it's as the old Arab proverb says: "foolish questions beget foolish answers". Something like that.
Let's start with "can". "Can" everything be reduced to pure physics? Possibly so. "Can" everything be reduced to dogmatic religion? Certainly so. "Can" the whole world be an illusion? Some people say so. The real point for me is, so what? What if something "can" be represented or misinterpreted as being something else? What does that really mean? "Can" the greatest romantic novel, the most profound philosophical teatrise, the most exact scientific theory, be reduced to a collection of the 26 letters of the English alphabet? Of course it can, but the question remains: so what?
I won't even get into the mess of what "everything" is supposed to mean, whether it must be limited to our sensory perceptions of the world or also include abstract ideas such as logic, commonsense, intuition, morals, aesthetics. Or what "reduced" means, whether it means the establishment of a cognitive model for sensory perceptions or the unification of the various academic disciplines. Or what "pure physics" means, whether it is just a bunch of mathematical symbols entirely devoid of meaning in any natural language, such as English, or whether those symbols require an interpretation in terms as vague as "uncertainty", "duality", "relative", which are so often used by modern physicists.
All in all, it's as the old Arab proverb says: "foolish questions beget foolish answers". Something like that.
- #831
Doctordick
- 634
- 0
Well, I am certainly sorry that I p*ss you off; it was never my intention!Daminc said:
And it is exactly that process which interests me. Two things appear to be true: first, the process must begin with no common ground and secondly it appears that at least some understanding can be achieved. As far as I can see, the problem of understanding one another is precisely the problem of understanding anything. And, I would be very pleased to find anyone willing to think about it. I personally have spent a lot of time thinking about it.
Don't you see the similarity between the two questions "can everything be reduced to 'communication'" and all the other possibilities you bring up? Isn't it first essential to establish the pitfalls of comunication before one establishs what is meant by the question? It seems to me we are both talking about the same issue.Faust said:
The other side of the coin is, "the first step in finding an answer is asking the right question!" By the way, as physics is often held to be "the mother of all exact science", I interpret the reference "pure physics" to mean "exact science" which must be the intention if one is to allow what is included in "physics" to change. (If you don't allow advances, the answer is clearly "no!")Faust said:
Have fun -- Dick
- #832
Faust
Doctordick said:
I don't know which issue you are talking about, and reading your previous posts hasn't helped me much. In any case, I was only pointing at the vagueness of the question. I think a better-phrased question would have raised a more interesting debate. But that's just my opinion.
I interpret "pure physics" to mean "the study of the movement of particles through space and time". I still think the question needs rephrasing.
- #833
Les Sleeth
Gold Member
- 2,262
- 2
Faust said:
In my opinion, anytime you see a discussion about something as real as physics turn into a communication debate, then you know rationalistic philosophy has been dominating the dialogue.
Faust said:
I'm going to disagree with you a bit here. I know this is a long thread, but I think early on we established what the question was. It might have degenerated into a semantics battle, but up front I think most everyone was clear that:
"Can" meant is it provable.
"Everything" meant all that exists.
"Reduced" meant, can all that exists be accounted for at this time . . .
"Pure physics" meant physical principles only.
My analysis of the debate is that committed physicalists believe all existence can be explained/accounted for with physical principles alone, but the most honest of the physicalists admit that at this time they can't do it. Those more inclined to exaggerate what physics can explain tried to convince we skeptics physicalism is pretty much a done deal.
My mother didn't raise a dummy, so I ain't buyin' physicalist propaganda. I know, beyond any possible doubt, that physical principles at this time cannot be proven to explain all existence. Further, I doubt that they will EVER account for reality (with proof) in the future, but that's just my personal, unproven opinion. If it's done, then I'd have no choice but to accept the ugly truth
of physicalism.- #834
Faust
Les Sleeth said:
Wouldn't that be analytic philosophy?
That may be the case, but it doesn't change the fact that the discussion did degenerate into a debate on communication.
It couldn't be different, given that you just stated what defines "physicalists" and "honest physicalists". Sorry for the little digression into semantics
I see a more important aspect to the debate though. The point is, over time physicalists have consistently triumphed over their opponents. If physicalists get a little arrogant sometimes, we must understand them, after all history is on their side.
Can you recall a single case where a physicalist account for a real phenomenon has been proven false? I wish I could remember one, but I can't.
It probably is for them. And even though I'm not an enthusiast of physicalism, I do envy the fantastic success of their doctrine. I certainly wish we could have even a fraction of that success using different approaches; it would make for a far more interesting world but alas, hasn't happened so far.
You are probably right, but I fail to see what the relevant consequences of that are. Besides the brawls between people in different philosophical camps, what can a neutral observer expect from the physicalist/anti-physicalist debate?
In other words, think of a person who's not into philosophy but is eagerly awaiting for the experts in their fields to find out truths about the universe: what would the failure of physicalism entail to that person? The possibility of miracles? Eternal life? Peace on earth?
I honestly fail to see what the fuss is all about. I would certainly be happy if everything could be reduced to pure physics if pure physics could give me happiness and eternal life in one way or another. Who cares if it's angels or subatomic particles? The ends justify the means.
What is that ugly truth? It's an honest question.
I believe in many things whose existence is denied by physicalists, but I don't see how those things are at odds with physicalism per se. Whereas some (not all) physicalists say "miracles can't possibly happen", I see physicalism as saying "if miracles do happen, then they can be explained". I find that a rather sensible position and, why not, even beautiful.
Of couse, I may be missing the point of physicalism for not being a physicalist
- #835
Les Sleeth
Gold Member
- 2,262
- 2
Faust said:
No. Rationalism would be thinking without sufficient reference to observed facts. It assumes truth can be had by reason alone. Empiricism changed all that by requiring that what one supposes to be true has to be confirmed by experience/observation. So my point was that since rationalists feel little need to actually look at what they are philosophizing about, they tend to over-emphasize the language used in a debate.
Faust said:
A thread isn't just the end . . . it is all of it. You can pick some spot in almost any thread and point out how it's off topic. I was trying to suggest what most of the participants recognized as the issue here.
Faust said:
That seems like a rather one sided view. Physicalists have not triumphed over anything outside their realm. What they have triumphed over is ignorant beliefs about the physical nature of the universe. They have not understood anything I know of about the meaning of life, how to be happy, how to realize the deeper things. Your admiration is like giving a golf pro all the credit for explaining a great athelete because he understands the principles of proper form. Physics explains mechanics, it explains form, it explains processes. Physics doesn't make one wise, loving, compassionate. . . but I suppose it all boils down to what one values most doesn't it.
Faust said:
I don't get your "envy." I have absolutely no hesitation acknowledging science as the best avenue for studying physical things. Where I balk is when those studying physicalness start to proclaim that's all there is. Well, is it really is a mystery when you look only at physicalness and then wonder why that's all you ever see?
Personally, I've had lots of success meditating. It doesn't stop me from being physical, but I do value the inner me more than anything I've ever done physically. I think it is more lasting, and far more satisfying. I can't see a single reason to envy anyone, but if someone has achieved deeper and more constant happiness than I have, then I hope he/she teaches me how to do it for myself. However, I don't see physicalists as instructive in this respect.
Faust said:
Sincerity?
Faust said:
Personally? I am interested in how I can be fulfilled realistically and NOW. I couldn't possibly care less about miracles or eternal life.
Faust said:
I don't think it's about what turns out to be true. The truth is the truth, I have no problem with that. But imagine you find yourself in a world run by accountants, and who insist all philosophy be accountant philosophy. Everything has to add up, everything has to balance, everything has to be fiscally sound . . . Is that an accurate, full representation of reality? Or is the accountants' worldview limited and molded by their particular focus and priorities?
Faust said:
The ugly truth is -- a life without feeling, or at least enough of it. Just the mechanics, er facts, ma'am.
Faust said:
It seems to me you are confusing science and physicalism. They are not the same.
But let's see if we can agree. I love science, totally. I can't get enough of it. I am only disputing the claim that physicalness is all there is to reality. If there weren't reasons to doubt that claim, then I'd be fine with it. But I believe there are glaring exceptions which those committed to physicalism tend to ignore, dismiss, gloss over and generally pretend are just little glitches in their theory when really they are major problems. I say, that a priori commitment to their belief system so biases their view they can't debate objectively.
And me? I am free to accept whatever is true since I'm not committed to anything except discovering the secrets to wisdom and a happy existence.
Last edited:
- #836
Daminc
- 39
- 0
I've been seriously thinking about it since 1991 (when I was 20
)Lets take this statement to be true for a moment "Everything CAN be explained by pure physics".
Without the ability to communicate and/or understand the the answer (I've been reliably informed that the answer is 42
) then the answer is meaningless.Also, I believe it is impossible to accurately communicate between 2 humans due to the subjective nature of how we perceive things. We could get really close, but every single person has a unique perception of the world around them and a unique background, combined with a unique genetic makeup, to interperate that perception.
Any answer that has a chance of being correct would have to be calculated by objective reasoning and observation which, I think, would have to be done by computers. Then we can use our subjective reasoning to interperate the answer by a common source of reference (the objective answer).
That way, we can go through the process of communication and attempt to reach understanding.
- #837
Faust
Les Sleeth said:
The problem is that empiricism cannot be applied to most philosophical questions, certainly not to metaphysics. So when you look at philosophical claims, what else do you have to go by other than the words themselves? Sure, there are the ideas behind the words, but perhaps we haven't been paying enough attention to the words themselves. I don't agree that everything is about language, but I do think there's more to language than we are willing to acknowledge. It's a fact that many of our utterances, when looked at from an analytic perspective, turn out to be no more than tautologies. Not enough attention has been paid to that fact, in my opinion, but then again one can pay too much attention to it.
That is what I meant anyway. The problem is that those ignorant beliefs were often not recognized as such. And that was my point; I didn't suggest physicalism was closer to the truth, I only pointed out the fact that physicalist arguments are quite powerful. I will give you an example further down.
I'm not really sure about this. Clearly our existence has many purposes, but the two most obvious are survival and reproduction. As a result of that, we in the West came to understand that sex is not a sin. I consider that a major triumph over non-physicalist views, and it has everything to do with being happy, the realization of deeper things, etc.
I think it's wrong to portray physicalists as heartless monsters bent on destroying feeling and emotion. I really don't get that from them.
I do not admire physicalists, I'm just trying to look at all the different philosophical currents from a neutral perspective. I don't really root for one camp or another, I have grown out of the whole debate. I reached a perspective from which it all appears as irrelevant, although I still enjoy talking about it, like someone who likes a sport but is not attached to any particular team.
Certainly not, but what does?
It was just a figure of speech.
I'm sure you've had. As for me, meditation doesn't seem to offer the things I want. (by the way, neither does physicalism or any brand of philosophy)
Well, I don't see my life as a pursuit for happiness, so knowing that a specific doctrine has made someone happy doesn't entice my curiosity.
Well, nobody likes accountants, but I think it's mostly because what they say cannot be disputed. It has nothing to do with the accountants' worldview itself, but more to do with the fact that you have to agree with what an accountant says even if you're not an accountant yourself.
Same with physicalism. You may not like it, you may think physicalists are heartless nerds, but the fact remains that they're pretty hard to beat at any game, not only their own.
You mean physicalists don't have feelings, or enough of them? They don't enjoy nature, appreciate the arts, fall in love, have ideals? That sounds preposterous to me, I'm sure I misunderstood you.
Of course not, but physicalism is the basis of science. You can't have the latter without the former. Three milennia of meditation may have revealed truths about the mind, but only physicalist science is capable of treating epilepsy, schizophrenia, impotence. That is not to say physicalism is a true account of the mind, but it does ring more true than the alternatives.
I don't think we disagree at all, I just think you're battling a windmill. Nothing is being endangered, nothing is being profaned, the world is not becoming a worse place. There's nothing wrong with the world, nothing wrong with the people in it that can be fixed by changing our philosophies. That is how I see it anyway, and apparently it's the only point of contention between us: you think the world can be a better place if only we thought about it differently, I think that doesn't matter at all.
Well, you do seem committed to a certain worldview which implies some truths about meditation. I am of the opinion that meditation is useless - europeans didn't know about it for centuries, and their lives were not the worse for it. But that's my commitment. No one is free to accept whatever is true, we all have commitments.
- #838
Les Sleeth
Gold Member
- 2,262
- 2
Faust said:
I meant as a philosophy, it tends to describe humans heartlessly.
Faust said:
We have to disagree on this. Physicalism is the belief that all existence is physical or the result of physicalness. Science is the study of the physical universe. One doesn't have to believe all existence is physical in order to study and appreciate the physical aspects of existence.
Faust said:
To not confuse things, it would be better if you'd said "three millennia of contemplation" rather than meditation, which is something different.
In any case, it isn't physicalism that has been successful, it is scientists. The physical account of the mind is the physical part. Just because there is physicalness there doesn't mean that's all there is. Again, I have to say that I see the problem as one of researchers not really knowing themselves. I don't see how one can understand consciousness if one never stops, sits down, and experiences its nature within one's own realm.
If all you do is look at processes, and in looking at processes all you do is be a processing device yourself, then you are not going to find or experience anything but processes. That is exactly why physicalists believe we are nothing but a bunch of physical processes.
Faust said:
Do you really believe it makes no different what people think? I can't remember the name of the tribe I studied years ago in an anthropology class, but in this tribe the main goal of life was to kill people in other tribes. Children were taught this way of thinking and were generally ignored until they were old enough to participate in killing. It was not a nice place to live.
Right now in this world there are some pretty destructive philosophies. That spot in New York where the World Trade Center used to be is the result of someone's philosophy. Obviously physicalism isn't in that league of evil, but I see it as an evil nonetheless. Why? Because it portrays us as "things," and that philosophy is a step toward heartlessness when, IMO, what humanity needs is to step toward the heart.
Yes we are embodied in a thing, which evolved out of a universe of things . . . but is consciousness a thing? That belief, I say, is counterproductive to the further evolution of consciousness because it prioritizes the various aspects of a human incorrectly. The more we accept we are first and foremost a thing, the more we are going to do little more than study things.
Faust said:
There's no worldview needed for meditation, not for me anyway. I've done it daily for over thirty years because I love how it stills my consciousness, allows me to think better when I decide to think, and because I like the heightened awareness that results. If there is any effect on my "view" it is simple clarity.
Faust said:
It doesn't sound like you know anything about it, so I'm not sure why you have such an opinion. If you think Europeans haven't known about it, you are quite uninformed. They've practiced it, mostly in monasteries, for nearly 2000 years. I suggest you read Evelyn Underhill's classic "Mysticism" to see just how extensively turning inward has been practiced. Or try the Greek Orthodox collection of writings known as the "Philokalia."
- #839
saviourmachine
- 96
- 0
Understanding
I've printed your last two posts addressing me.
Concreet example
I find the concepts of the sets still a bit difficult. Can you give some concrete examples? Can I take 'warmth' - with all kind of properties - as set A? Excuse me for the layman approach. The discovery of the concept "temperature" would than belong to category B. The discovery of the concept "noise temperature" would again change our knowledge, it's Bj. Both would me members of C. No, I'm at a loss. What's xi exactly in this context? I definitely need a concreet example. This is too abstract for me.
[tex]B \subset A[/tex] or [tex]B \equiv \{A_{some}, A_{other}, ..., A_{another}\}[/tex]
[tex]C \subset A[/tex] and [tex]C \equiv \{\{B_{some}\}, \{B_{other}\}, ..., \{B_{another}\}\}[/tex]
C is finite, but not "stable".
Message vs label
The elements of C are messages. What would be a message in a concreet example? The elements of B are labels. What is a label in a concreet example? Maybe using some standard mathematical notation - like above - can clear things up too.
Numeric example
With B1 = {3, 7}, B2 = {5, 9}, B3 = {7, 11} the difference between the messages (sets Bj) and the labels {3, 7, 9, 11} is clear. Did I got that right? Is the focus on the relationship between the elements of the message, or the relationship between a message and previous messages?
Layman example
I sort of understand the numeric example, but when considering something like 'gravity' or 'temperature' I don't know what A, B and C mean in that context. Can you help me with that? Or does the nature of the problem forbid you to fill on some details?
Predicting an element in a set "B"
Extrapolation
If the first message is from Newton, and the second is from Einstein, I don't know what the third will be. I'm at a loss what you're exactly extrapolating.
I hope you don't mind to explain it a bit more. Thanks for your time!
You got me! Sorry!Doctordick said:
I've printed your last two posts addressing me. Concreet example
I find the concepts of the sets still a bit difficult. Can you give some concrete examples? Can I take 'warmth' - with all kind of properties - as set A? Excuse me for the layman approach. The discovery of the concept "temperature" would than belong to category B. The discovery of the concept "noise temperature" would again change our knowledge, it's Bj. Both would me members of C. No, I'm at a loss. What's xi exactly in this context? I definitely need a concreet example. This is too abstract for me.
[tex]B \subset A[/tex] or [tex]B \equiv \{A_{some}, A_{other}, ..., A_{another}\}[/tex]
[tex]C \subset A[/tex] and [tex]C \equiv \{\{B_{some}\}, \{B_{other}\}, ..., \{B_{another}\}\}[/tex]
C is finite, but not "stable".
Message vs label
The elements of C are messages. What would be a message in a concreet example? The elements of B are labels. What is a label in a concreet example? Maybe using some standard mathematical notation - like above - can clear things up too.
Numeric example
So a set "B" is in this case "one number" and represents a change in my knowledge of A... So, "B" can be seen as an "sensorial vector", an observation. Based on "C" - that formed my pattern recognition system - I am able to use the new information "B" to adjust my predictions. The labels are assigned to the observed elements of A: numbers.
With B1 = {3, 7}, B2 = {5, 9}, B3 = {7, 11} the difference between the messages (sets Bj) and the labels {3, 7, 9, 11} is clear. Did I got that right? Is the focus on the relationship between the elements of the message, or the relationship between a message and previous messages?
Layman example
I sort of understand the numeric example, but when considering something like 'gravity' or 'temperature' I don't know what A, B and C mean in that context. Can you help me with that? Or does the nature of the problem forbid you to fill on some details?
Predicting an element in a set "B"
The next message can be as predicted or it can be a surprise.
Extrapolation
If the first message is from Newton, and the second is from Einstein, I don't know what the third will be. I'm at a loss what you're exactly extrapolating.
I hope you don't mind to explain it a bit more. Thanks for your time!
- #840
Doctordick
- 634
- 0
Sure, anytime you catagoize something, give it a name, you are thinking of a "set". The elements of the set constitutes the entire collection of things which you have decided are included under that name. Lastly, coming up with a name for the set is not required; at least not in the abstract. I like the following comment on the issue of "abstract" from Robert M. Hutchins and Mortimer J. Adler in the "Gateway to the Great Books": "If you have learned to add two and five without asking "Two and five what?" you already have both feet off the ground--higher than you think. You are now air-born. The rest is just a matter of gaining altitude."saviourmachine said:
Sure; however, if you do then membership in the set would be anything which you would consider satisfying what you mean by 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. I am not at all sure what you would wish to call 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. A coat? A smoldering fire? A friendly girl? Since I defined B to be a finite collection of elements of A, "the discovery of the concept "temperature" would not belong to B unless you would include "the discovery of the concept 'temperature'" as an example of 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. Why would you include this particular discovery as an example of 'warmth' - with all kind of properties?saviourmachine said:
Not with any meaning of 'warmth' – with all kind of properties I would consider reasonable. Under your example Bj would be a change in the specifc set of things you catagorize as 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. Your mother bought you some warm cloths or some hot (if 'warmth' – with all kind of properties included "hot") girls walked in the room. That is, the collection of things which you regarded to be in that set 'warmth' – with all kind of properties would change. C is the end result of all changes to date and would be everything you currently regard to be 'warmth' – with all kind of properties.saviormachine said:
B is not a subset of A, B is a finite collection of elements taken from A. The significant difference is that it is possible for an element which appears only once in A could appear multiple times in B. A subtly which has profound consequences which I won't get into for a while. Likewise, C also being a finite collection of sets B need not be a subset of A.
C is the collection of information available to you (knowledge of the things you consider to be 'warmth' – with all kind of properties as presented above). The elements of C are changes in that information (knowledge of the things you consider to be 'warmth' – with all kind of properties as presented above) which arrive via the addition of new elements to that set C which are labeled Bj. Message just seemed to be a good reference label to put on "change in information". I have no idea what you meant by 'warmth' – with all kind of properties. You could have meant "putting a coat on" as an example of an element of A. B was a collection of elements: perhaps putting a coat on together with three warm girls named susie, joan and kate in front of a low fire in a fireplace. Call it an experience if you wish.saviormachine said:
The real problem here is that the moment you begin to put meaningfull labels on these elements, you are proposing a solution (i.e., you know what you are talking about) and not examing the problem (trying to understand what you are talking about). Read my post to Les on the "Are Qualia Real" thread.
I really didn't understand what you were getting at. I don't think you understand why I am talking about sets. Given any problem concievable, C constitutes the information available to you to solve the problem. C is not A because we can not know for sure that all the information is available to us even though it is assumed that A is what we are trying to understand. And the set Bis required to provide for the possibility of change. That's really all there is to it.saviormachine said:
"Gravity" and "temperature" are meaningfull labels of concepts essential to the modern solution to all those environmental problems ordinararly referred to as "physics". Their very existence means that one is working with a solution, not with the problem. One could ask, what was the problem which lead to that solution? That would be the history of physics or maybe the history of science or perhaps the history of man. At any rate, the path to that solution is far beyond what I could write. What I am trying to do is to look at the fundamental nature of all problems themselves.saviormachine said:
I think you misunderstood what I was asking. First, I was talking about a representation of C (that upon which your solution is to be based). What I had pointed out to you was that, since C was a finite collection of sets B (which I had labeled as Bj) and every B constituted a finite collection of elements of A (by definition) I could put arbitary numerical labels on each element of every B and then have a specific list of all B in C. Possessing this list I could answer the question, "is this specific B (specific in the sense that I have a set of numerical labels which specify the B I am talking about) in the complete set C?"saviormachine said:The next message can be as predicted or it can be a surprise.
I should comment about this circumstance. Essentially I have not given those numeric labels any meaning at all and yet I can answer a very specific question; however, my ability to answer that question depends on those numerical labels I have assigned. Again, you need to recognize that meaningfull labels are part of a solution and not a mere formality. As soon as I give two elements somewhere in this set the same label (numerical or otherwise), I am fundamentally asserting they are the same element. How in the world did I know they were the same? For the moment, let us just say I guessed and maybe I guessed right and maybe I guessed wrong. Later I will point out some interesting aspects of having the freedom to label things anyway I wish. At the moment, in order to avoid making presumptions, I must assure that, whenever I make an assertion about C, that the assertion must be true no matter what labeling proceedure was used.
But meanwhile, you have a list of every B you have ever seen (in the problem so far) and, having labeled them, can refer to any specific one via the list of labels assigned to it. Against that backdrop I asked, "suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you the labels of all the elements but one from some B and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given." Your answer, "the next message can be as predicted or it can be a surprise", presumes we are talking about a new message. We are not, we are talking about answering questions about the C which is available to you.
There is a very simple proceedure which will create a set of lists from the lists you have prepared where this second list will asnswer the above question. First, take each list you had to start with and, for any two lists which are identical, add a label which does not exist on any list (since we are using numerical labels and the number of elements already labeled is finite, there exist a plentyful quantity of unused labels). Now, for each of these altered lists, make every list possible which is identical to that list except for the absense of one element. Now repeat the first step above, eliminating any duplicate lists created in step two, Finally, replace the labels which were removed in step two.
The result has a very curious property. That is the fact that no matter what list you choose of the finished collection, you can remove any element and there will be no list in the remainder of the lists which have the same set of numbers you are looking at. This property is achieved no matter what the original label assignment was. Given this new set of lists, if someone gives you the labels of all the elements but one, there is only one possible missing element so the question asked above may be answered.
I suspect you are questioning what value lies in the above performance. The value arrises when you realize that the collection of lists you have constructed can be seen as a mathematical function. The numerical result (the missing label) is given by the table of all lists missing one element (it is not a continuous function as it is only defined for the arguments in the table). It is a function of many variables (the list of B labels missing one element) which results in the label which is missing. Mathematically this can be written:
[tex] x_n=f(x_1,x_2, \cdots, x_{n-1}) [/tex]
If that is true, then it implies there exists a function F, defined by
[tex]F(x_1, x_2 , \cdots, x_n)=f(x_1,x_2, \cdots, x_{n-1})-x_n [/tex]
where the rule which tells you whether a particular list is valid is given by F=0, a very simple rule. This result was achieved by imagining the existence of some elements which were not part of A: i.e., they were totally made up in order to achieve that simple rule. What I have shown is that the existence or non-existence of any finite collection of elements can be constrained to exactly what has been seen (no matter what that collection is) by the simple rule F=0 and the introduction of imaginary or make believe elements.
Now what does this have to do with reality? Throughout history, scientific hypothicies have consisted of invented entities and invented rules. The rules are supposedly invented to explain what we see and the invented entities are then invented to correct for the problems in what we see. Every time we are able to prove that what we see is consistent with the entities and the rules (we think are true) we consider it proof that that they both exist. If you are going to give me the freedom to invent any entities I want and the freedom to propose any rules I want, you have given me more freedom than I need to explain everything which is known (since "everything which is known" is finite). I can construct a very simple universe based on that simple rule F=0 which is quite interesting. That is, if one is interested in thinking.
Have fun -- Dick