Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?

[moving finger]

On considering whether "everything can be reduced to pure physics", I have a question. Question: What if I had the power to create something from nothing.

Here is your problem :

You are assuming that the starting point is "nothing" and yet you still exist to create from nothing. Hence the starting point is not nothing. This problem underlies the common misconceptions of dualism and 3rd person objective science.

MF

 

[Canute]

That is exactly the issue I have been trying to communicate: "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it". I do not know what part of that sentence you do not understand. I am at a total loss as to how to make it any clearer.

There is nothing wrong with this sentence, and it is quite obviously true. However it is not the same sentence as the one you originally posted.

 

[Canute]

Online somewhere is an essay by Stephen Hawking called "The End of Physics". In it Hawking argues that one consequence of the incompleteness theorem is that physics cannot be completed. That is, a complete and consistent description of the universe cannot be constructed by physicists (or indeed by anyone). Heisenberg argued the same, for related reasons (problems of self-reference). This is also the view of Buddhists and their like. It also seems true to me that any explanations of the universe must have at least one explanatory gap in it. If so then the question becomes one of whether this really is a gap or whether there is something in it. In other words, whether it is an epistemilogical or an ontological problem. In my view it is both.

Aurino - thanks. It takes all sorts, as they say.

 

[metacristi]

It is conceivable that 'gaps' will ever exist (though I'd argue that we do not have yet sufficient reasons to think that a TOE cannot be complete-irrespective whether we will ever be able to prove this). After all we do not even have the definitive answers to such simple, common sense at first sight, questions like 'what is matter?' (the 'quantum field' approach is only the best existing model so far, having a fallible epistemological privilege, provisionally accepted as scientific knowledge).

But the first task of scientific quest is not to prove that our best existing theories are complete, as Popper put it well a scientist does not need to answer all questions in order to make sense of the observed facts (see his famous example with the 'dune').

There is no need for that as much as the theories prove to be very coherent and very successful and do not lead to internal contradictions. We begin with some basic assumptions, provisionally accepted, and together with empirical observations and other principles we build a net of statements having a high coherence, the so called scientific knowledge. Thus if we ever could achieve the same degree of coherence (and stability on long term) in the neurological field as that in physics we could say that science is overall on a good road. Using a too high standard (as those who are always complaining of the existence of 'gaps' do) would be at least non rational.

Moreover if we will ever find a very successful TOE (physical theory) + a very successful, stable and broad, theory of mind I would argue that we are even rationally entitled to say, provisionally, that this 'compund' theory is approximatively true. There might be further 'gaps' no one deny this (for example it is unlikely that we could ever prove clearly that all biology 'reduces' to that physical TOE), yet we would need much more reasons to think that the existing scientific knoweldge is not at least approximativley true.

 

[Canute]

Yes I agree that we may as well continue to develop our theories. But those theories, and all current theories, inevitably have at least one gap in them. This is for reasons Hawking gives, but also because in the last analysis all scientific theories rest on metaphysical assumptions. It is impossible to do science without doing metaphysics. This is not a criticism of science, just an observation as to its limits. Precisely the same limit applies to theological theories which use God or a divine miracle to fill the gap, or to those that use the 'Tao', 'Emptiness', 'Allah' or whatever to fill the gap. Mathematically speaking every formal system of terms and theorems must contain at least one undefined term, for the same reason that every dictionary must contain at least one.

 

[loseyourname]

Could you find a link to either Hawking's or Heisenberg's argument on this point? Incompleteness theorem refers to formal systems. The axioms of the system cannot be proved from within the system and so the system is incomplete. In the case of physics, its axioms are the laws of physics (conservation of energy, E=mc^2, all that good stuff). These cannot be proven by the laws of physics, but they are proven by experiment. They are not really a formal system - they are a description of the way physical entities in the universe behave, confirmed through empirical investigation. They are not something to be 'proven' in any formal sense in the first place. It's hard to see how the incompleteness theorem could possibly apply here. Heck, it doesn't even apply to natural numbers or certain forms of geometry.

 

[Canute]

Sure. Here are a few quotes supporting my post. I can't find the specific Heisenberg comment but have posted a quote from Max Planck instead which expresses the same view.

I've posted a few extracts that seem relevant to the topic since I had to search out the Hawking's reference and passed these on the way to it. They should all relate to the points you raise above.

*"…since every word in a dictionary is defined in terms of another word… The only way to avoid circular reasoning in a finite language would be to include some undefined terms in the dictionary. Today we must realize that mathematical systems too, must include undefined terms, and seek to include the minimum number necessary for the system to make sense."

Leonard Mlodinow
‘Euclid’s Window’

"Up to now, most people have implicitly assumed that there is an ultimate theory, that we will eventually discover. Indeed, I myself have suggested we might find it quite soon. However, M-theory has made me wonder if this is true. Maybe it is not possible to formulate the theory of the universe in a finite number of statements. This is very reminiscent of Goedel's theorem. This says that any finite system of axioms is not sufficient to prove every result in mathematics.

Stephen Hawking
'Goedel and The End of Physics'
Online

"Gödel, after all, proved that mathematics itself has its limits. In his famous incompleteness theorem, he showed that no logical system can be used to prove its own consistency. To do so, one has to step out of the system, pop up a level, and study it from a higher vantage point… But proving the consistency of that system requires popping up another level, and so on, ad infinitum… there is no highest vanyage point, no ultimate abstraction."

George Johnson
'Fire in the Mind'

"…as I explained in the first lecture, the way we have to describe Nature is generally incomprehensible to us."

Richard Feynman
QED - The Strange Theory of Light and Matter

"I do not think I am prejudiced against the importance that science has from the purely human point of view. But with all that, I cannot believe (and this is my first objection) - I cannot believe that [for example] the deep philosophical enquiry into the relation between subject and object and into the true meaning of the distinction between them depends on the quantative results of physical and chemical measurements with weighing scales, spectroscopes, microscopes, telescopes, with Geiger-Müller-counters, Wilson-chambers, photographic plates, arrangements for measuring the radioactive decay, and whatnot. It is not very easy to say why I do not believe it. I feel a certain incongruity between the applied means and the problem to be solved."

Erwin Schrödinger
'Why Not Talk Physics'

"… It is sometimes urged that the basal stuff of the world should be called "neutral stuff" rather than "mind-stuff," since it is to be such that both mind and matter originate from it. If this is intended to emphasise that only limited islands of it constitute actual minds, and that even in these islands that which is known mentally is not equivalent to a complete inventory of all that may be there, I agree. In fact, I should suppose that the self-knowledge of consciousness is mainly or wholly a knowledge which eludes the inventory method of description. The term "mind-stuff" might well be amended, but neutral stuff seems to be the wrong kind of amendment. It implies that we have two avenues of approach to an understanding of its nature. We have only one approach, namely, through our direct knowledge of mind. The supposed approach through the physical world leads only into the cycle of physics, where we run round and round like a kitten chasing its tail and never reach the world-stuff at all.

Sir Arthur Eddington
In Ken Wilbur - Quantum Questions

"It is difficult to decide where science ends and mysticism begins. As soon as we begin to make even the most elementary theories we are open to the charge of indulging in metaphysics. Yet theories, however provisional, are the very lifeblood of scientific progress. We simply cannot escape metaphysics, though we can perhaps over-indulge, as well as have too little."

Banesh Hoffmann
'The Strange Story of the Quantum'

"The elements of consciousness are particular thoughts and feelings; th eelements of the brain cell are atoms and electrons. But the two analyses do not run parallel to one another. Whilst, therefore, I contemplate a spiritual domain underlying the physical world as a whole, I do not think of it as distributed so that to each element of time and space there is a corresponding portion of the spiritual background. My conclusion is that, although for the most part our enquiry into the problem of experience ends in a veil of symbols, there is an immediate knowledge in the minds of conscious beings which lifts the veil in places; what we discern through these openings is of mental and spiritual nature. Elsewhere we see no more than the veil."

Sir Arthur Eddington
'Beyond the Veil of Physics'

"Many would hold that, from the broad philosophical standpoint, the outstanding achievement of twentieth-century physics is not the theory of relativity with its welding together of space and time, or the theory of quanta with its present apparent negation of the laws of causation, or the dissection of the atom with the resultant discovery that things are not what they seem; it is the general recognition that we are not yet in contact with ultimate reality. We are still imprisoned in our cave, with our backs to the light, and can only watch the shadows on the wall."

Sir James Jeans
The Mysterious Universe

"The symbolic nature of physics is generally recognised, and the scheme of physics is now formulated in such a way as to make it almost self-evident that it is a partial aspect of something wider."

Sir Arthur Eddington
Science and the Unseen World

"Formal self-reference in Goedel’s theorems has various features in common with self-reference in minds and computers. The theorems do not imply that there can be no formal computational models of the mind, but on the contrary, suggest the existence of such models within a conception of mind as subject to similar limitations as formal systems."

Damjan Bojadziez
Mind versus Goedel
In ‘Mind Versus Computer’,

What is the relation between Gödels theorem and whether we can formulate the theory of the universe in terms of a finite number of principles? One connection is obvious. According to the positivist philosophy of science a physical theory is a mathematical model. So if there are mathematical results that can not be proved, there are physical problems that can not be predicted….

Stephen Hawking – Goedel and The End of Physics – net article (http://www.damtp.cam.ac.uk/strtst/dirac/hawking/ )

"Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery in nature. And it is because in the last analysis we ourselves are part of the mystery we try to solve."

Max Planck
?

"It is important to realize that what we know as the ‘scientific worldview’ is an image of the universe that rests on a host of daring metaphyical assumptions. (! -ed) These are often presented and seen as facts that have been proven beyond any reasonable doubt, while in reality they stand on very shaky ground, are controversial, or are inadequately supported by the evidence."

Stanislav Grof
The Cosmic Game

 

[metacristi]

It might be mentioned here that the necessity of an infinity of axioms does not imply that such a system is necesarily incomplete. As a matter of fact a student of Godel (Gentzen if I remember well) proved that for infinite systems (infinite number of axioms) it is possible to avoid incompleteness. Our incapacity to propose such a system, to list the axioms in other words, does not prove that we cannot tend toward it, or that it is incomplete. We can never reach it of course so in this sense we could say that our theories (limited parts of that infinite system) are incomplete yet there is no reason to say that there is impossible to exist a (complete) infinite system describing Reality. But currently, in my view of course, there is no good reason to think that the universe is infinite and moreover that we need an infinity of axioms/postulates/laws to describe it. The problem, in my view, is still wide open, our incapacity to prove that a complete system is possible and to find it does not amount to say that such a system in an impossibility, the problem of consciousness included ('complete' imply here also the approximative truth of the system; otherwise if there exist false predictions the system cannot be complete, some axioms are false and have to be changed). Even for infinite systems.

 

[moving finger]

Sure. Here are a few quotes supporting my post. I can't find the specific Heisenberg comment but have posted a quote from Max Planck instead which expresses the same view.

a couple more that I like :
Do not keep saying to yourself “But how can it be like that?” because you will go down the drain into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped
Feynman

Man is not born to solve the problems of the universe, but to find out where the problems begin, and then to take his stand within the limits of the intelligible
Goethe

The human mind is not capable of grasping the Universe. We are like a little child entering a huge library. The walls are covered to the ceilings with books in many different tongues. The child knows that someone must have written these books. It does not know who or how. It does not understand the languages in which they are written. But the child notes a definite plan in the arrangement of the books---a mysterious order which it does not comprehend, but only dimly suspects.
Einstein

It’s up to us to make sense of Nature; it’s not Nature’s obligation to behave as we would like.
David Lindley/Where Does the Weirdness Go?

MF

 

[Doctordick]

If none of you can comprehend that you could be wrong about something and not know it, then you are beyond my intellectual reach.

That is exactly the issue I have been trying to communicate: "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it". I do not know what part of that sentence you do not understand. I am at a total loss as to how to make it any clearer.

That is exactly the issue I have been trying to communicate: "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it". I do not know what part of that sentence you do not understand. I am at a total loss as to how to make it any clearer.

There is nothing wrong with this sentence, and it is quite obviously true. However it is not the same sentence as the one you originally posted.

The only difference between the first and the second that I can see is that, in the first I say that if you cannot comprehend the truth of the statement you are beyond my intellectual reach and in the second, I merely restate the statement. If you cannot understand the first and find the second obvious, I am at a complete loss to understand your mode of thinking.

However, laying that aside, if I have your agreement that, "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it", I will step off to the next thing I think has to be recognized as a truth of similar clarity: "it is possible that you are not wrong about everything". If you will also accept that as a true statement, then it is my assertion is that these are important facts and they should be recognized as important issues in any chain of logical thought. I contend that the things that you are wrong about obey different rules than the things you are not wrong about and that the subtle difference yields astonishing consequences.

You should be well aware that, at times, extremely simple differences can yield far reaching consequences. For example look at the difference between asymmetric wave functions and symmetric wave function (nothing more than a simple difference in character of two possible solutions to exactly the same differential equation). One set of solutions yield collections of entities obeying Fermi statistics while the others obey Bose Einstein statistics; results which lead to far reaching differences in behavior of macroscopic entities.

If you are willing to listen, I will show you the consequences of the very simple difference between the rules obeyed by "what you are right about" and the rules obeyed by "what you are wrong about". And prove that consequences of these differences exist even when there is no way to discriminate between "what you are right about" and "what you are wrong about".

As to the rest of you, you sure seem to be able to come up with a lot of reasons not to think about things. I guess you are pretty well convinced there are no new intellectual breakthroughs to be made. I personally think that it is good that there are a few crackpots like me who doubt the absolute certainty of such proclamations.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Canute]

I think in general people are not saying that they don't want to think about things, but rather that they don't agree with the way you think about things.

About that sentence. Yes. you're right. There are two ways of reading it and I read it the way you didn't mean it. My apologies.

Of course I would be willing to listen to your ideas on things we know and things we don't, but only after you've shown that we cannot tell the difference between them, which is your more basic claim. I find it confusing that you say we cannot know anything and then offer to explain to me what you know. To do this would entail that you can tell the difference between what you know and what you don't.

 

[loseyourname]

Okay, it doesn't seem like any of those were arguments, just suggestions that physics might be inherently incomplete, with an analogy to Goedel. Thankfully, they aren't saying that their conjecture has anything to do with Goedel, because it doesn't.

By the way, I've always thought the same thing about languages, at least with regards to defining every term formally. Again, though, you escape the seeming circularity by defining certain terms empirically, by simple reference and sense to what they represent in the world. This gives you at least a semantic, if not a syntactic understanding, without circularity.

Edit: Let me be perfectly clear here before another argument starts. Physics may very well prove to be an incomplete system. I have absolutely no idea. I've already stated many times in this thread that I don't think it has full explanatory power. It, however, will never be incomplete in the sense that Canute seems to be intending, which is the incompleteness of certain formal mathematical systems according to Goedel's theorem. This theorem does not even apply to all formal mathematical systems, much less to empirical theories and laws.

 

[Doctordick]

I think in general people are not saying that they don't want to think about things, but rather that they don't agree with the way you think about things.

That has been obvious to me for well over forty years. That is the exact reason no one else (and that includes the entire physics community) has ever come across the relationship I have happened to have discovered.

About that sentence. Yes. you're right. There are two ways of reading it and I read it the way you didn't mean it. My apologies.

What about the second statement, "it is possible that you are not wrong about everything". Will you accept that statement as being on equal footing with the first statement and that both statements apply equally well to everyone? And secondly, will you allow me use the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" to refer to the two different cases: i.e., "knowable" refers to things which can be proved are correct and "unknowable" refers to things which can never be proved correct?

Of course I would be willing to listen to your ideas on things we know and things we don't, but only after you've shown that we cannot tell the difference between them, which is your more basic claim.

First (things we know) and (things we don't know) are not exactly the categories I am referring to; it is rather, "things that you are right about" and "things that you are wrong about". Secondly, I am not making any such a claim at all; my presentation specifically allows for the possibility that there is someone out there who can tell exactly when they are right and when they are wrong; however, I have very strong doubts such a person really exists. If they could tell the difference between what is right and what is wrong, why would they ever choose to be wrong about anything? I can only conclude that such a person would be all knowing. That may be him, but it certainly is not me!

Yeah, but then there is the guy who tells me, "sure I could be wrong about something, but I will assure you, I am not wrong about this!" I would rather not take his word for it, thank you. That could be a very dangerous intellectual presumption.

I find it confusing that you say we cannot know anything and then offer to explain to me what you know. To do this would entail that you can tell the difference between what you know and what you don't.

First of all, you are misinterpreting what I am offering to you. All I want to do is show you the logical consequences which flow directly out of the fact that being right and being wrong lead to vastly different possibilities and that the existence of those possibilities have nothing at all to do with being able tell the difference between the two. In fact, if you follow my reasoning, you will find that those consequences resolve down to exactly the mechanisms required to differentiate between where you are wrong and where you are right, but not at all the way you expect. Consider this thought experiment: if no one could prove that something put forward was false, does that constitute proof that it is correct? In my opinion, only a madman would conclude something was right just because he couldn't prove it was wrong.

Not as an argument but rather as a hand waving gesture to point towards the results I will achieve, let me point out that telling the difference between Bosons and Fermions does not depend at all on being able to confirm that their wave functions are symmetric or antisymmetric by inspection of the wave functions themselves but rather, it is the gross behavior of identified entity which is taken as conclusive evidence of the symmetry or asymmetry of the wave function. Logical arguments take precedence over examination if direct examination is impossible.

The next point in this argument is the issue of the definition of "an explanation". I have defined "an explanation as a defined method of yielding expectations of events not yet experienced based on information presently available to us." I have further claimed that my definition includes every case of an explanation known to us and excludes every case which cannot be considered an explanation under common understanding. If that assertion is in error, you should be able to give me either an example of "an explanation" which fails to fulfill that definition or something which fulfills that definition which can not possibly be seen as an explanation. Sure it is abstract but, if it is not a valid abstraction, you should be able to explain to me where it fails. As I said earlier, show me that my abstract definition is unacceptable (i.e., differs from your personal usage) and I will go away quietly. :shy:

Looking forward to a rational response -- Dick

 

[Canute]

Loseyourname

On what grounds do you say that the incompleteness theorem does not apply to physics, especially when many, including Hawkings, thinks it does? I thought the extracts I posted made a strong case that is does, and you haven't said what is wrong with that case.

What about the second statement, "it is possible that you are not wrong about everything". Will you accept that statement as being on equal footing with the first statement and that both statements apply equally well to everyone?

Of course. I doubt it's possible to be wrong about absolutely everything.

And secondly, will you allow me use the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" to refer to the two different cases: i.e., "knowable" refers to things which can be proved are correct and "unknowable" refers to things which can never be proved correct?

That is the precise opposite of my view I'm afraid. To prove something formally requires the use of logical and mathematical systems that are known to be produce only uncertain results. That is, if it is possible to prove something true within one formal system (from one axiom set) it is possible to prove it false in another (using a different axiom set). All such proofs produce only uncertain, realitive or contingent knowledge. Propositions are true or false only relative to ones axioms, or relative to other truths and falsities in the system. That is not certain knowledge.

However, things that are known directly and which therefore cannot be proved in this way, can be self-evident and thus can be known with certainty. To state this clearly, so that it is easy to object, I'd say that if a proposition can be formally proved to be true (i.e. proved by demonstration to be true) then it cannot be known for certain that it is true.

First (things we know) and (things we don't know) are not exactly the categories I am referring to; it is rather, "things that you are right about" and "things that you are wrong about". Secondly, I am not making any such a claim at all; my presentation specifically allows for the possibility that there is someone out there who can tell exactly when they are right and when they are wrong; however, I have very strong doubts such a person really exists.

A person who knows when he is right and when he is wrong would have to all-knowing. This is because there is no difference between knowing what is right and what is wriong, in that both require knowing. In my view it would be more true to say that for any individual some of his or her knowledge is certain and all the rest is uncertain.

If they could tell the difference between what is right and what is wrong, why would they ever choose to be wrong about anything? I can only conclude that such a person would be all knowing. That may be him, but it certainly is not me!

I agree. If one knows in full what is true and what is false then one is all-knowing.

Yeah, but then there is the guy who tells me, "sure I could be wrong about something, but I will assure you, I am not wrong about this!" I would rather not take his word for it, thank you. That could be a very dangerous intellectual presumption.

I agree again. This is why I'm surprised you get so upset when people disagree with you.

First of all, you are misinterpreting what I am offering to you. All I want to do is show you the logical consequences which flow directly out of the fact that being right and being wrong lead to vastly different possibilities and that the existence of those possibilities have nothing at all to do with being able tell the difference between the two. In fact, if you follow my reasoning, you will find that those consequences resolve down to exactly the mechanisms required to differentiate between where you are wrong and where you are right, but not at all the way you expect. Consider this thought experiment: if no one could prove that something put forward was false, does that constitute proof that it is correct? In my opinion, only a madman would conclude something was right just because he couldn't prove it was wrong.

Fine.

...let me point out that telling the difference between Bosons and Fermions does not depend at all on being able to confirm that their wave functions are symmetric or antisymmetric by inspection of the wave functions themselves but rather, it is the gross behavior of identified entity which is taken as conclusive evidence of the symmetry or asymmetry of the wave function. Logical arguments take precedence over examination if direct examination is impossible.

Of course. It seems to go without saying that if observation or measurement is impossible then we have to use some other method.

The next point in this argument is the issue of the definition of "an explanation". I have defined "an explanation as a defined method of yielding expectations of events not yet experienced based on information presently available to us." I have further claimed that my definition includes every case of an explanation known to us and excludes every case which cannot be considered an explanation under common understanding. If that assertion is in error, you should be able to give me either an example of "an explanation" which fails to fulfill that definition or something which fulfills that definition which can not possibly be seen as an explanation. Sure it is abstract but, if it is not a valid abstraction, you should be able to explain to me where it fails. As I said earlier, show me that my abstract definition is unacceptable (i.e., differs from your personal usage) and I will go away quietly. :shy:

Let's just assume that your definition is correct and move on. What follows?

Looking forward to a rational response -- Dick

Damn it man, such comments do nothing but get people's backs up. Leave them out. "Looking forward to your response" would have done.

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Canute,
Let me begin near the end.

I agree again. This is why I'm surprised you get so upset when people disagree with you.

I don't get upset when people disagree with me. I get dumbfounded by the extent with to which they will go to misconstrue what I am saying. And, having made that comment, let me go back to your response to my desire to use the words "knowable" and "unknowable" as representing the two central concepts of my presentation: "things you are right about" and "things you are wrong about". I would like to use those terms because I have used them before and it would save me a lot of typing. So, to your response:

That is the precise opposite of my view I'm afraid. To prove something formally requires the use of logical and mathematical systems that are known to be produce only uncertain results. That is, if it is possible to prove something true within one formal system (from one axiom set) it is possible to prove it false in another (using a different axiom set). All such proofs produce only uncertain, realitive or contingent knowledge. Propositions are true or false only relative to ones axioms, or relative to other truths and falsities in the system. That is not certain knowledge.

You have concentrated on the word "prove" and presumed that I mean by "prove" exactly what you have decided is meant by the word. That is not at all what I mean. When I talk about the possibility of proving something, my comments are coming from my recognition and acceptance of my own complete ignorance. That is to say, if you are truly right about something, then that fact can perhaps be demonstrated by some means (to prove is to demonstrate it is true). Thus it is possible that I could come to know that you are right (it is possible that it is a knowable truth).

This is in direct opposition to the case where you are wrong. If you are truly wrong about something I can be quite confident that, no matter how long mankind stirrs that pot of concepts they have created, it will never be correctly demonstrated that you are right about that particular thing. Thus it follows that I can absolutely never know that you are right on that fact (it can not be demonstrated or proved and is an absolutely "unknowable" fact, truth, idea?). And knowing how to differentiate between being right and being wrong has no bearing on this particular issue at all.

The significant difference between "knowable" and "unknowable" things as I have defined them is quite simple. If you are right, you are right (story is over); if you are wrong, there is utterly no limit on the ways you can be wrong (in fact, there may actually be some useful ways to be wrong).

Damn it man, such comments do nothing but get people's backs up. Leave them out. "Looking forward to your response" would have done.

Sorry about that, I'll try to be more careful in the future.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Canute]

DrDick

Your post doesn't deal with my objection, but I have no problem with it except for this.

That is to say, if you are truly right about something, then that fact can perhaps be demonstrated by some means (to prove is to demonstrate it is true). Thus it is possible that I could come to know that you are right (it is possible that it is a knowable truth).

My problem with this is that it is impossible to demonstrate a certain truth. That is, any proposition that can be demonstrated to be true might be false, and vice versa. This is because to demonstrate that a proposition is true or false requires the use of a formal axiomatic system, and it is never possible to demonstrate that the axioms of any such system are true. Aristotle said that the best we can do is make our axioms self-evident. This is fine, but knowledge that is self-evident to one person cannot be shown to be true or false to someone else, so no general or third-person proof can have self-evidently true axioms, except perhaps when the axiom can be agreed by everyone to be self-evident, as perhaps in the case of cogito ergo sum. But some people find even that axiom problematic.

This is why I prefer the term 'demonstrate', or 'prove by demonstration' to just 'prove'. What we usually call a proof is just a demonstration that some conclusion can be derived from some set of axioms. This method does not ever produce conclusions which can be known to be true or false. This is one reason that scientists never claim that their theories are true or false, and one reason that Russell and Whitehead failed to reach their goal.

This means that even if I can prove (by demonstration) that some proposition is true or false you will never be able to know that it is true or false, and neither will I, except in a relative way (relative to my axioms).

Because of this I can't agree with some of the things you say about knowing and not knowing. They appear to be based on false premises.

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Canute,

Once again I face the problem of people misconstruing what I am saying. I think the problem is that they cannot conceive of proceeding without some additional assumptions so they make those assumptions, assuming I have made them, and then argue against them.

My problem with this is that it is impossible to demonstrate a certain truth.

That cannot be your problem with what I said as I, at no time, implied that there was any necessity to make such a demonstration. You seem to miss the point that all I am doing is defining what I mean by the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" for the sole purpose of convenience. I have made much of the issue only so that you might be able to follow my reasoning without falling into extensive debate as to the correct meanings of the words. I am using them only to refer to two different types of things you, I or anyone else might think they know.

You made much of my comment "... the fact can perhaps be demonstrated ...". Why do you think the word "perhaps" is in there? All I am doing there is trying to explain to you why I like to use the words "knowable" and "unknowable" so that you could more easily tie them to my simple usage. Would you better understand what I meant if I had just omitted that sentence and left it with, "it is knowable in the sense that, with infinite time (time to discover all erroneous ideas), I could possibly come to "really and correctly know" that you are "truly right". On the other hand, with regard to things about which you are wrong the event of knowing them to be absolute truth of can not possibly ever occur (thus pointing me to the word unknowable)". This is the central critical issue.

At issue here, is not the possibility of discovering what is true but rather the apparent fact that false beliefs can on occasion be found false. I am saying that this is the difference between what is "knowable" and what is "unknowable" (by my definition which I have been trying to communicate) and it has important and far reaching consequences. Now I am sure there are enough cases in history to convince you that having been wrong does occur, at least for the rest of the world. (You should even have a few experiences of you own at becoming aware of the fact that you were wrong about something.)

It is clear from the rest of your post that you are looking for a way to tell the difference between these two classes of things before making a commitment to the significance of that difference. I am sure that you are aware of some things you were wrong about in the past. The point is that evidence that you are wrong can occur and, if it does ever occur, it will not turn out to be something you were right about. You will never discover you are right about something you were wrong about!

My point is that there are the things you are right about and things you are wrong about and they have very different fundamental characteristics. The single most important character of being right is that one will absolutely never find out they are wrong; this is almost the definition of being right. On the other hand, the history of mankind is ripe with cases where they were wrong.

Because of this I can't agree with some of the things you say about knowing and not knowing. They appear to be based on false premises.

I am not talking about "knowing" and "not knowing". I am using the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" to mean some very specific things. Easy reference to the two issues is central to my presentation and it serves no purpose to muddy up what I mean by those terms. The use of English words are so vague anyway that it shouldn't bother you that I want to put a specific exact meaning on my usage. All I want to do is, in my analysis, to have the easy power to refer to the two different categories; and I harbor no interest in being able to tell the difference between them.

In fact, in my presentation, I am going to do my very best to maintain the requirement that it is not possible to tell the difference. That has to be the single most important constraint on any proposed explanation of anything. The reason for maintaining that constraint is that, if it is ever violated, a mechanism exists to show the proposed explanation is false: i.e., evidence exists which will show that something thought to be true (under the explanation) is false and thus the proposed explanation fails.

Dick

 

[Canute]

I'm afraid I can't follow you. I agree that something that is not true (or false) is not knowable. Also I agree also that only what is true (or false) is knowable. (By true I presume we mean here 'what is the case'). Briefly put, you seem to be saying that it is impossible to know that a false fact is true or that a true fact is false. I suppose this translates as - only the truth can be known. I agree. But I don't agree that it's never possible to tell the difference between what is knowable and what is unknowable, which is what you seem to saying.

Your last para. hints at where you are heading, but it's a bit cryptic as it stands. What is it that you are suggesting?

 

[Doctordick]

I'm afraid I can't follow you. I agree that something that is not true (or false) is not knowable. Also I agree also that only what is true (or false) is knowable. (By true I presume we mean here 'what is the case'). Briefly put, you seem to be saying that it is impossible to know that a false fact is true or that a true fact is false. I suppose this translates as - only the truth can be known. I agree.

It sounds like you understand me but I am not yet entirely convinced you really have a handle on what I am talking about here.

But I don't agree that it's never possible to tell the difference between what is knowable and what is unknowable, which is what you seem to saying.

I did not say it was never possible. In fact, it is exactly the discovery that we are in error which leads to a change in what we think is true. However, that event always occurs in the future and not in the past. Our change in belief changes when we discover we are wrong and not before.

Your last para. hints at where you are heading, but it's a bit cryptic as it stands. What is it that you are suggesting?

No explanation for anything will be deemed acceptable by a rational person if they know that the explanation is dependent on something which is wrong. This clearly requires that person accepting an argument either be absolutely correct with regard to every premise behind that explanation (in which case there is no element upon which to make such a judgment) or be unable to tell the difference between what is knowable and what is unknowable (i.e., where he is right and where he is wrong with regard to that explanation). This circumstance suggests a very important absolute constraint on any acceptable explanation. As I said,

The reason for maintaining that constraint is that, if it is ever violated, a mechanism exists to show the proposed explanation is false: i.e., evidence exists which will show that something thought to be true (under the explanation) is false and thus the proposed explanation fails.

And it fails without the need to learn anything new; the reason it fails is because it is known to be based on invalid information.

The issue here is exactly what one will accept as a reasonable explanation given their current state of knowledge: i.e., exactly what constitutes an acceptable explanation given the fact that our current knowledge consists of a combination of knowable and unknowable information (things we are right about and things we are wrong about). How can that possibly be unless it is a fact that we cannot, with the information currently available to us, perform that very separation.

Notice that there are two very different ways in which we can be wrong about something: first, it is possible that we have simply made an error thinking the thing out and second, the information necessary to show we are wrong may not yet be available to us. The first I hold as not important as the only solution is to be more careful in ones analysis. (Experts in analysis should not be expected to make errors.) The second however can only be eliminated by further education (finding additional information) and thus becomes a fundamental constraint on any acceptable explanation.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Canute]

It sounds like you understand me but I am not yet entirely convinced you really have a handle on what I am talking about here.

Nor me.

I did not say it was never possible. In fact, it is exactly the discovery that we are in error which leads to a change in what we think is true. However, that event always occurs in the future and not in the past. Our change in belief changes when we discover we are wrong and not before.

I can't make sense of the idea that an event can only happen in the future. To happen an event must be in the present, and a second later it is in the past. Is this not so?

No explanation for anything will be deemed acceptable by a rational person if they know that the explanation is dependent on something which is wrong.

Hmm. I'd rather say that all explanations are based on assumptions (axioms, premises) that might be false, and that for this reason it is not possible to know if an explanation is true by simply analysing the explanation. (Although it may be be possible to confirm the truth of an explanation by 'extra-explanatory' means).

The issue here is exactly what one will accept as a reasonable explanation given their current state of knowledge: i.e., exactly what constitutes an acceptable explanation given the fact that our current knowledge consists of a combination of knowable and unknowable information (things we are right about and things we are wrong about). How can that possibly be unless it is a fact that we cannot, with the information currently available to us, perform that very separation.

I'd say that there is no precise correlation between what is knowable or unknowable and what we are right or wrong about. After all, it's quite possible to be wrong about something that is knowable if you don't happen to know it, or right about something that is unknowable by accident.

I feel the problem here is your use of 'knowable'. If a fact is knowable then it is possible to know it. If a fact can only be known in the future, as you say, then it is not possible to know it in the present, and therefore not possible to know it. This appears to be a paradox.

 

[Doctordick]

Well, it seems we are right back where we started from. I don't know if I have exceeded your attention span of if you just want to avoid thinking about what I am saying. Look back at my post on 4/14/05:

That is exactly the issue I have been trying to communicate: "it is possible to be wrong about something and not know it". I do not know what part of that sentence you do not understand. I am at a total loss as to how to make it any clearer.

You responded with,

There is nothing wrong with this sentence, and it is quite obviously true.

And apologized for misconstruing what I had said.

I then asked about the second statement I had made:

What about the second statement, "it is possible that you are not wrong about everything". Will you accept that statement as being on equal footing with the first statement and that both statements apply equally well to everyone?

To which you responded

Of course. I doubt it's possible to be wrong about absolutely everything.

So I presumed you comprehended that, for any specific person, "there were things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, wrong" and "there were things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, right". I further presumed you understood that these two categories had no intersection. (And, by the way, I never said that the two categories were complete, just it case you are presuming I implied they were.)

At any rate, I thought I made it clear that the existence of these two different kinds of presumed true facts were very central to my argument and asked you if you would "allow me use the terms "knowable" and "knowable" to refer to the two different cases". I made it quite clear that the only reason I wished to use those particular tags was because I have used them before and it would save me a lot of typing. To this you baulked because

That is the precise opposite of my view I'm afraid.

I presumed that your complaint was that you found the suggested usage confusing not that you were unable to comprehend such a usage so I gave you a perspective which would consistently lead to the correct interpretation of my usage:

The significant difference between "knowable" and "unknowable" things as I have defined them is quite simple. If you are right, you are right (story is over); if you are wrong, there is utterly no limit on the ways you can be wrong (in fact, there may actually be some useful ways to be wrong).

You seemed to accede to my wishes on that when you responded,

Your post doesn't deal with my objection, but I have no problem with it except for this.

That is to say, if you are truly right about something, then that fact can perhaps be demonstrated by some means (to prove is to demonstrate it is true). Thus it is possible that I could come to know that you are right (it is possible that it is a knowable truth).

My problem with this is that it is impossible to demonstrate a certain truth.

A difficulty I thought we had dispensed with since I was making no claim that such a thing could always occur. I was thus led to the idea (wrong it seems) that you would allow me to use those words to denote those categories. But then you come along with this post,

I'd say that there is no precise correlation between what is knowable or unknowable and what we are right or wrong about. After all, it's quite possible to be wrong about something that is knowable if you don't happen to know it, or right about something that is unknowable by accident.

Clearly using those words in their conventional vague interpretation. You should have simply told me that you would not allow me to use the words knowable and unknowable to refer to the categories. It will take more typing but I will use the phrases "things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong".

I will comment on the rest of your post even thought I think we need to get the above difficulty settled before we can go on intelligently as making further comments may be a worthless endeavorer. Your complaints are entirely a consequence of misconstruing what I am trying to say.

I can't make sense of the idea that an event can only happen in the future. To happen an event must be in the present, and a second later it is in the past. Is this not so?

What I said was, "our change in belief changes when we discover we are wrong and not before". The whole subject here is the difference between "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong". This whole thing refers to their current state of belief. However, peoples beliefs change; they change when they discover they are wrong about some aspect of their beliefs. The point here is that they discover that they are wrong in the present, not in the past. You do not have the power to change what you believed in the past. The past is over and done with and there is nothing you can do to change it. Your beliefs in the past were based on what you thought you knew then, not on what you think you know now. Change in knowledge is the central purpose of the concept of time.

I define the past to be what you know and I define the future to be what you don't know. I should be clear that, under that definition, the present constitutes a change in knowledge and no more. If you follow my presentation, I will show you that my definition resolves down to exactly what you think of as time (in every detail). This is not a simple assertion, it is a direct consequence of changing knowledge and you must understand that change in order to understand time. And there is no way you can comprehend change in knowledge unless you first comprehend the difference between "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong".

Hmm. I'd rather say that all explanations are based on assumptions (axioms, premises) that might be false, and that for this reason it is not possible to know if an explanation is true by simply analysing the explanation. (Although it may be be possible to confirm the truth of an explanation by 'extra-explanatory' means).

Again, you are looking at an issue which has utterly no bearing on what I am presenting. I have no interest in whether or not an explanation is true. My only interest is what constitutes an explanation and what makes a given explanation acceptable.

The issue here is exactly what one will accept as a reasonable explanation given their current state of knowledge: i.e., exactly what constitutes an acceptable explanation given the fact that our current knowledge consists of a combination of ["things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong"]. How can that possibly be unless it is a fact that we cannot, with the information currently available to us, perform that very separation.

Clearly, if that information were available to us, we would change our perspective and no longer find the explanation acceptable.

If a fact can only be known in the future, as you say, then it is not possible to know it in the present, and therefore not possible to know it. This appears to be a paradox.

It appears to be a paradox because you are putting unwarranted baggage into the concept of time. I defined time in the following manner: the past is what you know and the future is what you do not yet know. The present is the boundary between the two and time serves no purpose beyond handling that change in knowledge. Your statement is an explicit inference that change cannot occur thus essentially says you are going to simply refuse to handle the problem of the existence of change.

If what I have just said confuses you just forget I said it and pretend I quit writing when I got to the end of the "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong" kinds of information and let me know if you think you understand what I am talking about there.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Jonny_trigonometry]

no, not everything can. Can physics describe why? no!, it can only describe how. Physics can only describe part of everything, not everything.

Why did Stevie wonder use a harmonic minor scale to bridge between a dorian contecedant melody, and a locrian anticedant melody in one of his songs?
"the best answer to that question lies in the field of physics." <--- huh? now that just doesn't make sense.

 

[Philocrat]

no, not everything can. Can physics describe why? no!, it can only describe how. Physics can only describe part of everything, not everything.

Why did Stevie wonder use a harmonic minor scale to bridge between a dorian contecedant melody, and a locrian anticedant melody in one of his songs?
"the best answer to that question lies in the field of physics." <--- huh? now that just doesn't make sense.

Welcome to the deabte, Jonny! What you are saying here hits at the very heart of Reductionism. This "R-Word" is now the centrepiece of all explanations. It is wherever you look! It is an issue that cuts across every discipline. There are just too many multi-layered issues involved. However, one issue stands out the most.

(1) Do we reduce A to B in order to eliminate A?

or;

(2) Do we reduce A to B to retain both?

and;

(3) What about reducing a Set of things to another set of things to eliminate one set or retain both sets?

Ok, for an argument's sake would the choice of (1) make things easier even if we opted for it? Eqaully, how doe we know that everything is of the form that can be eliminatively reduced to something else? Supposing there are things that cannot be eliminated in this way?

Equally questionable is the choice of (2) and the second part of (3). If you reduce something to another thing, what is the wisdom in retaining both?Why not deal with one thing or one set of things to which the previous is reduced? For example, if we succeed in reducing Biologiy to Chemistry and subsequently to physics, should we shape how naturally language, communicate everything to each other, and understand things within the bounds of physics? That is, kiss goodbye to chemistry and biology altogether? I have already given a fewy useful reasons or pueposes for this sort of reductionism a few pages back. Of course, there are more reasons. What are those extra reasons that we really need to justify reductionism?

Can you think of some?

 

[Philocrat]

MATTER ON A METAPHYSICAL SCALE:Is Matter reducible to matter only?

Metaphysically, it is not very clear what the exact ‘NATURE’ of matter is. In a flash it dawned on me that all there is to matter is matter. All that matters is matter. And the spook begins for it seems that “MATTER IS IRREDICIBLE TO NO OTHER THING BUT ITSELF”. For it seems that whatever can be said about matter (whether quantitatively, narratively, or metaphysically) one always ends up with matter.

1) Matter adds matter to matter and what results is matter
2) Matter subtracts matter from matter and what results is matter
3) Matter divides matter to inumerabable bits what results is a set of matters
4) Matter multiplies matter by matter and the result is matter
5) Matter impregnates matter and out comes nothing else but matter
6) Matter eats matter and excretes matter
7) Matter swims in matter
8) Matter walks on matter
9) Matter flies on matter
10) Matter flies matter on matter
11) Matter drives matter on matter
12) Matter sits on matter
13) Matter leans on matter
14) Matter runs on matter
15) Matter sweats matter
16) Matter heats and cools matter
17) Matter fuels matter
18) Matter fights matter
19) Matter kills matter
20) Matter heals matter
21) Matter infects matter
22) Matter screams matter at matter
23) Matter contains matter
24) Matter moves matter
25) Matter lifts matter up and places matter on matter
26) Matter lifts matter up and places it in matter
27) Matter jumps into matter
28) Matter jumps over matter
29) Matter dives into matter
30) Matter melts into matter
31) Matter dissolves in matter
32) Matter throws matter into matter
33) Matter explodes into matter
34) Matter implodes into matter
35) Matter cuts matter with matter
36) Matter duplicates matter to matter 1, matter 2, matter 3…….to…..matter n
37) Matter! Matter! Matter!

If you were to dare ask such questions as:

38) “What makes John different from Grace?” or “what distinguishes John from Grace?”, you would be implying “What makes matter different from Matter” or “What distinguishes matter from Matter?
39) “Why is a VW Beetle faster than a Bus?”, You would be implying “Why is matter faster than matter?
40) “Why is the cup on top of the table?” or “Why is Lucy next to a dust bin?”, we would be equivalently implying “ Why is matter on top of matter?” or “Why is Matter next to matter?”
41) And so on.

And when we move to simple statements of facts or standard propositions, things just get spookier. Now consider the following statements:

42) “The Big Ben is London” metaphysically implies “Matter is in matter”
43) “The Earth is in the Milky way” equivalently implies “Matter is in matter”
44) “That is John’s Book” metaphysically implies “That is Matter’ matter”
45) “The sausage inside sausage insides sausage …ad infinituum” equivalently implies “The matter inside matter inside matter ….ad infinituum”
46) “Andy is driving a car” equivalently implies “Matter is driving matter”

QUESTION: If Matter is irreducible to something else, at least at the metaphysical level, how can it be reduced to other spooky metaphysical categories as “Nothing”, “Nothingness”, or “Consciousness”?

Well, the next set of postings updates the progress of all the related debates to date. As the topics shows, it is almost like there is nothing that we can think about that has no reductive implications.

 

[Philocrat]

TYPES OF REDUCTIONISM

So far we have all been debating, and saying what we all think we know about reductionism. Ok, as Les once advised us above, let us now look at what the prfessionals in the industry say about the subject. Perhaps, from here onward, it would be a good idea for us to start basing all our arguments on what the professionals say, especially those arguments and topics that directly concern philosophy and science. Below are the standard definitions, arguments and counter arguments on Reductionism. You are free to argue for or against any parts of the contents of these links.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reductionism (An introductory explanation of of different forms of reductionism from Wikipedia, the largest online encyclopaedia).

Reductionism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Reductionism in philosophy describes a number of related, contentious theories that hold, very roughly, that the nature of complex things can always be reduced to (explained by) simpler or more fundamental things. This is said of objects, phenomena, explanations, theories, and meanings. The term is often used to criticize an imagined position rather than to describe a real one.
· Ontological reductionism is the idea that everything that exists is made from a small number of basic substances that behave in regular ways. Compare to monism.
· Methodological reductionism is the idea that explanations of things, such as scientific explanations, ought to be continually reduced to the very simplest entities possible (but no simpler!). Occam's Razor forms the basis of this type of reductionism.
· Theoretical reductionism is the idea that older theories or explanations are not generally replaced outright by new ones, but that new theories are refinements or reductions of the old theory in greater detail.
· Scientific reductionism has been used to describe all of the above ideas as they relate to science, but is most often used to describe the idea that all phenomena can be reduced to scientific explanations.
· Linguistic reductionism is the idea that everything can be described in a language with a limited number of core concepts, and combinations of those concepts. (See Basic English and the constructed language Toki Pona).
· The term "greedy reductionism" was coined by Daniel Dennett to condemn those forms of reductionism that try to explain too much with too little.
· Analytical reductionism as used in [[1] (http://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/phibalas/dialogue2001/Contribute/Reductionism%20UPI2203.htm )]"is the underlying a priori of ontological reductionism".

Dictionary Reductionism: http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/reductionism

Scientific reductionism: http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Scientific reductionism

Reduction of Consciousness to Chemistry (http://www.nih.gov/news/NIH-Record/06_27_2000/story01.htm )

The Cartesian reductionism: By Gerald L. Smith, Sewanee, Tennessee http://smith2.sewanee.edu/texts/Ecology/OnReductionism.html

Arguments against Reductionism:

http://home.btclick.com/scimah/materialism.htm

http://home.btclick.com/scimah/AI.htm

Arguments against Buddhism
In order to understand the strengths of a philosophy one should attempt to refute it.

Qualia - Subjective versus objective experience
'...The Buddhist does not doubt that the brain does some very sophisticated ordering of its incoming nerve impulses into the datastructures which are the objects of knowledge. But when all is said and done, those data structures remain as objects. They are not themselves knowledge, neither are they that which performs the function of knowing.
A datastructure by its very nature must have form. But according to Buddhist beliefs, the mind is formless and is capable of grasping any object of knowledge, including facts about the mind itself, which then become objects of knowledge in their own right. Consequently the mind is potentially unbounded...'

Algorithms and datastructures

'...All systems subject to the laws of physics can be simulated by algorithms. Hence any system which cannot in principle be simulated by an algorithm must have a non-physical component. The ability to demonstrate any non-algorithmic function of the mind would be evidence that some of the mind's activities have a non-physical basis...'

Emergence

'...The mind cannot be an emergent property of the brain or any other physical system, since emergent properties and emergent phenomena are psychological in origin, and require the pre-existence of an observer's mind in order to become manifest...'

The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in science and engineering

'...So we are left with something of a mystery. According to the physicalist worldview, the mind (including mathematicians' minds) is an epiphenomenon of matter which has evolved solely to ensure the survival of the selfish genes which code for it. Why should this 'top-level' phenomenon have such intimate access to the 'bottom level' phenomena such as quantum physics? After all, the two levels are supposedly separated by less well-understood (in some cases) explanatory layers such as evolutionary psychology, neurology, cell biology, genetics, molecular biology, and chemistry...'

The very subtle mind

'...The mind is neither physical, nor a by-product of purely physical processes, but a formless continuum that is a separate entity from the body. When the body disintegrates at death, the mind does not cease. Although our superficial conscious mind ceases, it does so by dissolving into a deeper level of consciousness, called 'the very subtle mind'. The continuum of our very subtle mind has no beginning and no end...'

Non-algorithmic phenomena

'..The great difficulty in talking about non-algorithmic phenomena is that although we can say in general terms what they do, it is impossible by their very nature to describe how they do it. (If we could describe in a stepwise manner what was going on, then the phenomenon would be algorithmic)...'
Beyond the Doubting of a Shadow
A Reply to Commentaries on Shadows of the Mind
by Roger Penrose

Minds, Machines and Mathematics
by David J. Chalmers
- Sean Robsville

All these types of reductionism need to be looked at relatively and the arguments that we provide for or against any of them should build a systematic but clear picture of how they all fit together or simply how they are related. How they all fit together should suggest from the emerging picture how it is possible to reduce from one type to the next.

 

[Philocrat]

REDUCTIONISM IN COMPUTING

Computers do not understand TEXTS, ALPHABETIC CHARACTERS, GRAPHYCS SYMBOLS, PICTURES, PSEUDO CODES or even Numbers in the sense that we humans do. Everything we see and read on the computer screens needs to be sytematically unpacked and reduced to zeros and ones and further into pure electrical pulses of ons and offs. In fact, from the point of view of practicality, computing is the best starting point to learn very useful things about the whole notion of Reductionsim. And I guess those of you who understand computers from the Software User-level to programming level up to the electronic level would appreciate precisely what am talking about here. As most of you already know, the whole idea behind Upward Reductionism and Downward Reductionism in computing, from one scale or level to the next, is to make life easier for different classes of users. In this very sense, Reductionism hides multi-layered complexities from the users. Many classes of users benefit greatly from this, including computer programmers and different sets of software and hardware engineers.

For those of you who are interested in Reductionism in computing, perhaps it would be a good idea to pick any topic that you know about and demonstrate how it reduces from one level to the next level. At the so-called Electronics level, you need to demonstrate the FIRMWARE/ELECTRONICS INTERFACE. That is, the reductive rules governing the BIOS/HARDWARE interface. At the OPERATING SYSTEM LEVEL (DOS, UNIX, WINDOWS, LINUX etc), you may explain how the operating system interfaces between the Firmware/BIOS and the SOFWARE PACKAGES AND UTILITIES on top at the user level. For propgrammers, you may discuss the relationships between the Low Level and High Level Programming languages and how they interface with their built-in interpreters, compilers and the operating systems. Network Engineers you may discuss how one communications protocol level reduces to the next (software or/and hardware, whichever one you are versed in). All these are undisputedly reductive entities in computing. There are so many levels of reduction from scale to scale that those involved in different parts of this industry would immediately recognise and appreciate precisely what I am talking about here

For those of you who are not familier with the Number System reductionism, I have painstakingly complied a conversion set of tools for you to play around with. It includes pre-programmed online converstion tools and links to manual methodologies for converting from one number system to the next. This demostrates how computer is reductively guided to the level of physics where it can understand us humans.

NUMBER SYSTEM CONVERSION TOOLS

Online Numbers System Converter (Automatic)

Conversion from one number system to another (http://www.cstc.org/data/resources/60/convtop.html) This link allows you to convert from decimal to any numbers system using their base values (base 2 to 16, to be precise) and from one number system back to decimal. There is also an option to obtain full schematic explanation of how each conversion type was done or achieved.

Base Converter (http://www.cut-the-knot.org/binary.shtml ) This link includes the formula for manual conversion and an online tool for simultaneous conversion into all the standard number systems. You enter a number into a cell representing a given number system and it is automatically converted into the rest of the number systems at once.

Another Online Number System Converter (http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/electronic/number4.html)

An Extended online Number System Converter (http://number.webmasters.sk/numerical.php) This converter gives extended number system format. Give it a try.


Manual Number System Conversion Methodology

Methods for converting from one number system to another (http://www.cstc.org/data/resources/60/convexp.html) This links shows you how to manually convert from one numbers system to another using well developed standard methodologies.

Conversion Tables, ASCII and HTML Character sets

Number System Conversion tables (http://www.ascii.cl/conversion.htm) This table shows the conversions table for Dec, Hex, Oct and Binary numbers.

ASCII Character Sets (http://www.ascii.cl/index.htm) The ASCII character sets in Hex and Dec, including characters that are not shown on the keyboard.

The HTML Character Set in extended format (http://www.ascii.cl/htmlcodes.htm) This table shows the extended character sets for the HTML system. The associated codes can be used in your web applications to generate the extended characters shown. There some reserved empty undefined codes that can be defined by the user in web applications.

Character entity references for ISO 8859-1 characters (http://www.w3.org/TR/html401/sgml/entities.html) The W3C Character set specification for HTML 4.

NOTE: Physics is currently examining the possibility of QUANTUM COMPUTING (or is it NANOCOMPUTING) with the hope of subsequently outfoxing and ultematly replacing the current binary electronic system. This is another example of how physics is reductively attempting to move computing power a level down the scale. Fingers crossed. Let us just wish physics goodluck on this!

 

[Jonny_trigonometry]

I don't get it, the answer is no! physics can't ever be able to describe the "why" because you can always ask why ad infinitum.

 

[Jonny_trigonometry]

why is this thread so long? can physics answer that?

 

[Jonny_trigonometry]

note: ideas are part of everything

 

[Doctordick]

Computers do not understand TEXTS, ALPHABETIC CHARACTERS, GRAPHYCS SYMBOLS, PICTURES, PSEUDO CODES or even Numbers in the sense that we humans do.

An unsupported assertion. In order to defend that assertion, one is required to come up with a method of demonstrating exactly how one is to tell that a human "understands" something and how that understanding can not be simulated on a computer, not just at emotional impression that such is the case.

Everything we see and read on the computer screens needs to be sytematically unpacked and reduced to zeros and ones and further into pure electrical pulses of ons and offs.

If this is here to support your above assertion, please explain your method of proving that all evidence of human experience is not systematically reduced to neuron activity together with chemical activity withing a human brain (a completely analogous statement).

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Canute]

Clearly computers do not understand anything at this time. If you want to argue that they will in the future then you need to come up with a method of demonstrating exactly how one is to tell that a human "understands" something and how that understanding can be simulated on a computer, not just argue from an emotional impression.

Please also explain your method of proving that all evidence of human experience is systematically reduced to neuron activity together with chemical activity within a human brain.

 

[Doctordick]

Canute, I find it very difficult to understand you. Many of your posts seem to indicate that you are a very intelligent person but I am confused by some of your posts. This post is a clear example of what confuses me. On first reading, you seem to be supporting my comments to Philcrat: i.e., assertions should not be made without a substantial argument that those assertions represent a valid position which can be defended. But, if that interpretation is taken, then your posts serve no purpose.

Clearly computers do not understand anything at this time. If you want to argue that they will in the future then you need to come up with a method of demonstrating exactly how one is to tell that a human "understands" something and how that understanding can be simulated on a computer, not just argue from an emotional impression.

This is exactly what I was saying and I could not understand your restatement of exactly the same complaint without adding anything of interest. The only difference between what I said and what you said was your comment that "Clearly computers do not understand anything at this time", which I presumed you meant reflected the current position on the issue which is clearly true. On rereading, the only consistent interpretation of your comment which I could come up with was that you are agreeing with Philcrat's assertion and didn't think it needs any support. At that point, your final comment,

Please also explain your method of proving that all evidence of human experience is systematically reduced to neuron activity together with chemical activity within a human brain.

seemed to only make sense if it were directed to me and not to Philcrat. But that interpretation requires that you think I am making an assertion in opposition to Philcrat's. This is not at all the case. I have made no assertions at all; I have merely pointed out the fact that assertions are a poor way to begin any discussion. It seems that the whole of the discussion going on here has to do with people making assertions and others arguing against those assertions. I have no intention of making any assertions at all.

It appears to me that you have a very strong impulse to presume that I am making assertions above and beyond the statements upon which I had thought agreement had been obtained. I am doing no such thing. With regard to agreement, I had taken that we had achieved agreement on only two points:

[There exists] "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, right" and "things which one thinks they know to be factually true where such judgment is, in fact, wrong"

All I desire is an easy way to refer to these two different kinds of things one thinks are true. It seems to me that you are presuming I am trying to say something far more sweeping than that. If that is the case, your presumptions are very much in error. Instead of reacting emotionally to what I say, I would appreciate a little serious thought. Without serious thought, we will never communicate.

I am sorry and I don't want ot upset you, but I would really like a rational response -- Dick

 

[Canute]

Philocrat wrote that computers cannot understand things in the way that humans do. You wrote that this is an unsupported assumption. I find that very odd. It's like saying that it's an unsuported assumption to say that there is not a teapot in orbit around Mars. Everything's an assumption when you get that picky about it.

It seems best to me to assume that computers don't understand anything until there is at least one piece of evidence to suggest that they do. As far as I know not one serious researcher has suggested that they do. To understand requires consciousness, so in effect you are saying that it is wrong for Philocrat to assume that computers are not conscious. It does not seem wrong to me but rather the only sensible thing to do, since it seems to be a fact.

You say also that there is no evidence that minds do not reduce to brains. I disagree again. There are sound logical reasons for refusing to believe that minds reduce to brains. Not everybody sees these arguments as conclusive, however nobody has yet come up with a single plausible explanation of how consciousness might be caused by brains, even a theoretical one, despite great efforts to do so, and it seems reasonable to take this as good circumstantial evidence that they don't. Other evidence would include the unfalsifiability of solipsism, which entails that we can never know that brains cause consciousness even if they do. There is also the evidence of ones own experience, which for many people shows conclusively that mind does not reduce to brain. There are also various philosophical arguments, hence the 'hard' problem of consciousness. Why 'hard'? Because nobody can yet make scientific sense of the idea that brains cause consciousness. The longer this situation continues the more likely it becomes that it doesn't. So you can rightly say that Philocrat cannot prove what we is saying, but you cannot rightly say that he is making unsupported assumptions.

What is your view? Do you think that brains cause consciousness or not?

Your last extract on "things which one thinks they know etc" seems inarguable, as I've said before, but I don't know yet why you feel it's a significant point.

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Canute; it is nice to know that you are still willing to talk to me. I agree with almost everything you say but differ as to the central import of the issues.

Everything's an assumption when you get that picky about it.

Yes, and "getting that picky about it" is the very essence of exact science. This thread asks the question, "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" I say the answer is yes; which I qualified some time earlier by the statement that "physics" should really be replaced with "exact science" as the field of physics seems to me to be degenerating into a religion. But, with that proviso, I believe I can do an excellent job of demonstrating that every possible acceptable explanation of anything can be spelled out in an exact manner consistent with the ideals of an exact science. To do that in an exact manner, I must first establish communications which can be said to be exact in the same sense. To date, I have failed to effect that step.

It seems best to me to assume that computers don't understand anything until there is at least one piece of evidence to suggest that they do. As far as I know not one serious researcher has suggested that they do. To understand requires consciousness, so in effect you are saying that it is wrong for Philocrat to assume that computers are not conscious.

What bothers me is that the step is being made prior to a decent definition of consciousness; essentially, no one has explained to me how I am to determine the exact meaning of this term "consciousness".

It does not seem wrong to me but rather the only sensible thing to do, since it seems to be a fact.

I have no idea as to whether it is right or wrong and, as far as I am concerned, the only sensible thing to do is to not worry about the issue. "Seems to be a fact" is quite a vague statement. Certainly the first thing one should desire to do, before wasting much time, it to at least provide an approach which would settle the question.

You say also that there is no evidence that minds do not reduce to brains. I disagree again. There are sound logical reasons for refusing to believe that minds reduce to brains. Not everybody sees these arguments as conclusive, however nobody has yet come up with a single plausible explanation of how consciousness might be caused by brains, even a theoretical one, despite great efforts to do so, and it seems reasonable to take this as good circumstantial evidence that they don't.

The whole issue seems to me to be based on thousands upon thousands of preconceived assumptions. There was once no evidence that chemistry reduced to physics but QED certainly cleared that issue up. Today, a lot of chemical investigations come down to budget decisions: the cost of actually doing the chemistry compared to the cost in time and money to calculate the answer with computers. There is no doubt in the accuracy of the theory.

The real point here is that we are only speaking of opinions and opinions are cheap and common. It is my opinion that most all of what goes on here is a bunch of people stirring that boiling pot of vague emotionally charged concepts in the rather undefendable belief that something of significance will float up to the top.

Other evidence would include the unfalsifiability of solipsism, which entails that we can never know that brains cause consciousness even if they do.

Now that isn't very good evidence of anything as it says we can't know anything for sure. If you ever manage to follow me through, that subject will come up again from a vastly different perspective.

There is also the evidence of ones own experience, which for many people shows conclusively that mind does not reduce to brain.

Most people are not very bright and, for the most part, very few people are capable of comprehending the actual extent of their limitations.

There are also various philosophical arguments, hence the 'hard' problem of consciousness. Why 'hard'? Because nobody can yet make scientific sense of the idea that brains cause consciousness. The longer this situation continues the more likely it becomes that it doesn't. So you can rightly say that Philocrat cannot prove what we is saying, but you cannot rightly say that he is making unsupported assumptions.

I can if I hold that most of that supposed support arises from other assumptions. You have your opinions and I have my opinions; these issues are not worthy of serious discussion. I am not going to argue who is right and who is wrong about any of this. My only purpose in posting on this forum is to try and get through to someone.

What is your view? Do you think that brains cause consciousness or not?

I regard the question to be in exactly the same category as "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Conscious is about as well defined a concept as angels.

Your last extract on "things which one thinks they know etc" seems inarguable, as I've said before, but I don't know yet why you feel it's a significant point.

I am well aware of the fact that you don't understand the significance of that fact (and I think I can call it a fact as it pretty well exhausts all possibilities). For well over forty years I have tried and failed to get anyone to look in the direction I have looked. Everyone's reaction is pretty well the same. There is a troll on this forum who has managed to express the attitude of the scientific community pretty succinctly.

I further agree that I cannot prove that causality does not exist; however, I can certainly show that the evidence for causality in reality is non-existent

This is nonsense.

Exactly the standard reaction of anyone throughly indoctrinated in the current scientific dogma. Notice that I have specifically asserted that I can show the evidence is non-existent and that his reaction is not at all to listen to my argument.

A thousand teatrises on the evidence against causality go down the drain when faced with simple empirical facts. Paper (and now computer screens) can take any rubbish.

No one has ever proved it before, that obviously implies it can not possibly be true.

There is another view only slightly askew of your position but so far from your paradigm that it would absolutely never occur to you.

I have read your posts but all I can say is that your view is not only far from my paradigm, it's also mistaken. As a matter of logic, no one can possibly conclude anything true starting from the premises you start.

Notice the explicit forgone conclusion there?

It should be clear to anyone that dualism is a figment of our imagination, that reality is by definition a monistic entity, because also by definition there exists only one reality. Anyone who starts out with the notion that an explanation of reality is not part of reality itself is doomed to failure. The real challenge is to come up with an explanation that includes itself without ending up in infinite regression. I believe it's possible but I have never seen anyone do it.

First, I have never stated that I had an explanation of reality which was not a part of reality itself and second, I have discovered an attack which does not end up in an infinite regression. So he believes it's possible but certainly not the way I do it. And he doesn't need to think about it; nobody ever does.

I will not present the entire deduction in one fell swoop, though I could, because it is my experience that people invariably look first to my conclusions and on those grounds alone conclude that I am a crackpot and that's the end of it. No one ever makes an attempt to follow my reasoning. There are a number of blocks that I have seen on several occasions (by blocks I mean issues people use to justify their refusal to go any further in my reasoning). That is why I was approaching saviormachine in the manner I was. He seemed to be following my thoughts but, just as you, I think he thought that they led nowhere.

You have said very clearly that you can see no significance to my division of all knowledge into two parts: that about which you are right and that about which you are wrong. I make that division because the two categories obey very different rules. If it is a thing you are right about then it will still be a thing to be explained (or understood as I admit the issue here is a bit vague here) no matter how long we wait for a solution to the problem of understanding or explaining the universe. The point is that it does not change or go away. The other side of the coin is the things you are wrong about. Those certainly have the possibility of changing. In fact, it could be said that there are an infinite number of ways to be wrong. My point is that, even if we cannot tell the difference, the two categories obey violently different constraints and that fact is of very great significance. If you stick with me, I will show you exactly the significance of that difference.

Have fun – Dick

 

[Canute]

This thread asks the question, "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" I say the answer is yes;

Have you come across the Western philosophical 'problem of attributes'? If not it would be worth looking it up. It shows that matter cannot be reduced to physics.

What bothers me is that the step is being made prior to a decent definition of consciousness; essentially, no one has explained to me how I am to determine the exact meaning of this term "consciousness".

Consciousness is usually defined as 'what it is like' in the scientific and Western philosophical literature. Most philosophers and many scientists seem happy with this definition, although clearly physics cannot reduce 'what it is like' to anything else or prove that it exists. Many people, Crick for insatance, would like to redefine it, but nobody has come up with anything better yet.

The real point here is that we are only speaking of opinions and opinions are cheap and common. It is my opinion that most all of what goes on here is a bunch of people stirring that boiling pot of vague emotionally charged concepts in the rather undefendable belief that something of significance will float up to the top.

As you say, opinions are cheap and common.

Now that isn't very good evidence of anything as it says we can't know anything for sure.

How do you figure that? The unfalsifiability of solipsism does not entail that we cannot know anything.

My only purpose in posting on this forum is to try and get through to someone.

About what?

I regard the question to be in exactly the same category as "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin?" Conscious is about as well defined a concept as angels.

The question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin is an extremely important one and medieval scholars were well aware of this. They were not fools. The question concerns the fabric of reality and whether it is quantised or a continuum (among other things). It's a question worth pondering in some depth. As for consciousness, it is generally defined as 'what it is like'. Of course this is not a scientific definition but as yet there is no evidence that consciousness can be given a scientific defintion.

I am well aware of the fact that you don't understand the significance of that fact (and I think I can call it a fact as it pretty well exhausts all possibilities). For well over forty years I have tried and failed to get anyone to look in the direction I have looked. Everyone's reaction is pretty well the same.

I can't react one way or the other since I don't know yet what you're suggesting.

You have said very clearly that you can see no significance to my division of all knowledge into two parts: that about which you are right and that about which you are wrong.

This is a misuse of the term 'knowledge'. A piece of knowledge that is false is not knowledge, it is a false assumption. But I know what you mean.

My point is that, even if we cannot tell the difference, the two categories obey violently different constraints and that fact is of very great significance. If you stick with me, I will show you exactly the significance of that difference.

If we cannot tell the difference between what we know and what we don't know, or between which of our beliefs are true and which false, then knowledge is impossible. It is incoherent to suggest that we have knowledge that is false. If a statement is false then one cannot know it is true.

If you mean that we sometimes mistake false assumptions for knowledge then I couldn't agree more. But one cannot say that knowledge may turn out to be false. If what we assumed was true turns out to be false then clearly we cannot ever have known that it is true. Nobody says "I know that this statement is true although I must admit that one day it may turn out to be false". It would be equivalent to saying "I know something I'm not sure I know".