- #211
Les Sleeth
Gold Member
- 2,262
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balkan said:1) that's utter bull****... now, patronize me again, and my next reply will be just as inpleasant in tone... you choose how we speak to each other...
Fliption isn't being patronizing. His is probably the most patient mind around here, and regularly sticks with rude and obtuse people long after the rest of us have given up on them.
He has humbly been trying to explain to you something which you clearly don't understand. Before going any further, let me add that I am not equating "agreeing" with "understanding" (i.e., I mean you don't have to agree with the concept of qualia before I acknowledge you understand).
How do I know you don't understand the concept? It would be like you trying to explain to someone that the rate of time is altered in a frame of reference when that frame accelerates. After explaining it to them they say, "oh, all that happens is the g-forces from acceleration inhibits the clocks' movement." In other words, the way he answers proves he doesn't understand relativity. Likewise, the way you answer about qualia proves you don't understand the significance of it.
Your complaint that the qualia argument is a nothing but a "word game" isn't quite fair. Actually it is a thought problem, and as you know scientists use them all the time. Einstein's twin paradox is one, as is Schrodinger's cat. If you'd tone down the outrage a bit and give this thought problem a fair look, you might see there is a genuine point in there.
However, I'll admit that personally I don't like the way the zombie argument is set up, and I don't like using qualia as the defining characteristic of consciousness. But let me defend it a little anyway by simplifying the argument.
Is it possible for someone without taste buds to act like they can taste? Or, can someone act loving without actually feeling love? If so, then taste and love involve something more than behavior -- there is an internal subjective aspect. The idea of using either a zombie or a robot in the thought experiment was to point out that consciousness isn't just functions or behaviors, but the heart of it is that experience of what a particular taste "is like" or what the experience of love "is like." You can get a robot to put food in its mouth, to chew, to go "ahhhhhhhh, so delicious," but the robot isn't really having subjective experience of taste, it is just imitating the external behaviors of taste.
My personal preference for describing what a robot/zombie is missing is to say they can detect taste or light or sound, but they don't "know" they are detecting anything. So like with Fliption's example of the security camera, it detects movement, but it is clueless that it does.
THAT subjective self-knowledge is what thinkers, physicalists and non-physicalists alike, are in a quandry to explain in the way of consciousness. Functionalist thinkers like Daniel Dennett wave off the problem saying he's confident "one day" we'll find a physicalistic answer, but no one in either camp believes we have it yet.
One quick comment on babies and experience. I think Fliption's point was that a baby is born with the potential to experience red is "like this." He doesn't need to learn how to have a subjective aspect of consciousness. Also, if you maintain that we don't need to experience a color to know the color, then you are disputing empiricism itself, which demands that researchers experience what they hypothesize to be true. If, as an empiricist, you were blind and hypothesized the new color Fliption talked about was a certain way, that is a theory, and will remain a theory to you until you can actually see the color. Even if your imagination can approximate the color, it still isn't the same information as sense experience.
Unless you want to agree with the rationalists that truth can be known by reason alone, then you have to admit that experience is a unique dimension of living awareness without which we cannot really know if what we imagine to be true is actually true.
Anyway, as of now physical processes can't account for the subjective aspect of consciousness, and that is why it, along with progressive organization, was on the list of what cannot currently be explained by physicalness.
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