Fukushima Management and Government Performance

[Dmytry]

Bleh. Thats no good.
Yes, I've read that already. Again, I don't see anywhere saying HOW it was resolved, so how can we talk about it if we don't know. I'm not getting from the article that they just said it was good and continued on, so if that is what they did then that's not a good thing.

All they recommended was empirical study, then business as usual. That is BS. The study won't cover the variety of conditions. You can't do things like that with this sort of study. The standard is obviously very low. When a beam in bridge cracks 1/3 of the way, you do not do empirical studies of how good or bad is that. You call it a failure.

But WHY do you disagree? What basis does your position come from? Other than your mistrust of course. Everything I have ever read points to FAR more injuries and deaths from every other form of power production we currently have. Do you disagree with that? Or are you saying that the POTENTIAL dangers outweigh the benefits?

The danger does not scale linearly with the number of plants. If we are to switch to nuclear - we should think of the potential danger when there is a lot more nuclear power plants, and when a disaster would strike several at once, and the response would be overwhelmed.

For me personally, if the data shows that nuclear power has caused few injuries and deaths, AND harmed the environment less, then why wouldn't I want us to use it?

Of course, all that is with the understanding that it CONTINUES to cause the least amount of harm overall.

But if share of nuclear in energy mix is to be increased, would it continue to cause least amount of harm?

The problem with nuclear is that deaths from it are grouped into the low probability events. I think LNT is true, which means there's noticeable death toll, and puts nuclear not so far better than other methods of energy production. Instead, I think nuclear is somewhat better. Which is, well, conservative opinion, is it not?

You instead interpret anything unknown in favour of nuclear power. That is not a good approach for safety.

 

[Drakkith]

All they recommended was empirical study, then business as usual. That is BS. The study won't cover the variety of conditions. You can't do things like that with this sort of study. The standard is obviously very low. When a beam in bridge cracks 1/3 of the way, you do not do empirical studies of how good or bad is that. You call it a failure.

Are you sure you aren't looking too deep into the study? That particular study was specifically to look at one aspect. I don't reach the same conclusions you reach. They described multiple situations where the borel could be damaged and proposed several solutions. How is that business as usual?

The danger does not scale linearly with the number of plants. If we are to switch to nuclear - we should think of the potential danger when there is a lot more nuclear power plants, and when a disaster would strike several at once, and the response would be overwhelmed.

But if share of nuclear in energy mix is to be increased, would it continue to cause least amount of harm.

Sure, I agree that the possibility of a more widespread incident would increase with more plants. I cannot say whether it would continue to be the least if we went to more plants.

The problem with nuclear is that deaths from it are grouped into the low probability events. I think LNT is true, which means there's noticeable death toll, and puts nuclear not so far ahead of other methods of energy production.

What is LNT?

 

[Dmytry]

Are you sure you aren't looking too deep into the study? That particular study was specifically to look at one aspect. I don't reach the same conclusions you reach. They described multiple situations where the borel could be damaged and proposed several solutions. How is that business as usual?

not quite.
"The proposed solution for this generic issue is in two steps. The first step would be to test samples of Boral under conditions duplicating the environmental conditions that would be experienced in these MPC units. This experiment can be done quite readily, and at a modest cost. If there is no evidence for crumbling or relocation of the B4C-Al composite material, the issue would be considered resolved.

However, if the experimental evidence indicates that relocation of the B4C-Al composite material is credible, the second step would be to ensure that these MPC units either are repaired under dry conditions, or that the water used in submerged operations contain a soluble neutron absorber such as boric acid (or some other means be used for reactivity control).

Alternatively, it is the staff's understanding that the manufacturer has been conducting research to find ways to improve the performance of Boral. This also could resolve the issue."
That is really not the right way to do it. Easy to miss something. The water in SFP is not clean, it has hydrogen peroxide or other compounds added to kill bacteria, for example, or something else, and practice varies between plants.
There are other issues that weren't addressed, for example loss of coolant in the spent fuel pool, and other issues in the spent fuel pool.
The bottom line is - they were supplied material developed by some third party company ceradine
http://www.ceradyne.com/products/nuclear/boral-composite.aspx
and this material did not perform to specification - unexpected swelling etc. They're doing studies to try and show that it is still safe, well because it'd be expensive to replace. That's not a good way to do safety.

It really is just crazy from the engineering standpoint. Aluminium is a very reactive metal. This is porous compressed aluminium powder we are speaking of. If there is a good reason for using aluminium - and it is the best choice - that won't make aluminium less reactive or have higher melting point or be less of a fire hazard. Pressed mix of aluminium powder and boron carbide, in the spent fuel pool, that is scary from the chemical/engineering standpoint. Aluminium burns with a LOT of compounds (such as oxides of most metals). And it burns very hot.

Sure, I agree that the possibility of a more widespread incident would increase with more plants. I cannot say whether it would continue to be the least if we went to more plants. What is LNT?

Linear no threshold effect of carcinogens. Most easily illustrated on asbestos. Asbestos fibres mechanically slice DNA, causing additional mutations. When someone gets cancer due to asbestos, it is in principle traceable to single fibre. There is existing high lifetime cancer rate of 40% , caused by existing mutation load (mostly not radioactivity); small changes in the mutation load are expected to result in linear changes in cancer rate (approximating a small piece of response curve with line).

 

[Drakkith]

not quite.
That is really not the right way to do it. Easy to miss something. The water in SFP is not clean, it has hydrogen peroxide or other compounds added to kill bacteria, for example, or something else, and practice varies between plants.
There are other issues that weren't addressed, for example loss of coolant in the spent fuel pool, and other issues in the spent fuel pool.
The bottom line is - they were supplied material developed by some third party company ceradine
http://www.ceradyne.com/products/nuclear/boral-composite.aspx
and this material did not perform to specification - unexpected swelling etc. They're doing studies to try and show that it is still safe, well because it'd be expensive to replace. That's not a good way to do safety.

I don't know why you think this is the case. A problem was identified, a study was initiated, and those are the results of that study. The whole point is to see if there will be a problem at all, and it turned out that yes there was. If the problem was so negligible that it wouldn't cause a problem, then there wouldn't be a need to replace the materiel. That is exactly how you do safety. I've never known another way to do it. You don't have an issue brought up and safety measure implemented without knowing what problems are going to be caused by this. One of the biggest reasons is that you wouldn't know what safety measures to implement in the first place if you didn't do the study. So I don't know why you have an issue here.

It really is just crazy from the engineering standpoint. Aluminium is a very reactive metal. This is porous compressed aluminium powder we are speaking of. If there is a good reason for using aluminium - and it is the best choice - that won't make aluminium less reactive or have higher melting point or be less of a fire hazard. Pressed mix of aluminium powder and boron carbide, in the spent fuel pool, that is scary from the chemical/engineering standpoint. Aluminium burns with a LOT of compounds (such as oxides of most metals). And it burns very hot.

If there aren't any compounds that react with the aluminum inside the pool or the container, why would that be a problem? Is there any materiel that you can think of that might be introduced in sufficient quantities to produce any significant hazard? Whether through routine use or in accidents.

Linear no threshold effect of carcinogens. Most easily illustrated on asbestos. Asbestos fibres mechanically slice DNA, causing additional mutations. When someone gets cancer due to asbestos, it is in principle traceable to single fibre. There is existing high lifetime cancer rate of 40% , caused by existing mutation load (mostly not radioactivity); small changes in the mutation load are expected to result in linear changes in cancer rate (approximating a small piece of response curve with line).

I don't even know what this says in relation to your previous post. You said if LNT is correct then the rates of death would be higher. How does this paragraph say anything about that?

 

[Astronuc]

The bottom line is - they were supplied material developed by some third party company ceradine
http://www.ceradyne.com/products/nuclear/boral-composite.aspx
and this material did not perform to specification - unexpected swelling etc. They're doing studies to try and show that it is still safe, well because it'd be expensive to replace. That's not a good way to do safety.

It really is just crazy from the engineering standpoint. Aluminium is a very reactive metal. This is porous compressed aluminium powder we are speaking of. If there is a good reason for using aluminium - and it is the best choice - that won't make aluminium less reactive or have higher melting point or be less of a fire hazard. Pressed mix of aluminium powder and boron carbide, in the spent fuel pool, that is scary from the chemical/engineering standpoint. Aluminium burns with a LOT of compounds (such as oxides of most metals). And it burns very hot.

BORAL® is a precision hot-rolled composite plate material consisting of a core of mixed aluminum and boron carbide particles with an 1100 Series aluminum cladding on both external surfaces. The cladding forms a solid and effective barrier against the environment. BORAL® is produced over a wide range of surface dimensions, areal densities and thicknesses. BORAL® is manufactured in flat sheets that can be cut, punched, bored and formed into shapes. The physical properties of BORAL® allow it to be designed into fabricated structures as necessary.

from http://www.ceradyne.com/products/neutron/boral.aspx

Aluminum sheet/plate (not powder) forms a protective oxide which prevents it from catching or reacting strongly with other metals, or metal oxide. The form is very important. One may be thinking of the thermite reaction in which Al powder is blended with iron and chromium oxides (and oxides of other metals). I believe ignition requires relatively high temperature.

 

[Dmytry]

from http://www.ceradyne.com/products/neutron/boral.aspx

Aluminum sheet/plate (not powder) forms a protective oxide which prevents it from catching or reacting strongly with other metals, or metal oxide.

Well, the whole thing is not watertight, apparently... water gets in, and it experiences swelling due to hydrogen formation, i.e. the aluminium plates detach, and it even caused 'mechanical interference' aka the stuff got so bloated things were getting stuck. Definitely not a good thing, that would lead to all sorts of strange on-site solutions to get things unstuck. Their solution? Cut the corners, make it even less watertight, so that hydrogen escapes. If it is acceptable to use aluminium oxide there - the end result of letting this thing sit in water - why not use aluminium oxide right away?

The form is very important. One may be thinking of the thermite reaction in which Al powder is blended with iron and chromium oxides (and oxides of other metals). I believe ignition requires relatively high temperature.

Not for amounts that can warm themselves up by initially slow oxidation. It can burn in air too. I actually used to burn crumpled aluminium foil with tiny oxyhydrogen torch (to ignite it).
I'm not saying that it will burn as well as thermite. But in the event of partial fuel fire, there will be metal oxides present, and there will be aluminium powder, and it is very reactive. Molten aluminium as well. I'd rather the neutron absorber was not the first thing to fail, and I'd rather it be something inert with a high melting point. If there is a serious leak in the spent fuel pool, you'll run out of borated water eventually.

 

[Dmytry]

I don't even know what this says in relation to your previous post. You said if LNT is correct then the rates of death would be higher. How does this paragraph say anything about that?

You asked what is LNT. "Linear No Threshold" model of response to carcinogens. Radioactive materials are carcinogens. The free radicals produced in cell due to irradiation are carcinogens. The LNT is how you calculate deaths due to extra cancer from radiation exposure. It's how you get numbers of tens thousands deaths due to Chernobyl. The radiation is mysterious and complicated, so I use asbestos as example of other carcinogen. Radiation is believed to be similar. It is about particle tracks through cells, and it is believed that extra cancer rate is linearly proportional to irradiation for small doses.

 

[Drakkith]

What temperature will waste in these containers reach if cooling is lost near the start of their storage? Any idea?

 

[Drakkith]

You asked what is LNT. "Linear No Threshold" model of response to carcinogens. Radioactive materials are carcinogens. The free radicals produced in cell due to irradiation are carcinogens.

Ah, well that makes sense. Your other post didn't. (What abestos had to do with it I had no idea till now)

So you think that minor amounts of radiation cause further mutations that results in an increase in cancer greater than what is measured and associated with radiation now?

 

[Dmytry]

What temperature will waste in these containers reach if cooling is lost near the start of their storage? Any idea?

Well, I am at the moment concerned about boral in SFP , where the cooling was lost and the thing heated enough to produce a lot of hydrogen for the hydrogen explosion (according to TEPCO), which is above the melting point of aluminium. Plus the boral plates may have swelling due to hydrogen - heating them may result in them bursting.

 

[Dmytry]

Ah, well that makes sense. Your other post didn't. (What abestos had to do with it I had no idea till now)

Well, it is kind of similar. The carcinogen that is 'rare' in the organism. Just as are particle track through cell nucleus. The principle is that there is no safe dose of asbestos because the minimum dose for a cell is 1 fibre and that is not safe. Same for radiation - the minimum dose is single particle track through cell nucleus (and then it is probabilistic depending to how close to DNA did it strike). For a cell, a single track can be a big dose. The point is that radiation doesn't dilute to safe levels.

So you think that minor amounts of radiation cause further mutations that results in an increase in cancer greater than what is measured and associated with radiation now?

No, I believe in LNT as it is assumed now 'for safety purposes', except I think it is not a mere precaution, but actually is a best theoretical model we got so far. It gives big numbers of deaths for very tiny exposures of large number of people. Each of those deaths can not be proved to be caused by radiation.
The numbers of deaths due to nuclear energy which are far below coal exclude the calculations based on LNT.

 

[Drakkith]

Well, I am at the moment concerned about boral in SFP , where the cooling was lost and the thing heated enough to produce a lot of hydrogen for the hydrogen explosion (according to TEPCO), which is above the melting point of aluminium. Plus the boral plates may have swelling due to hydrogen - heating them may result in them bursting.

Dmytry you are worried about everything. If it COULD go wrong you are worried about it.

 

[Drakkith]

Well, it is kind of similar. The carcinogen that is 'rare' in the organism. Just as are particle track through cell nucleus. The principle is that there is no safe dose of asbestos because the minimum dose for a cell is 1 fibre and that is not safe. Same for radiation - the minimum dose is single particle track through cell nucleus (and then it is probabilistic depending to how close to DNA did it strike). For a cell, a single track can be a big dose. The point is that radiation doesn't dilute to safe levels.

No, I believe in LNT as it is assumed now 'for safety purposes', except I think it is not a mere precaution, but actually is a best theoretical model we got so far. It gives big numbers of deaths for very tiny exposures of large number of people. Each of those deaths can not be proved to be caused by radiation.
The numbers of deaths due to nuclear energy which are far below coal exclude the calculations based on LNT.

Umm, ok. I can't say anything about this as it is all based on your opinion.

 

[Dmytry]

Dmytry you are worried about everything. If it COULD go wrong you are worried about it.

Well that's the attitude I'd want safety experts to have, except even more so. If we only worry about problems that are proven to emerge for sure, well, that'll be extremely unsafe. I'd rather safety was based on murphy's law rather than on optimism.

More on topic of LNT... the point is, the death toll of coal is very visible. The death toll of nuclear is hidden - it is in the rare accidents, and even then, it is a small percentage of a large group of people dying. It is very easy to understate it. You can read more on the topic. Read what LNT is, read about single cell studies, form your opinion.

 

[NUCENG]

While I don't doubt that there is at least some truth in that article, I have to ask if it is unfarily biased. We have no idea what questions were asked nor what the responses were. (Not from the article at least) I just hate to base anything off a simple web article that takes an "opinion based" stand.

Also, can someone do this for me? Give me the 5 top things that caused the incident OTHER than the quake/tsunami and flooding of the generators. I'm talking about mistakes made, bad decisions made, failed equipment, ETC that helped cause this.

So far:
1. Inadequate siting evaluation for the design basis earthquake and tsunami.
2. Failure to protect Essential AC switchgear and EDGGs from external flooding event
3. Failure to use operating experiience from US plants who identintified danger of Generators and switchgear in turbine building basement from internal and external flooding.
4. Failure to consider additional protection measures after larger wxrwenal design basis threat from earthquake/tsunami was identified.
5. Procedures or approval proceesses which allegedly delayed containment venting until containment exceeded design pressure by factor of 2.


Other causes/issues (no particular order):
Slow and piecemeal implementation of evacuation orders and shelter in place orders.
Inadequate dosimetry/protective clothing for emergency response crews.
Unit 3 failure to restart RCIC (exact cause unknown) but may have accelerated core uncovery at unit 3.
(For Dmytry) Lack of prepositioned supplemental cooling equipment, and transport and procedures to use it.
Inadequate equipment/training/procedures/exercises for identification of radioisotopes in post-accident samples.
Communication lapses or weaknesses leading to misinformation, over-optimistic releases.
Possible negligence to be determined.

As investigation and additional information is revealed the llist will change. An off the wall guess is that there may eventually be thousands of lessons-learned, contributing causes, equipment failure events, human errors, perhaps even crimes.

 

[Dmytry]

So far:
1. Inadequate siting evaluation for the design basis earthquake and tsunami.
2. Failure to protect Essential AC switchgear and EDGGs from external flooding event
3. Failure to use operating experiience from US plants who identintified danger of Generators and switchgear in turbine building basement from internal and external flooding.
4. Failure to consider additional protection measures after larger wxrwenal design basis threat from earthquake/tsunami was identified.
5. Procedures or approval proceesses which allegedly delayed containment venting until containment exceeded design pressure by factor of 2.Other causes/issues (no particular order):
Slow and piecemeal implementation of evacuation orders and shelter in place orders.
Inadequate dosimetry/protective clothing for emergency response crews.
Unit 3 failure to restart RCIC (exact cause unknown) but may have accelerated core uncovery at unit 3.
(For Dmytry) Lack of prepositioned supplemental cooling equipment, and transport and procedures to use it.
Inadequate equipment/training/procedures/exercises for identification of radioisotopes in post-accident samples.
Communication lapses or weaknesses leading to misinformation, over-optimistic releases.
Possible negligence to be determined.

As investigation and additional information is revealed the llist will change. An off the wall guess is that there may eventually be thousands of lessons-learned, contributing causes, equipment failure events, human errors, perhaps even crimes.

Well yea, that post i agree with.
Other thing to add... some failure of the reviewing process that is there to ensure lack of those many failures, as well as the failure to recognize the failure of reviewing process, et cetera. Possibly over optimistic expectations about reviewing, not enough critical thinking along the lines of "how do we know it is safe?", possibly too much trust that people would do the right thing (despite numerous historical examples to the contrary).

edit: that's my software experience. When you find bugs in the code that supposedly have been reviewed and tested (to the point of those bugs not being expected), in addition to fixing those bugs, the review/testing process itself has to be reviewed, as well as you need to reconsider why you overestimated efficacy of the review&testing process, and beware that may apply to the other divisions of the company.

 

[AntonL]

So far:
1. Inadequate siting evaluation for the design basis earthquake and tsunami.
2. Failure to protect Essential AC switchgear and EDGGs from external flooding event

these you cannot attribute to Tepco - the design was done in the Ebasco a USA company.

 

[Astronuc]

these you cannot attribute to Tepco - the design was done in the Ebasco a USA company.

Ultimately, it is the licensee's responsibility to ensure that the design and operation of a nuclear plant meet certain minimum safety and quality standards. At least, that is the situation in the US as specified by 10 CFR, and supporting law and regulation.

It was and has been TEPCO's duty and responsibility to ensure the FK I plant design was and is safe, and is operated safely. If EBASCO performed the tsunami analysis and designed the seawall, then they do bear some responsibility for the results. That does not remove responsibility from TEPCO.

An interesting and relevant article in the NY Times - Culture of Complicity Tied to Stricken Nuclear Plant
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/asia/27collusion.html

 

[NUCENG]

these you cannot attribute to Tepco - the design was done in the Ebasco a USA company.

Didn't attribute it to TEPCO alone. But they bought into the design and built it. And regulators approved the siting. The OP asked for causes, not blame.

 

[gmax137]

In the US, the utility submits documents called PSAR and then FSAR which are reviewed by the regulator. These SARs form the basis for the issue of the construction permit and operating license for the plant. The thoughts and approaches that went into the seismic design and tsunami protection would be summarized in the SAR. These SARs are public documents (though they are harder to get since 9/11); if you have questions about the tsunami design for a US plant, you should be able to read about it in the plant's SARs.

Is the same true for the Japanese units? Do they have SARs or similar documents? Are they available anywhere on the internet? I'd really like to read the PSAR/FSAR discussion of flooding by tsunami for the daiichi units.

 

[NUCENG]

Well that's the attitude I'd want safety experts to have, except even more so. If we only worry about problems that are proven to emerge for sure, well, that'll be extremely unsafe. I'd rather safety was based on murphy's law rather than on optimism.

More on topic of LNT... the point is, the death toll of coal is very visible. The death toll of nuclear is hidden - it is in the rare accidents, and even then, it is a small percentage of a large group of people dying. It is very easy to understate it. You can read more on the topic. Read what LNT is, read about single cell studies, form your opinion.

Based on your previous posts, Dmytry, just where are you going to find safety experts that are better than the ones you already don't trust? Do we need to start mass production of Dmytry clones to be sure they have that attitude? How are you going to be sure they don't get corrupted like you believe all of us are?

 

[AntonL]

It was and has been TEPCO's duty and responsibility to ensure the FK I plant design was and is safe, and is operated safely. If EBASCO performed the tsunami analysis and designed the seawall, then they do bear some responsibility for the results. That does not remove responsibility from TEPCO.

You are 100% correct that the responsibility is with the customer who specify and not with the contractor. Do we know who the consultants were? Also, in the 1960 Japan was glad that it could buy nuclear know how and would not have questioned GE or EBASCO designs. I still believe that no tsunami analysis was done in 1960, and the break water at O.P+5.6m one would also need in areas that have no tsunamis. As a comparison the break water for Dubai's Palm Island has a crest height of 4.25 metres above mean sea level which translates to around 5m above low tide or O.P.+5m In the shallow Persian gulf there are no tsunamis just wind swept waves.

An interesting and relevant article in the NY Times - Culture of Complicity Tied to Stricken Nuclear Plant
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/asia/27collusion.html

Concerning Asian Culture this 1998 classical http://www.flight.org/blog/download/airline-safety/korean_airlines_safety_audit_report.pdf" is an eye opener and should be compulsory reading for safety officer training.

 

[Dmytry]

Based on your previous posts, Dmytry, just where are you going to find safety experts that are better than the ones you already don't trust? Do we need to start mass production of Dmytry clones to be sure they have that attitude? How are you going to be sure they don't get corrupted like you believe all of us are?

Can also clone Murphy, it's the Murphy's law after all. Or not even clone anyone. Probably all you need is not to select for optimism.
But that's extras... first of all, need not to be getting the numbers and/or math wrong to confirm preconceptions. The greater problem is when there is an issue but everyone involved goes into denial and can't even calculate anything.

 

[AntonL]

And would this have made any difference? http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110426005409.htm

TEPCO boss wanted use of SDF plane / Minister nixed March 11 plan to rush to HQ
The Yomiuri Shimbun

Tokyo Electric Power Co. President Masataka Shimizu tried to fly to Tokyo from Aichi Prefecture on an Air Self-Defense Force airplane on March 11 after the massive earthquake that struck that day, but his permission to use the aircraft was revoked shortly after it took off, it has been learned.

About 20 minutes after takeoff, the ASDF C-130 Hercules transport plane carrying Shimizu was ordered by Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa to change course and return to Komaki Air Base in the prefecture.
...

Upon being informed of the disaster, Shimizu went from Nara to Nagoya by train in a bid to reach Tokyo, the sources said.

He had hoped to fly to Tokyo in a helicopter owned by a TEPCO affiliate, but was forced to abandon the idea because the Civil Aviation Law forbids private-owned helicopters flying after 7 p.m.

With all land routes in chaos, the TEPCO president inquired about using an SDF plane to get to Tokyo, the sources said.

The defense minister's intervention meant Shimizu did not arrive in Tokyo until about 10 a.m on March 12.

(Apr. 27, 2011)

 

[NUCENG]

On the topic of BORAL

GSI-196
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/196.html

IN 2009-26
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0924/ML092440545.pdf

Nuclear Engineering Handbook: Metamik has replaced Boral
http://books.google.com/books?id=EMy2OyUrqbUC&pg=PA302&lpg=PA302&dq=boral+nuclear&source=bl&ots=Scpc8NkWG2&sig=hDk0PvxRCj9YjtRdpaFp0988eiM&hl=en&ei=Hka4TefADaXX0QGg4fn3Dw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDIQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=boral%20nuclear&f=false

EPRI TR 100841 BORAL Behavior Under Simulated Cask Vacuum Drying Conditiions.

Fuel Pool Clipping corners prevents swelling due to internal hydrogen gas that leads to blistering/swelling, No loss of neutron absorption has been found.

NRR action plan
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1015/ML101520463.pdf
BORAL Aging is a topic in License Renewal Reviews and requires plants to have a condition monitoring program.

Summary:

US Fuel Pool Issues requiring re-racking stemmed from failure of DOE to begin accepting spent fuel for geological storage in accordance with US law.

Dry cask storage at reactor sites is moving spent fuel out of the fuel pools.

BORAL Issue is public knowledge, no cover-up. NRC has issued guidance for monitoring condition of BORAL and closed the Generic Safety Issue. NRR is still working on additional technical reviews and will issue NUREG/CR this year.

Replacement materials for BORAL are available and being developed.

BORAL manufacturing processes have been modified to reduce porosity.

Sampling of BORAL for porosity is done for quality control.

Monitoring programs for BORAL aging

Cask applications may require replacement of BORAL after first wet dry cycle.

And yes, Contribution of BORAL to event at Fukushima is unknown and to be investigated..

Challenge: Industry, Vendors and Regulators have identified a problem, evaluated its significance, and are working to correct the problem. Why would they be doing that if safety wasn’t a priority. They could save a lot of money by covering up and ignoring the problem.

Okay now what else should be done?

 

[Dmytry]

Well I don't think public would complain about such stuff until something blows.

It's not exactly unpredictable that if you have compressed aluminium powder, not watertight, it's long term (or even short term) stability would be highly questionable. It is great that the issue is being worked on. Great to see that the issue was not swept under carpet. But it remains WTF use the highly reactive low melting point metal when long term stability is required? Yes, aluminium is stable due to formation of oxide - when it is not powder. And non-powdered aluminium can be damaged if there's hydroxide ions in the liquid.

"The degradation mechanisms and deformation rates of any of the neutron-absorbing materials
in the SFP are not well understood. Therefore, for licensees that credit the use of a
neutron-absorbing material to maintain subcriticality in their SFP, knowing the condition of the
neutron-absorbing material in the SFP and monitoring the SFP for any indications that
degradation of the material may be occurring can prevent noncompliance with SFP criticality
requirements.
"
You can't say i am having some sort of hindsight thing about it. Someone mentioned boral somewhere a while back, i researched the issue, it just doesn't seem to make sense to use compressed aluminium powder, then I looked - indeed there are issues, big surprise. Great to see that issues weren't swept under carpet, would've preferred though some better foresight, e.g. higher melting point neutron absorber would be better in case of loss of coolant at spent fuel pool. I couldn't find a lot about loss of coolant in spent fuel pool. I don't even know for sure if Fukushima is using boral, I hope it is something else, but when not knowing i'd rather expect worst. The plant is rather old.

 

[NUCENG]

Well I don't think public would complain about such stuff until something blows.

It's not exactly unpredictable that if you have compressed aluminium powder, not watertight, it's long term (or even short term) stability would be highly questionable. It is great that the issue is being worked on. Great to see that the issue was not swept under carpet. But it remains WTF use the highly reactive low melting point metal when long term stability is required? Yes, aluminium is stable due to formation of oxide - when it is not powder. And non-powdered aluminium can be damaged if there's hydroxide ions in the liquid.

"The degradation mechanisms and deformation rates of any of the neutron-absorbing materials
in the SFP are not well understood. Therefore, for licensees that credit the use of a
neutron-absorbing material to maintain subcriticality in their SFP, knowing the condition of the
neutron-absorbing material in the SFP and monitoring the SFP for any indications that
degradation of the material may be occurring can prevent noncompliance with SFP criticality
requirements.
"
You can't say i am having some sort of hindsight thing about it. Someone mentioned boral somewhere a while back, i researched the issue, it just doesn't seem to make sense to use compressed aluminium powder, then I looked - indeed there are issues, big surprise. Great to see that issues weren't swept under carpet, would've preferred though some better foresight, e.g. higher melting point neutron absorber would be better in case of loss of coolant at spent fuel pool. I couldn't find a lot about loss of coolant in spent fuel pool. I don't even know for sure if Fukushima is using boral, I hope it is something else, but when not knowing i'd rather expect worst. The plant is rather old.

So if the work in progress to monitor and correct this issue proceeds, you have nothing to add, pending the release of the investigation results or more information from the NUREG/CR document being prepared. Okay on to your next issue.

 

[NUCENG]

And would this have made any difference? http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110426005409.htm

Hopefully not, I hope he still had his cell phone and that he wasn't trying to micromanage the operators at Fukushima ala Jimmy Carter and Desert 1. Has he ever been licensed on a nuclear plant or did he have to trust his people?

While he was enroute, should he have passed the baton to Dmytry? ;-}

 

[NUCENG]

Can also clone Murphy, it's the Murphy's law after all. Or not even clone anyone. Probably all you need is not to select for optimism.
But that's extras... first of all, need not to be getting the numbers and/or math wrong to confirm preconceptions. The greater problem is when there is an issue but everyone involved goes into denial and can't even calculate anything.

Give it a rest Dmytry, must I go back and pull every exagerated statement, unsubstantiated claim, deliberate twisting of other posts, and errors you have made on this forum? I owned up to my miscalculation (which didn't change my point). BTW, it wasn't you who detected that error -that would have taken a little effort to do something other than spout off.

I admitted I had not adequately researched the maximum tsunami ever recorded in Japan, assuming it came from the worlds biggest earthquake at Valdivia, Chile. (I an still interested in hearing an explanation of why they only designed for a 5.5 m tsunami if they really had evidence of a 30 m runup in historical times.)

Your insistance on perfection is laudable but unrealistic. Are you seriously saying that every word you have written here can be substantiated by facts? Have you ever admitted to mistakes? You actually accused me of deliberately understating those numbers, of knowing that I lied to make my point. Sorry Dmytry, where should I report for the firing squad. Let me know when you find somebody else who is perfect because I insist that should be the qualification of the squad.

Those who can, do. Those who can't do, teach. Those who can't teach, criticize.

 

[NUCENG]

Well yea, that post i agree with.
Other thing to add... some failure of the reviewing process that is there to ensure lack of those many failures, as well as the failure to recognize the failure of reviewing process, et cetera. Possibly over optimistic expectations about reviewing, not enough critical thinking along the lines of "how do we know it is safe?", possibly too much trust that people would do the right thing (despite numerous historical examples to the contrary).

edit: that's my software experience. When you find bugs in the code that supposedly have been reviewed and tested (to the point of those bugs not being expected), in addition to fixing those bugs, the review/testing process itself has to be reviewed, as well as you need to reconsider why you overestimated efficacy of the review&testing process, and beware that may apply to the other divisions of the company.

Exactly. Corrective action is more than shooting the programmer or software developer that made the eror or that didn't find it during testing or review. Corrective action has to looke for issues such as overwork, deficient specifications, inadequate training, environmental factors such as lighting anbd distractions and many more aspects. Believe it or not, we have also figured that out in the nuclear industry. And it doesn't stop with the company. Operating experience reports are issued so the same mistakes don't occur at another plant or even in other countries. Ever seen that in a software project? OR IS IT ALL HUSH HUSH AND PROPRIETARY?

 

[NUCENG]

Well that's the attitude I'd want safety experts to have, except even more so. If we only worry about problems that are proven to emerge for sure, well, that'll be extremely unsafe. I'd rather safety was based on murphy's law rather than on optimism.

More on topic of LNT... the point is, the death toll of coal is very visible. The death toll of nuclear is hidden - it is in the rare accidents, and even then, it is a small percentage of a large group of people dying. It is very easy to understate it. You can read more on the topic. Read what LNT is, read about single cell studies, form your opinion.

LNT is assumed in the nuclear industry as part of the ALARA process. What more can we do and why then is this even a consideration for this topic?

 

[NUCENG]

Well that's the attitude I'd want safety experts to have, except even more so. If we only worry about problems that are proven to emerge for sure, well, that'll be extremely unsafe. I'd rather safety was based on murphy's law rather than on optimism.

More on topic of LNT... the point is, the death toll of coal is very visible. The death toll of nuclear is hidden - it is in the rare accidents, and even then, it is a small percentage of a large group of people dying. It is very easy to understate it. You can read more on the topic. Read what LNT is, read about single cell studies, form your opinion.

See #101

 

[Dmytry]

I just found something very interesting when researching LOCA at spent fuel pools:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/082r3.html
what is most interesting, is the risk estimates in that table... one in 45 000 000 years, one in 13 000 000 years, one in 714 000 years... wonderful, simply wonderful. Then from those wonderful numbers the importance of issue is calculated, and the cost benefit analysis is performed.

 

[NUCENG]

What temperature will waste in these containers reach if cooling is lost near the start of their storage? Any idea?

The miniumum time from reactor discharge to transfer to cask storage is 5 years. The casks are designed to be air cooled without any external cooling sources. Fuel loaded into a cask is analyzed and selected to maintain that design basis. Neutron absorbing material is used to ensure sub-criticality even if the cask is filled with water.

Need more, I can probably find some references, specs, or reports.

 

[NUCENG]

On the issues of Core Shroud Cracking.

A list of Japanese Shroud, Jet Pump and Dryer Issues:
http://www.wise-paris.org/english/ournews/datas/021002BWRJPTableMap_en.pdf

TEPCO response to technical issues:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu02_e/images/0917e2.pdf

It is wise to look for both sides of an issue. An indictment of the industry by an anti-nuclear group lists other plants:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu02_e/images/0917e2.pdf

Note reference to resignation of TEPCO president. BTW Although Pat Nixon did hold the bible it was her husband RICHARD Nixon that took the Inaugural Oath on the bible. But that minor mistake is not relevant to the argument, Dmytry.

Also note that Mr. Sugaoka did not come forward until he had lost his job at GE. Don’t misunderstand me I appreciate that the truth came out but I won’t excuse a man who violated the trust to report safety problems when they are discovered. He is no hero.

EPRI VIP Project
http://portfolio.epri.com/ProgramTab.aspx?sId=NUC&rId=182&pId=5361

Every BWR is required to perform inspections and report the results for vessel internals inspections. These documents are available on ADAMS as public records. Every flaw found requires evaluation and repair or approval prior to resuming power operation.

One example of NRC oversight:
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0620/ML062080680.pdf
If you have a spare decade do an ADAMS search on the NRC website for “VIP”

TEPCO Unit 4 was in the process of replacing their core shroud.

Again, my question is what else should be done?