Fukushima Management and Government Performance

[NUCENG]

I have half a mind to buy a plane ticket to Tokyo and start picketing TEPCO headquarters with a sign saying "release contamination data" on one side and something really insulting about their mothers on the other. That's how angry I am. I know it's not even my country, but...

Also, be aware that their definition of freedom of speech - especially for gaijin (foreigners) - is not the same as you may expect.

 

[NUCENG]

An excellent article today in Asahi Shimbun beginning a 4 part series on the 'Nuclear Village' at TEPCO.
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106070161.html
It appears as an almost self contained and self supervised entity if the article is to be believed.
Management clearly did not have real insight into that segment of the business, but it was so successful that no one rocked the boat despite some very clear warning signs.
TEPCOs nuclear management will provide case studies for a long time.
Hopefully the lessons will be learned.

This looks like an extremely good insight into "TEPCO THINK." Hope you will post links to the remainder of the series.

 

[NUCENG]

I was outraged recently when I read that the IAEA had rated Japan's handling of the Fukushima crisis as "exemplary". It looks like I was not the only one.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304906004576371781243470772.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

The WSJ has a funky firewall setup, so if that link does not work for you, please go to Google News and search for "IAEA draws fire".

Apparently there are 3 members of the G-8 countries who want to sideline the IAEA in the wake of their recent "exemplary performance" evaluation of Japan. Several conferences and meetings regarding nuclear safety have recently been scheduled so that IAEA head Yukiya Amano will not be able to attend. They knew his schedule, and they arranged these meetings with the intention that he should be unable to attend.

It doesn't get much more political than that

IAEA is an international organization and filled with diplomats. They probably want more informatiion out of TEPCO and Japan government before their final report is ready.
When I read:

"The response on the site by dedicated, determined and expert staff, under
extremely arduous conditions has been exemplary and resulted in the best
approach to securing safety given the exceptional circumstances."

I think they were talking about the on-site operators and emergency responders (fire, police and SDF), not management, and certainly not regulators, that may have delayed important actions.

IAEA has the distinction of being the only international body that has any chance of helping direct the investigation by virtue of technical expertise and association with the UN. In fact, they have no direct authority to order any action, but they would lose even their persuasion ability if they get too hostile. There were some pretty clear nuances in the summary report that indicated that designs, regulation, enforcement, and readiness to adapt to new information were lacking. I suggest patience and see what the final report says.

 

[NUCENG]

The history or radiation is chock full of ignorance, deception, outright lies, and massive pollution of the entire world with isotopes and increased cancer rates. This disaster is no different.

So we should throw up our hands, sit in a corner and wait to die? This thread does not require technical information and cites like the main thread, but we would all like to see more than helpless resignation. If that is what the "tyrants and tycoons" see from the "people" doesn't it encourage them to do more of what you don't like? The interim and this forum and this thread (and yeah the "OTHER political thread" are full of complaints and things that could have been done better. I have worked in the industry for many years and I don't feel helpless. I am confident that lessons have been, are being, and will be learned.

If you could turn back the clock to some time before nuclear science, when would it be? When was ignorance deception, lies less than today?

 

[robinson]

You may have missed my point.

 

[MiceAndMen]

I think they were talking about the on-site operators and emergency responders (fire, police and SDF), not management, and certainly not regulators, that may have delayed important actions.

IAEA has the distinction of being the only international body that has any chance of helping direct the investigation by virtue of technical expertise and association with the UN. In fact, they have no direct authority to order any action, but they would lose even their persuasion ability if they get too hostile. There were some pretty clear nuances in the summary report that indicated that designs, regulation, enforcement, and readiness to adapt to new information were lacking. I suggest patience and see what the final report says.

As to the first part there, as regards the emergency resonders, I think they did a very good job. As for the second part, I'm not so sure. The latest report from Japan to the IAEA seems to own up to a lot more in the way of shortcomings than the IAEA themselves had touched on. The final report from the IAEA will be interesting, that's for sure.

 

[NUCENG]

Speaking of children, do you see now why i was especially riled up by the argument as of how everyone likes children and so on?
It was back before the 20msv/year playground exposure limits and that resignation IIRC. I was expecting this stuff to happen, based on Chernobyl.

For you the soviet union is something that was an enemy or what ever; for me it is a place i was born in, and i can see that a lot of things are fairly universal between governments. Before Fukushima you would never have thought that Japan was this similar to Soviet Union when it comes to nuclear accidents - whereas I would think so because I don't see the way SU handled Chernobyl as anything exceptionally bad or good - I was spared the cold war propaganda either way. We have two data points of how government handles severe nuclear disaster - one in communist country, another in capitalist country - and they are fairly similar, so it is not the economical system that matters (though I would say that socialist government could use larger amount of resources and could relocate people easier).

How can you be sure that your government could handle nuclear disaster (plus tsunami) better? For me the only reason to think so is that EU (and US) are more powerful entities than Japan and each can conceivably throw more resources at problem. Well, I do think that you have less complacent population and people would be REALLY pissed off; but i'd think government would try nonetheless; government does not deserve the credit for the love of freedom that people it governs have; people deserve credit for what government they elect.

also speaking of 20mSv/year limit for playgrounds. That is the EU limit for nuclear workers, but a lot more lax, because the nuclear workers are carrying dosimeters and are not getting any internal exposure of note (plus with ALARA principle vast majority of workers stay below 1mSv/year), whereas children are getting internal exposure and are in a messy non-uniform field and there's no ALARA, quite the opposite (don't do anything when below limit). I would guess that the distribution of actual children doses would be non-gaussian with many children going well above this limit.

I have no children of my own but work with children through several programs, and I have nephews, nieces and their children and now even grand children. I am with you a hundred percent that increasing exposure limits for children is wrong.

When I was growing up, the Red Menace of the Soviet Union and PRC were the "enemy." While I was in the military I trained to defend against those countries and that included service in Vietnam. Today I see the Russian and Chinese people as economic competitors not enemies. If I had a nickel for every immigrant and ex-patriot of a different nationality that I have worked with in the nuclear industry I might almost be able to buy a gallon of gas.

Most of those people came to the US for economic opportunity and because they thought things were better here. For some reason they want to stay here in large numbers. I have lived in ROK, Republic of China, Japan, and the UK. I have visited several other countries. I now live where I want to stay.

"How can you be sure that your government could handle nuclear disaster (plus tsunami) better?" An extended Station Blackout (even without a tsunami) is a serious challenge to any nuclear plant and I'll even guess that is 100% true for Generation IV plant designs and gas cooled pebble bed plants.

The following are some reasons that I personally feel a US plant would have been better prepared:

1. We drill and exercise severe accidents several times each year at every plant. These exercises include testing communications links to NRC, state, and local government and emergency responders. We practice making decisions about evacuation zones and even have exercised some limited evacuations.

2. Our design bases are not a one-time file and forget function. We have intrusive and detailed inspections and reviews by regulators, industry peers and organizations. We have documented design basis and used probabilistic risk evaluations to identify critical systems and manual actions. Then those areas get even more rigorous evaluations, regulation, and inspections. I believe there will be significant rework of Station Blackout after the Fukushima accident. Coastal plants are already being asked to reexamine seismic and tsunami risks.

3. In response to 9/11 plants have been evaluated for major damage due to aircraft impacts and disruption of offsite power. Equipment has been procured, installed or pre-positioned, and procedures have been developed to provide extended core cooling and makeup.

4. Actions specified in Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Monitoring Guidelines are not subject to delays waiting for government approval or because the CEO can't get a helicopter ride. Those actions are already approved and will be implemented when entry conditions are met.

5. Steps like venting containment would be implemented before exceeding containment design pressure, unlike Fukushima.

6. Anyone who has ever participated in NRC decision making and inspections will recognize that the regulatory process is not controlled by industry nor by the anti-nuclear lobby. I have been repeatedly frustrated by what I saw as over-zealous pet-peeve regulators as people like David Lochbaum (UCS) have been frustrated by NRC refusal to act on his comlaints. When everybody leaves the table frustrated, I've learned the decisions are aimed at increasing safety. What I have seen in Japan of the relationship between regulators and industry scares me. If they missed something like tsunamies what other issues could there be.

7. Until recently, most of our operators and staff were selected with experience in the nuclear navy. The one year training program, followed by qualification and training and drills and testing and on and on is probably the best preparation in the world to respond to a plant upset or accident. I am a little concerned that the cutbacks in nuclear ship numbers and an effort to start building a lot of new plants will need to find a new source for the caliber of operators and the numbers they will need.

Would these factors be enough to save the core in an extended station blackout? I don't know, and hope I never find out. That is truthful even if you don't believe any of it. If these factors are enough to save containment the results would be better than Fukushima.

And when this is all wrapped up, lessons have been learned and implemented, my confidence will be even higher and I still won't want to test it.

BTW I am still working my way through about 4 GB of references about PRA to figure out whether I believe the 1E-7 per year probability numbers. There is an assumption of a factor of 20 between the qualification of seismic equipment and the safe shutdown earthquake that I cannot yet validate, but I am okay with 1E-5 so far.

 

[NUCENG]

You may have missed my point.

Wouldn't be the first time. Would you share your point so I can get past my bias?

 

[robinson]

To understand you have to know the history of radiation, radioactive materials, nuclear experiments, the bomb tests, the fall out, the politics behind nuclear power plants, the political and military aspects as well, just to be able to grasp the enormity of the deception and lies that surround nuclear issues.

 

[robinson]

All of which, I just realized, would be off topic here.

 

[NUCENG]

All of which, I just realized, would be off topic here.

Not if you tie it to government performance. I think there was a lot of early ignorance of potential health effects in the early days of nuclear science. Thus we had xray machings in shoe stores and radium paint poisoning. Regulations and safety guidelines have improved since then. In Japan we have regulators increasing dose limits instead of enforcing limits they thought were necessary before the accident. I think that is wrong, especially when they increased dose limits for children.

One of the biggest problems I've seen is that due to errors and mistrust of TEPCO the government of Japan took over the responsibility for briefing the media and press briefings and nothing seems to have changed. I won't deny lies and deception have occurred in this accident. But I am not ready to say that can't change - if those lies and deceptions are exposed and the TEPCO and government examples become lessons of what NOT to do.

 

[zapperzero]

An excellent article today in Asahi Shimbun beginning a 4 part series on the 'Nuclear Village' at TEPCO.
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201106070161.html
It appears as an almost self contained and self supervised entity if the article is to be believed.
Management clearly did not have real insight into that segment of the business, but it was so successful that no one rocked the boat despite some very clear warning signs.
TEPCOs nuclear management will provide case studies for a long time.
Hopefully the lessons will be learned.

This is part of the spin cycle. The lizard sheds its tail to save the body. "Oh there were a few bad apples, we had no idea they had been lying to us all along, let's punish them. Us? We're clean, just a tad bit incompetent. One does not go to jail for being a bit incompetent, does one? After all, it's such a big company, how could we possibly understand every aspect of it in detail?".

 

[zapperzero]

Also, be aware that their definition of freedom of speech - especially for gaijin (foreigners) - is not the same as you may expect.

So, I should bring Japanese friends along.

 

[tsutsuji]

I was outraged recently when I read that the IAEA had rated Japan's handling of the Fukushima crisis as "exemplary". It looks like I was not the only one.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304906004576371781243470772.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

I think the closing words of the fact finding mission: "to take advantage of the unique opportunity created by the Fukushima accident" are quite insensitive : http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/missionsummary010611.pdf

 

[ThomS]

So, I should bring Japanese friends along.

First, you need to request permission from the police to protest. See how that goes first. If you show up even with Japanese friends, the police will be called and they will make strong inquiries on the spot and more than likely dissuade from you protesting further. If they let you stay, you will more than likely be asked to protest quietly (no shouting or bothering any people passing by). Moreover, they will have at least 3-10 police on site to make sure of all of this. Expect them to ask all sorts of things including for your ID, passport, etc., and if you are carrying any number of items that may be considered dangerous. You would be surprised by what is dangerous btw. God have mercy on you if you do, since it will straight to jail.

And, Oh!, the peer pressure on your Japanese friends will be enormous at this point. That is a whole other ball of wax.

 

[zapperzero]

Sounds familiar.

 

[NUCENG]

I think the closing words of the fact finding mission: "to take advantage of the unique opportunity created by the Fukushima accident" are quite insensitive : http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fukushima/missionsummary010611.pdf

I agree, it sounds insensitive to call this an opportunity. If you think IAEA called government and TEPCO management lies and withholding of information "exemplary" I am outraged, too.

But picking words out of context (applying exemplary to management and regulators), ignoring that translations can create distortions much different than the original text (opportiunity), and trying to imply that the intent was to downplay the seriousness of this accident is not accurate either.

IAEA did not cause this event. They may prove to be puppets of industry and your criticisms may then be absolutely right. But right now, where else can we turn for an independent viewpoint that isn't limited by information bottlenecks like we are on this forum?

Be fair, do you think the person that wrote that paragraph thought that this accident was a good thing?

 

[tsutsuji]

ignoring that translations can create distortions much different than the original text (opportiunity)

The leader of the fact finding mission is a Briton, so he is supposed to know how to speak English.

Be fair, do you think the person that wrote that paragraph thought that this accident was a good thing?

He says it is a good thing for nuclear safety and he is right. The shutting down of Hamaoka would not have been possible without the Fukushima accident. So as far as the safety of the Tokyo population (which would be severely affected in case of a Hamaoka accident) is concerned, the Fukushima accident is a good thing. But one should have a word of understanding for the plight of the Fukushima prefecture population.

The sinking of the Titanic was probably not a bad thing if you consider the improvements in ship safety that were made afterwards.

But right now, where else can we turn for an independent viewpoint that isn't limited by information bottlenecks like we are on this forum?

That's right, IAEA is better than nothing. It provides a space for negotiation based on "fact finding" for a number of complicated issues like what happens in Iran, Syria and so on : http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13665460

 

[tsutsuji]

While the IAEA communicates about itself as being part of the solution, the following excerpt from the Japanese government's report should make us wonder if it is not part of the problem :

Above Tsunami Assessment Method of JSCE is also reflected to IAEA Tsunami Hazard
Guide as per DS417. However, the tsunami recurrence period is not identified in the
method,

III-31 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/pdf/chapter_iii-2.pdf

At the 1st Kashiwazaki International Symposium on Seismic Safety of Nuclear Installations, November 2010, the "Tsunami assessment for nuclear power plants in Japan" presentation by M.Takao, TEPCO : http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-sympos...sionB/B-11.pdf concludes on page 14 "Fukushima Daiichi NPS / We assessed and confirmed the safety of the nuclear plants based on the JSCE method which was published in 2002". The IAEA gave credibility to this statement by being present at the Symposium if not being a sponsor : http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/1_Opening.html . My question is : what kind of peer review is performed in those scientific circles ? Was the quality of the peer review process good enough ?

 

[swl]

One of the biggest problems I've seen is that due to errors and mistrust of TEPCO the government of Japan took over the responsibility for briefing the media and press briefings and nothing seems to have changed.

Somehow I was under the impression that the government wanted to control the media so that TEPCO did not disclose any information that the public should not be aware of.

So now we have two layers to isolate us from the information, and if TEPCO wishes to withhold information they can just withhold it from the government as well.

 

[swl]

First, you need to request permission from the police to protest.

Is it a protest if you hold up a sign that says "Please release radiation data"?

Anyone else here up for this?

 

[robinson]

Might be more effective to do your own measurements. Of course they won't allow that, but at least you would have a slight chance to get some real data.

 

[tsutsuji]

As I wrote in the other thread : https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3351282#post3351282 , I suspect the insensitivity of the IAEA I mentioned in my previous posts here is partly based on ignorance and facts not found because not investigated by the fact-finding team concerning how well the evacuation was performed. They visited the nuclear power plants, but did they interview the evacuees ?

 

[NUCENG]

As I wrote in the other thread : https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3351282#post3351282 , I suspect the insensitivity of the IAEA I mentioned in my previous posts here is partly based on ignorance and facts not found because not investigated by the fact-finding team concerning how well the evacuation was performed. They visited the nuclear power plants, but did they interview the evacuees ?

http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/govinf2011-8.pdf

This IAEA document indicates that the Fact-Finding Mission was the fifth group they sent to Japan. There were also a radiation monitoring team, a BWR expert team, a Marine radiation monitoring team, and and Food Safety Assessment team. I expect there are other UN agencies dealing with evacuees from the tsunami as well as the nuclear exclusion zone.

Related to evacuees, the fact-finding team had a responsibility to check:
"Emergency preparedness and response; and Radiological consequences."
Other than being a warm and fuzzy "photo op" what would interviews with evacuees have told the team - that they weren't happy about it? That may sound cold and callous, but that was not their mission. They are looking at how evacuation decisions were made, and how timely they were carried out.

It always irritates me when a politician takes a joy-ride around a disaster in a helicopter and makes noise in front of a bank of cameras and microphones. The police and government workers diverted to dealing with a rubbernecking politician should be working on the disaster, not babysitting politicians. I'm glad the IARA team got their information and briefings and got out of there. Part of their charter is to get official data out to the member states. That is better than having each country send their own team to Japan.

 

[rowmag]

Might be more effective to do your own measurements. Of course they won't allow that, but at least you would have a slight chance to get some real data.

Who won't allow it? In our town we do our own measurements, and they are published on the web with no interference. Of whom are we supposed to be afraid?

 

[Calvadosser]

Illuminating article on the mistrust of TEPCO by the Japanese government in the early days of the catastrophe:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/world/asia/13japan.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1"

 

[swl]

Illuminating article on the mistrust of TEPCO by the Japanese government in the early days of the catastrophe:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/world/asia/13japan.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1"

Interesting comments about the plant manager, MASAO YOSHIDA.

"...almost certainly prevented a more serious meltdown and has made him an unlikely hero."

Mr. Yoshida, 56, according to friends, is a square-jawed, hard-drinking and sometimes rough-talking man who is a straight shooter.

They go on to make this guy sound like a real cowboy hero.

I'd like to buy him a drink - and congratulate him on how he managed to blow up four reactors and damage the fuel in five, when only three were running.

 

[clancy688]

I'd like to buy him a drink - and congratulate him on how he managed to blow up four reactors and damage the fuel in five, when only three were running.

Is there anything he could've done after the earthquake and tsunami to save his reactors? I don't think so. They were doomed because of construction flaws.
They could either make it worse or delay the inevitable. It looks as if he's done the latter.

 

[Calvadosser]

They go on to make this guy sound like a real cowboy hero.

I'd like to buy him a drink - and congratulate him on how he managed to blow up four reactors and damage the fuel in five, when only three were running.

All depends... I had naively assumed that reactor operators were routinely trained on hypothetical accidents and there were well defined points where the normal operation manual was thrown in the bin and Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines took over.

However, I have the impression TEPCO had no Severe Accident Mitigation Guidelines ready for the situation. Even if they existed, from everything I have seen, I would imagine that Mr Yoshida had never been trained to use such guidelines - or if he had, they did not cover the situation where no AC power was available, water for reactor cooling was exhausted, gas venting systems were damaged and so on. Plus several reactors and spent fuel ponds to deal with simultaneously.

If my impression is correct, then it is TEPCO's management who should be congratulated, rather than they guy who found himself in the hot seat with inadequate resources and training for the situation he faced.

 

[NUCENG]

Is there anything he could've done after the earthquake and tsunami to save his reactors? I don't think so. They were doomed because of construction flaws.
They could either make it worse or delay the inevitable. It looks as if he's done the latter.

I am not going to criticize Mr. Yoshida because I was not there to see what he was faced with. Neither will I call him a hero for the same reasons. Mr. Sugaoka the "whistle blower" is also being called a hero, and I'm not sure about that because of the time lapse between when he was aware of the cover up of the shroud cracks to when he went public. The press is always looking for heroes and demons. Most people are neither.

However, if Mr. Yoshida was going to disobey orders, I wish it would have been venting the containments earlier - before they reached pressures that could have released hydrogen gases through leaks into the buildings. Had he been able to keep containment and the buildings from catastrophic failure, they would be dealining with a much more localized disaster and fewer exposures to the public.

 

[swl]

Is there anything he could've done after the earthquake and tsunami to save his reactors? I don't think so. They were doomed because of construction flaws.
They could either make it worse or delay the inevitable. It looks as if he's done the latter.

He made the situation far worse with his failure to ventilate the reactors before they were damaged by overpressure. Had containment and mechanical systems been spared the damage caused by explosions, then the cooling and contamination issues they are dealing with now would be much more manageable.

And as plant manager, he should have understood the steps required to maintain control over system pressure. Unless I've missed something, his failure to do so must be attributed to willful negligence, or negligence due to incompetence.

 

[swl]

And the TEPCO president requesting permission to evacuate all TEPCO personal from the plant due to radiation danger; now that was priceless. This same team of fearful nuclear experts will be soon waving the "nuclear power is safe" banners in an effort to get more projects going.

 

[NUCENG]

And the TEPCO president requesting permission to evacuate all TEPCO personal from the plant due to radiation danger; now that was priceless. This same team of fearful nuclear experts will be soon waving the "nuclear power is safe" banners in an effort to get more projects going.

Perhaps, but what credibility will they have? Are we so short of things to worry about that we have to worry about what MIGHT happen for future construction? The United States learned many of these lessons in 1979. Russia learned these lessons in 1986. In 2011 Japan is faced with these same lessons about credibility and trust. Or do you think you are the only one that sees it yet?

 

[NUCENG]

He made the situation far worse with his failure to ventilate the reactors before they were damaged by overpressure. Had containment and mechanical systems been spared the damage caused by explosions, then the cooling and contamination issues they are dealing with now would be much more manageable.

And as plant manager, he should have understood the steps required to maintain control over system pressure. Unless I've missed something, his failure to do so must be attributed to willful negligence, or negligence due to incompetence.

Skip the trial. Off with his head!

I also wish they had vented earlier. But I cannot say for certain that would have done more than delay what happened. Neither you nor I have enough information to conclude the plant staff did anything that we wouldn't have also done given their procedures,, training, and information that was available at the time.

Let's put the thumbscrews and irons back into the box for a while and be fair, okay

 

[Calvadosser]

He made the situation far worse with his failure to ventilate the reactors before they were damaged by overpressure. Had containment and mechanical systems been spared the damage caused by explosions, then the cooling and contamination issues they are dealing with now would be much more manageable.

And as plant manager, he should have understood the steps required to maintain control over system pressure. Unless I've missed something, his failure to do so must be attributed to willful negligence, or negligence due to incompetence.

Or to contradictory instructions from his superiors.

My recollection was that the TEPCO top management could not bring themselves to order the depressurisation of the reactors (?). In the end the prime minister's office gave them a direct instruction to depressurise. Even then, TEPCO spent hours in discussion amongst themselves before finally ordering depressurisation. Shortly after, the first of the explosions occurred.

My limited understanding is that depressurisation is one of the very first (and urgent) steps in the guidelines for managing a severe reactor accident. But at that stage, TEPCO top management seemed (to me) to be in denial that a serious accident had already occurred - there was even talk about how injecting seawater was not a good idea because it would render the reactors unusable in the future. Yet, by then, the reactors were already damaged beyond repair.