Fukushima Management and Government Performance

[NUCENG]

I just found something very interesting when researching LOCA at spent fuel pools:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/082r3.html
what is most interesting, is the risk estimates in that table... one in 45 000 000 years, one in 13 000 000 years, one in 714 000 years... wonderful, simply wonderful. Then from those wonderful numbers the importance of issue is calculated, and the cost benefit analysis is performed.

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/082r3.html

“Based on the available information and the above calculations, this item was given a medium priority ranking.” Any bets that it isn’t back in an “Immediate” category now?

WASH-1400 data used in this evaluation nearly 30 years ago is being updated as part of SOARCA. Again the industry is NOT covering this stuff up. It is ongoing research effort and will likely result in new requirements in a matter of months.

At the time of the WASH -1400 report and this GSI there had not been any addition of prepositioned pumps and power sources such as those added post-9/11 as part of the so-called B.5.b response. So even if their estimation of risk is underestimated, plants have already added capabilities that are not considered here. Pool loading at that time may not have included offloads to dry fuel storage. More reading to do.

Again, what more should we be doing? Can you spell Yucca Mountain? But that is mired in politics, not engineering or management. Different thread please.

 

[NUCENG]

Well, you can read about TEPCO's standards in the past. Covering up core shroud cracks lol, literally.

The situation was resolved on paper. Pretty much the same way as o-ring erosion was 'resolved' by NASA before Challenger.
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/196.html
Furthermore, the behaviour of boral in the event of loss of coolant was not ever addressed.

I am referring to it as example of this sort of fault. Feynman explains why it is wrong much better than I can.

Well, it would be more like - I am not sure benefits outweight the costs. And I strongly disagree with those who are absolutely sure that benefits outweight the costs.
The problem with natural disasters is... that is plant failure when you are least ready to handle it. That's simultaneous plant failure. It is OK (bad but doesn't kill a lot of people) when you make 25..30% of electrical power with nuclear. It is not OK when you are approaching 80%. Simultaneous failures are very bad.

Challenger, Columbia, and Apollo 1 were experimental vehicles where known risks were eliminated as they were found. NASA is probably the single most proficient organization in the world using Probabilistic Risk Analaysis today. Feynman's analysis is valid and a wakeup call to avoid complacency and self satisfaction or self-delusion as you may call it. Overall those deaths were exchanged in search of knowledge and discovery. The astronauts knew they were strapping in on top of a huge potential explosion. They did so willingly because they believed in the effort. They didn't force you to join them.

I know you won't accept my opinion but I believe the nuclear industry uses PRA and takes corrective actions as new risks are discovered, just like NASA. If they do it why can't you consider the possibility that there is at least one person in the nuclear industry who may be trying to do it, too?

What more should we do?

Now can we please get back to topical discussion?

 

[NUCENG]

Of course I agree that things are the way they are because of saving money! From the most miniscule decision that has no effect on safety to monumental disregards in safety, these things DO happen. That is the nature of business. The key is to recognize when something is legitimately an accident and when it is negligence. Which things are which in the Fukushima incident? I have no idea. That WILL be looked into.

I looked at that study you linked and I didn't see anywhere where they said it was OK. They identified the problem, proposed solutions, and in the end it said that the situation was resolved. Since I don't know how, I can't say on that. What exactly did you have a problem with in that article?

Yes, that was a tragedy. One that did not have to happen. But in almost all cases, nothing bad HAS to happen. It's a simple fact of life that they do though.

Well, you do come off as quite untrusting of MANY people. If I were to sum up your position, I would say that you do not think the benefits of nuclear power outweigh the costs due to inadequate safety procedures and other related things. Is that about right?

If I am wrong about your psyche, I am still responding to your claims and arguments. Address them with something more than "I don't trust that," or "I don't believe that" or "I wouldn't have done that," or that classic that you used "I'm right and you are wrong"

Do that and I don't care if you need therapy or just a warm puppy to make you feel better about life.

 

[NUCENG]

I can only think of two managerial mistakes

Mistake 1: Was the tsunami assessment study's http://www.jnes.go.jp/seismic-symposium10/presentationdata/3_sessionB/B-11.pdf"

[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/in4bqs.JPG
Do we know historical heights for the area? The Tepco document does not make any references to these!
yes we do: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/27/fukushima-tsunami-plan-japan_n_841222.html


Mistake 2: By not admitting that NPP could be in danger of being hit by a tsunami using historical run ups, thus no extra precautions were taken and working out various scenarios and how to deal with them.

Other possibilities:

Who came up with procedures or approved procedures allowing containment pressure double the design limit before initiating venting?

Why didn't TEPCO learn from OE from the united States about plants that were vulnerable to flooding in turbine basement essential equipment?

Why was there inadequate equipment for protecting and monitoring dose for emergency responders?

Why was conflicting information and possibly even misinformation released to the media?

 

[NUCENG]

I'd guess that it was gross negligence. We'll see after they have investigation and trial.

That is fair.

 

[Dmytry]

I'm still amazed at the 1 in 700 000 years estimate. You need to know so much about geology with such a certainty (such a low probability of having incorrect theory, or missing some rare mechanism) to arrive at such a number... they must have totally revolutionized geophysics, and indeed, the entire scientific process...
OR they used any lack of geophysical knowledge in their favour when doing estimates, striving for the lowest estimate that they feel someone would believe at the time.
Take your pick.

 

[NUCENG]

Well, I would like to think that I would do the right thing in the similar situation. But I know how easily people do the wrong/selfish thing - by convincing themselves that it is the right thing, not because they are inherently 'evil'.

Well, it's not that I totally don't trust the people, it's that I don't trust people I do not know to act against self interest.
I do not think you trust them so much either.
Consider NUCENG. He had consistently gotten numbers wrong in his favour. Can I trust him to do the math? No I can't. Can i trust 100 or 1000 people like him? No I can't, because the error is systematic rather than random, it won't average out to zero.
Do I think he just sits, and thinks consciously, machiavelli style, "how can i mix up the numbers in my favour" - no, of course not! He may even honestly think he's trying to get numbers right.

Now he had been trying to portray me as paranoid, equating awareness of that sort of bias - and it's consequences - to some deep distrust and fear of everyone. Where did I ever admit fear of everyone? Distrust of everyone? Well i guess so, do you trust random person on the street to return the money they borrow? I don't, and probably you neither, but watch out, I am going to be quoted on this to show how I'm paranoid and delusional and full of distrust and fear.

I may not see what is the 'right thing' or my idea of right thing may be incorrect. There is such thing as bias. For example, before this entire fukushima thing, I was rather pro nuclear, considering that most of energy in my house was supplied by nuclear for a while. That was bias and ignorance of the problems. Spent fuel pools on the top floor, etc, etc.
The plant here was better than most, I still think so, spent fuel not on top floor, gradual in-operation refuelling so no rush to refuel as fast as possible, no complete fresh core in spent fuel pool, etc. I was ignorant of situation at foreign plants though.

Yes, consider NUCENG. That sorry excuse for a blithering idiot made one calculation error and didn't do a sufficient look to find the maximum historical tsunami. Off with his head.

Out of 200+ posts that clearly fits the bill as "consistently gets the numbers wrong. You wouldn't be distorting the truth to make your point would you? Would a neutral observer come to the conclusion that accidentally or deliberately you may have distorted quite a few things on this forum?

RBMK design weaknesses were self-revealing at Chernobyl. They were compounded by human error. As sad as that was, I am glad for your sake that event did not happen at Ignalina.

 

[Dmytry]

In those 200 posts there wasn't a lot of doing numbers with outcome relevant to the issue, unfortunately... need a larger sample size yes.
It's typical really. The one in 700 000 years probability of beyond the design seismic event uncovering the SFP, well that was someone else.

 

[NUCENG]

In those 200 posts there wasn't a lot of doing numbers with outcome relevant to the issue, unfortunately... need a larger sample size yes.
It's typical really. The one in 700 000 years probability of beyond the design seismic event uncovering the SFP, well that was someone else.

After all that, not one suggestion of what can be done better. The only thing you have left is two numbers? Okay, apparently my point is carried that you shouldn't try to indict the entire nuclear industry for the sins of TEPCO and the Japanese government in this aciident.

Now we can get back to the specifics of Management and Government performance in this event. I will post again later today with what I have found about that.

 

[Dmytry]

I think it is entirely unfair to put it all on TEPCO and Japanese. There is just as much criminal negligence in this NRC report as in any data I've seen from TEPCO so far. The report ignores cascading failures, source data uncertainty, human factor... things that you cannot ignore when doing cost benefit analysis. Just as you can't ignore tsunami risk when you're on Japan coast. The only difference is that with tsunami, the negligence is more likely to come in the open (or they were simply unlucky).
I think I understand why you're so keen on calling those who disagree with you paranoid/delusional. Figures like "one in 700 000 years" (nevermind the one in 13 millions years and one in 45 millions years) are entirely incompatible with even the slightest mistrust. Or a slightest trace of humility; to believe in such figure you have to assume very low probability that something important was missed.

 

[NUCENG]

I think it is entirely unfair to put it all on TEPCO and Japanese. There is just as much criminal negligence in this NRC report as in any data I've seen from TEPCO so far. The report ignores cascading failures, source data uncertainty, human factor... things that you cannot ignore when doing cost benefit analysis. Just as you can't ignore tsunami risk when you're on Japan coast. The only difference is that with tsunami, the negligence is more likely to come in the open (or they were simply unlucky).
I think I understand why you're so keen on calling those who disagree with you paranoid/delusional. Figures like "one in 700 000 years" (nevermind the one in 13 millions years and one in 45 millions years) are entirely incompatible with even the slightest mistrust. Or a slightest trace of humility; to believe in such figure you have to assume very low probability that something important was missed.

First, I am not clairvoyant, to which report do you refer? If it is about the anlysis that closed out the Generic Safety Issue, the national labs performed their probabilistic risk assessments for two specific US plants: I believe they were Vermont Yankee and Millstone. They did not perform that calculation for Fukushima. Just give me a few hours to finish my post which is directly on point on PRA and for Fukushima and the Japanese government. I will provide references you may find very enlightening. I need to finish reading so I don't distort what I have found. You may actually find yourself in agreement with me. What would that be, twice? You seemed stunned that you agreed with my top 5 causes.

edit: It was the H.B. Robinson plant not Millstone.

 

[Dmytry]

I'm referring to "Resolution of Generic Safety Issues: Issue 82: Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools (Rev. 3) ( NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1–33 ) "
which is an example of gross negligence and incompetent risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis of the potential solutions, on par with Japanese negligence. As result of this incompetent analysis, no new requirements were established for US plants.

I'm not saying that this NRC report is directly responsible for Fukushima. I'm only saying that Japanese de-facto situation in the cost benefit analysis does not seem to differ substantially from that of US. Indeed, the geography differs greatly.
For example (just an example to illustrate the point), when you understate 1/1000 years risk as 1/1000 000 years, you can get away with it for a while, whereas if you understate 1/100 years risk as 1/100 000 years, you won't get away with it for very long. In a geography with 1/100 years events, thus, the negligence is more likely to result in actual loss.

 

[NUCENG]

Japan is a member of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety which was a treaty formed after the Chernobyl accident to address issues of nuclear safety with international cooperation. Members submit periodic safety assessments and report to the international body. They also respond to questions from other members.

Japan’s latest annual report dated last September:
http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/oshirase/2010/files/220831-2-2.pdf

Japan’s answers to questions in 2002 have apparently been deleted from the IAEA website but I found them on NISA: http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/internationalcooperation/conventions/cns/pdf/2ndAnswers.pdf

Here are some highlights I found in the questions:

Question 2. Prior to the Tokaimura criticality accident there were apparently no unannounced inspections at Japanese nuclear facilities.

Question 5, 6, 7, 22 etc.
NISA allows licensees to self-inspect based on operating experience at other plants and appear to have no idea whether there are any needs for followup by regulators.(Question 8 No international inspections in three years

Question 14 No response for discussion of experience since passage of the Allegations Law (3 years). I believe Mr. Sugaoka was making his allegations against TEPCO and GE during this timeframe. Perhaps NISA was not involved yet?

Question 37, 38 Answer seems to be that only one licensed operator is required for each crew and that there are only 418 licensed operators at 52 units. That seems extremely low to me based on the usual crew in the US of 2 Senior Reactor Operators, two licensed reactor operators, an Auxiliary operator and a Shift Technical Advisor.

Question 41 on resident inspectors “There is no problem in independence”

Question 47. You read it and see if it squares with the decision-making on venting Containments at Fukushima.

Question 53, 55 No measurement system for Safety Consciousness as of 2002. In the second question They said basically that the licensees declared they were committed to safety and “issued a press release.”

Question 60 No management or organizational problems escist because there have been no INES Level 1 or greater events in this reporting period. Tokaimura, Hanaoka, TEPCO coverups apparently didn’t have any management or organizational causes.

Question 63, 64, 75, 106 PSA/PRA and Root Cause areprobably not up to standards used in the US. It seems they are just starting PSA and the answer on 64 doesn’t say anything about human error investigation in response to the question.

Question 74, 102 There are no periodic reassessments of earthquake levels assumed in the design basis unless a new plant is built.

Question 91 EPZ planning. Obviously they are going to have to look at this again.

Question 110 “The mitigation measures for those events that could lead to large release in late phase at severe accident also implemented with hardened vent system for BWR containment vessel and alternate water injection.”

Question 112 in light of the Sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway how about Terrorism at NPPs. “We still understand that terrorist attacks are few in Japan and that Japan is a rather stable country. As for the terrorist attacks on 9/11, NISA does not re-evaluate current designs of our nuclear power plants”

There are many different regulatory and advisory boards, committees, ministries, and organizations. The questioners repeatedly asked who was the final decision maker or had the responsibility for nuclear safety. See if you can find an answer that stays the same from one question to the next? NISA METI MEXT AEC NSC NUPEC Advisory Committee on Natural Resources, the Diet, The Prime Minister etc., I've probably missed one or two... or twenty.

There is a lot more to be read and researched in that short 36 page document. I am sure this is just the tip of the iceberg of facts out there. If you want evidence of the hands off approach of regulators it is there. When I started this thread I wanted first to get people off the knee jerk condemnation of the entire nuclear industry based on the event at Fukushima. Unlike some of you, my gut reaction is not so astute so I look for evidence before I start shooting the scientist who brings me unwelcome news. (Sorry Dmytry, couldn't resist!)

This is specific information for this topic which is Fukushima Management and Japanese Regulatory Performance. The lack of periodic reviews of earthquake or tsunami studies since Fukushima was first licensed is explained. It isn't required in Japan.

This topic can be diverted to specific issues like BORAL or PRA or other technical issues or my math skills or we can talk about the topic. Inaccurate or misstated information, decision making delays which may have made the accident worse, a regulatory environment which is ineffective. If we concentrate on specific decisions, or rules, or responses for which we have evidence this can be a useful thread. If we want to rant about self deception, or managerial greed that should probably be in a different forum completely.

 

[NUCENG]

I'm referring to "Resolution of Generic Safety Issues: Issue 82: Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools (Rev. 3) ( NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1–33 ) "
which is an example of gross negligence and incompetent risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis of the potential solutions, on par with Japanese negligence. As result of this incompetent analysis, no new requirements were established for US plants.

I'm not saying that this NRC report is directly responsible for Fukushima. I'm only saying that Japanese de-facto situation in the cost benefit analysis does not seem to differ substantially from that of US. Indeed, the geography differs greatly.
For example (just an example to illustrate the point), when you understate 1/1000 years risk as 1/1000 000 years, you can get away with it for a while, whereas if you understate 1/100 years risk as 1/100 000 years, you won't get away with it for very long. In a geography with 1/100 years events, thus, the negligence is more likely to result in actual loss.

I haven't been able to obtain the reports that came up with those numbers. (Trying not to spend $31.00 for information which should be public domain since it was paid for by US tax dollars.) But I can probably explain the biggest difference between those numbers an Fukushima. In the US we are required to justify our design bases in every team inspection we receive which is several times a year, based on current performance. Problem plants get lots more attention, but everybody gets some. I have seen inspectors ask about the maximum flooding events, and maximum tornado wind speeds and hundreds of other numbers before looking at how we design for those events. Apparently that doesn't happen in Japan. As a result the 1:1000 year tsunami led to a 1:1 event of loss of all AC power and Loss of All decay heat and a severe accident. Just because in nearly 40 years nobody has questioned how big the tsunami wall should have been.

At Robinson and VY the 1:1000 year initiating event may not be able to cause loss of both trains of every decay heat removal event. We just experienced major storms at the US Browns Ferry and Surry plants with no problems. But I can guarantee that both of those plants are watching what is being learned in Japan so they can be sure it doesn't happen here.

 

[Dmytry]

I haven't been able to obtain the reports that came up with those numbers. (Trying not to spend $31.00 for information which should be public domain since it was paid for by US tax dollars.)

Well, the report I had linked includes risk calculation, and it totally neglects cascading failures, as well as the possible scenarios are very incomplete. I don't think you need to buy anything to conclude that the report is utter BS. Even if you take on faith the input data, the stuff contained in the report is BS enough by itself.
Then on basis of the calculated risk - which is an obvious gross under estimate - cost-benefit calculation is done and it is decided not to implement any measures for pool safety. That on my view is gross negligence. That is how Japanese did not make adequate tsunami protection at Fukushima (or arguably, had no tsunami protection at all).

But I can probably explain the biggest difference between those numbers an Fukushima. In the US we are required to justify our design bases in every team inspection we receive which is several times a year, based on current performance. Problem plants get lots more attention, but everybody gets some. I have seen inspectors ask about the maximum flooding events, and maximum tornado wind speeds and hundreds of other numbers before looking at how we design for those events. Apparently that doesn't happen in Japan. As a result the 1:1000 year tsunami led to a 1:1 event of loss of all AC power and Loss of All decay heat and a severe accident. Just because in nearly 40 years nobody has questioned how big the tsunami wall should have been.

At Robinson and VY the 1:1000 year initiating event may not be able to cause loss of both trains of every decay heat removal event. We just experienced major storms at the US Browns Ferry and Surry plants with no problems. But I can guarantee that both of those plants are watching what is being learned in Japan so they can be sure it doesn't happen here.

How's about also fixing up NRC somehow so that they won't be 'resolving' things like in that report I linked? It is really not safe to just assign 1/ hundreds thousands or millions years probability to anything that did not happen yet, just to avoid implementing any counter measures in advance to it happening. Someday something will happen to you guys first.

 

[AntonL]

In this thread we discussed a lot regarding the apparent lack of tsunami protection.

Is it a coincidence that the 5.6 metres design Tsunami height corresponds to the minimum of 5.5 metre storm surge that can be expected by a category 5 hurricane? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saffir–Simpson_Hurricane_Scale

Now Tepco is contemplating to sandbag Fukushima for added tsunami protection

 

[Astronuc]

The Japanese government is scrutinizing the close relationship between the regulator and the utility industry.

AP IMPACT: Ties bind Japan nuke sector, regulators
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110501/ap_on_re_as/as_japan_earthquake_revolving_door

 

[AntonL]

The Japanese government is scrutinizing the close relationship between the regulator and the utility industry.

AP IMPACT: Ties bind Japan nuke sector, regulators
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110501/ap_on_re_as/as_japan_earthquake_revolving_door

in continuation

http://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?g=eco&k=2011050300393"
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/archive/news/2011/05/03/20110503p2g00m0dm023000c.html"

 

[NUCENG]

The Japanese government is scrutinizing the close relationship between the regulator and the utility industry.

AP IMPACT: Ties bind Japan nuke sector, regulators
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110501/ap_on_re_as/as_japan_earthquake_revolving_door

in continuation

http://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?g=eco&k=2011050300393"
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/national/archive/news/2011/05/03/20110503p2g00m0dm023000c.html"

This is a fact. Is 68 (in 50 years) a big number compared to the number of industry executives? There are also likely to be promotions from industry into government ministries. In theory that could be a good way to promote information transfer and understanding of the industry impacts of regulation and vice versa. In practice it may be a bribe or reward for regulatory misconduct or malfeasance while in office.

There is also likely to be cross-seeding from academia and nuclear vendors (Hitachi, Mitsubishi, etc.) to management and to the regulatory agencies. Japan doesn't have a nuclear navy. When you are trying to hire someone with nuclear experience where else do you go? When does cooperation become criminal?

What we need to look at is decision making or design weaknesses that were overlooked or ignored. Was this due to collusion or lack of oversight. Were TEPCO managers aware of the vulnerability to tsunami. Did the regulators know?

 

[NUCENG]

Found this about evaluation of tsunami and earthquake at Fukushima:

http://msquair.wordpress.com/2011/04/28/common-cause-at-daiichi-fukushima/

 

[NUCENG]

Double posted here ands on the main thread.

According to the World Nuclear Association TEPCO had upgraded seismic design basis earthquake to 600 Gal in 2008. This means they may not have exceeded the design basis earthquake for safe shutdown. The March 11, 2011 earthquake PGA was 507 Gal. Previous information was that the Fukushima design basis was 449 Gal.

The WNA article
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf18.html
was updated 4/23/2011.

 

[NUCENG]

Well, the report I had linked includes risk calculation, and it totally neglects cascading failures, as well as the possible scenarios are very incomplete. I don't think you need to buy anything to conclude that the report is utter BS. Even if you take on faith the input data, the stuff contained in the report is BS enough by itself.
Then on basis of the calculated risk - which is an obvious gross under estimate - cost-benefit calculation is done and it is decided not to implement any measures for pool safety. That on my view is gross negligence. That is how Japanese did not make adequate tsunami protection at Fukushima (or arguably, had no tsunami protection at all).


How's about also fixing up NRC somehow so that they won't be 'resolving' things like in that report I linked? It is really not safe to just assign 1/ hundreds thousands or millions years probability to anything that did not happen yet, just to avoid implementing any counter measures in advance to it happening. Someday something will happen to you guys first.

Here is what I've learned. The data and results are based on information from the US Geological Survey (Not NRC). This is the source recognized by architects and insurance companies as the source for design to seismic risk. For Fukushima the data showed a 10% probability of exceedence of an earthquake with Peak Ground Acceleration of 0.32g (313 Gal) over a period of 50 years. That is equivalent to a 0.002 per year probability of an earthquake greater than 313 Gal. Depending on the source the Fukushima design basis for a safe shutdown earthquake was either 449 Gal or 600 Ga.l

Also using the USGS, the Vermont Yankee plant has a 2% probability of exceedance over 50 years for an earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of .06g or 59 Gal. This is equivalent to a 4E-4 per year probability of an earthquake with PGA of 59 Gal. In the US there are two design basis earthquakes. The Operating Basis Earthquake is the maximum earthquake at which the plant is expected to continue normal operation. At VY that is 0.07g or 69 Gal. The second is called the Safe Shutdown Earthquake and is the design for which the buildings and safety systems must remain operable for the plant to reach and maintain cold shutdown. At VY this is a 0.14g earthquake or 137 Gal earthquake.

In short, the Fukushima plants were 5 times more likely to experience an earthquake 5 times worse than VY. The DBE for Fukushima is either 18% over the 2011 earthquake or 12% non-conservative to that earthquake. The 2011 earthquake was 61% larger than the predicted 50 year eathquake with a 10% probability of exceedance. At VY the SSE is 2.3 times greater than the predicted 50 year eathquake with a 2% probability of exceedance.

Fukushima had neglected consideration of tsunamis during recent seismic reviews (see other post). Vy is located near the borders of Massachusettsm Vermont and New Hampshire well away from the sea and hos no probability for effect by tsunami.

The mistake at Fukushima resulted in common mode or single point of failure for both trains of onsite AC. Once batteries failed the progression to core damage had a probability of 1. We don't have details of any PSA resuilts from Fukushima. In fact I am not certain they have performed a PSA for external events yet. But what you have is a scenario where the earthquake and resulting tsunami had a probability on the order of 1 in 500 years and that initiator led directly to core damage.

At VY, we have no similar vulnerability to tsunami damage. A detailed PRA has been performed for seismic and other external events. In the absence of a common mode failure the progression to core damage will require multiple independent failures of safety systems. Thus the probabilities on the order of 1E-6 are not unreasonable considering that the seismic initiator is starting off at 4E-4 per year.

 

[NUCENG]

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1379_web.pdf

EVALUATION OF SEISMIC SAFETY FOR EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Allows for deterministic or probabilistic analysis to identify the design basis seismic risk.


http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1170_web.pdf

FLOOD HAZARD FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ON COASTAL AND RIVER SITES

Section 11 discusses identification of tsunami for design basis
Section 14 discusses changes to flooding hazards that may occur over time.
Section 15 discusses the need to monitor and adapt to changes from construction until decommissioning.

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1159_web.pdf

EXTERNAL EVENTS EXCLUDING EARTHQUAKES IN THE DESIGN OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Section 10 discusses barriers and protective measures credited for defense against flooding including tsunamis.

http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/oshirase/2010/files/220831-2-2.pdf
Convention on Nuclear Safety
National Report of Japan for the Fifth Review Meeting
In Japan, seismic safety of nuclear installations has been re-evaluated since 2006 in accordance with the revision of the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities, and in some nuclear installations, voluntary seismic reinforcing work has been carried out in light of the revision of the Regulatory Guide.

Conclusions:
Based on the above NISA initiated reevaluations of seismic risk in 2006. TEPCO apparently increased their design basis earthquake to 600 Gal in 2008 (See Post #126). During this reevaluation concerns raised about tsunami were not pursued (See Post #125). As a result it now appears that the event of March 11 was within the seismic design basis for Fukushima Daiichi, but the ensuing tsunami had not been properly considered or protected.

 

[Drakkith]

At VY, we have no similar vulnerability to tsunami damage. A detailed PRA has been performed for seismic and other external events. In the absence of a common mode failure the progression to core damage will require multiple independent failures of safety systems.

This is saying that the failure in japan was due to a single system failure and that the power plants in VY don't have the possibility of a single failure causing core damage?

 

[NUCENG]

This is saying that the failure in japan was due to a single system failure and that the power plants in VY don't have the possibility of a single failure causing core damage?

Good question. VY doesn't have a vulnerability to tsunami that could cause a single point of failure, but they should be looking for other vulnerabilities and lessons-learned about protection of safety systems from flooding. I think a systematic review of siting analysis is a prudent step for every nuclear plant and facility in the world.

PRA is a systematic method for doing such a review. For all of its purported weaknesses it may be the best tool available. From what I am finding NISA came late to the PRA party, but was starting to get it in place. TEPCO was at least working on seismic upgrades. But neither of them was addressing geological evidence of at least two previous tsunamis since 500 BC at Fukushima that exceeded the design basis for the plants.

There were multiple system failures from a common mode or single point of failure. The tsunami was the immediate cause. The mechanism was external flooding. The systems included offsite power (initially lost in the earthquake, but may have been rendered unrepairable by flooding of the switchyard. The next system was the onsite AC Diesel Generators. The fuel system, the physical generators, and cooling systems were all damaged by the lack of flooding protection. The final system was the essential switchgear for safety related pumps and systems. The switchgear was also located in the turbine building. This prevented rapid replacement of power from portable generators.

The immediate cause was the tsunami But then you need to use the techinque called a "Why Ladder" to determine if it is really the root cause. Why was the tsunami able to cause the loss of multiple safety systems? Each time you answer the question you again ask why until the answer doesn.t change. That is the root cause.

When you see reports of scientists being ignored about the tsunami risk and you see both TEPCO and regulators who had opportunities to take action on tsunami protection or protection of safety systems from flooding, the root cause has to be Human Error. The shutdown order from the prime minister to Hamaoka seems to indicate that at least the Japanese government is starting to realize that fact. The quote from a TEPCO executive that they could only act on records since the late 1800s just cost his company several trillions of yen.

This will come down to a long list of failures of oversight, of safety conscious work environment, of problem identification and corrective action, and other organizational and human errors. I doubt that we will ever see enough information in press reports and newsn articles to go deeper than the first rung on this "Why Ladder" There will be a lot of external "help" from academic research and psychiatrists and engineers and politicians and crackpots and conspiracy fans, but it is unlikely this will ever come down to a simple and single point of failure.

 

[Dmytry]

Good question. VY doesn't have a vulnerability to tsunami that could cause a single point of failure, but they should be looking for other vulnerabilities and lessons-learned about protection of safety systems from flooding. I think a systematic review of siting analysis is a prudent step for every nuclear plant and facility in the world.

PRA is a systematic method for doing such a review. For all of its purported weaknesses it may be the best tool available. From what I am finding NISA came late to the PRA party, but was starting to get it in place. TEPCO was at least working on seismic upgrades. But neither of them was addressing geological evidence of at least two previous tsunamis since 500 BC at Fukushima that exceeded the design basis for the plants.

There were multiple system failures from a common mode or single point of failure. The tsunami was the immediate cause. The mechanism was external flooding. The systems included offsite power (initially lost in the earthquake, but may have been rendered unrepairable by flooding of the switchyard. The next system was the onsite AC Diesel Generators. The fuel system, the physical generators, and cooling systems were all damaged by the lack of flooding protection. The final system was the essential switchgear for safety related pumps and systems. The switchgear was also located in the turbine building. This prevented rapid replacement of power from portable generators.

The immediate cause was the tsunami But then you need to use the techinque called a "Why Ladder" to determine if it is really the root cause. Why was the tsunami able to cause the loss of multiple safety systems?

When you see reports of scientists being ignored about the tsunami risk and you see both TEPCO and regulators who had opportunities to take action on tsunami protection or protection of safety systems from flooding, the root cause has to be Human Error. The shutdown order from the prime minister to Hamaoka seems to indicate that at least the Japanese government is starting to realize that fact. The quote from a TEPCO executive that they could only act on records since the late 1800s just cost his company several trillions of yen.

Agreed that it was a 'human error'.
The problem is that probability of human error is much higher than one in 700 000 years, and as such should not be neglected in the design decisions (such as spent fuel pool safety). To ignore possibility of human error is a case of human error in itself.

The problem with NRC report is that it assumes one in 700 000 years probability based on several 'judgements' multiplied together; if you assume even a rather conservative probability of making a mistake in those judgements, you obtain far more humble figure than one in 700 000 years. The NRC report also covers cask drop accident and turbine missile, don't forget that it is not only about quakes.
That is per se not a problem if the number is just an abstract number, the problem is when such un-realistic risk assessment is used as a basis for a real decision to do nothing about spent fuel pool safety.
Humans are fallible creatures, and the plant does not build and run itself. Organizations of humans too are quite fallible; 100 people don't have the single person's probability of error¹⁰⁰.

Ultimately just about every nuclear plant failure in history is a human error, and it makes no sense what so ever to ignore it in the plant design. It's as if you built cars without airbags, after doing analysis of accidents without accounting for driver errors and finding the airbag non-cost-effective, even though it is cost effective in presence of imperfect driving.

 

[NUCENG]

Agreed that it was a 'human error'.
The problem is that probability of human error is much higher than one in 700 000 years, and as such should not be neglected in the design decisions (such as spent fuel pool safety). To ignore possibility of human error is a case of human error in itself.

The problem with NRC report is that it assumes one in 700 000 years probability based on several 'judgements' multiplied together; if you assume even a rather conservative probability of making a mistake in those judgements, you obtain far more humble figure than one in 700 000 years. The NRC report also covers cask drop accident and turbine missile, don't forget that it is not only about quakes.
That is per se not a problem if the number is just an abstract number, the problem is when such un-realistic risk assessment is used as a basis for a real decision to do nothing about spent fuel pool safety.
Humans are fallible creatures, and the plant does not build and run itself. Organizations of humans too are quite fallible; 100 people don't have the single person's probability of error¹⁰⁰.

Ultimately just about every nuclear plant failure in history is a human error, and it makes no sense what so ever to ignore it in the plant design. It's as if you built cars without airbags, after doing analysis of accidents without accounting for driver errors and finding the airbag non-cost-effective, even though it is cost effective in presence of imperfect driving.

I like your airbag analogy. Cars were built for years without seatbelts, safety glass, airbags, energy absorbing chassis, emissions controls or other safety features. We have learned and implemented changes that have improved safety even though it increased costs. And in spite of that improvement in safety, people die every day from car accidents. The free choice to get in an automobile despite the risk means people see a benefit that outweighs the risk. Activists like Ralph Nader have watched the industry and publicized the failures. As a result safety has improved. Mileage is improving. Alternative power sources are being tried. Emissions are down. Notice that they didn't go back to the horse and buggy. (Ever wonder what the health effects from the manure in the streets and flies and stench was like in those "good old days?")


As I stated in an earlier post the probability of a design basis earthquake at the at VY plant is 1:2500 years. At Fukushima it was about 1:500 years and a much more intense quake. You haven't responded to my discussion of why the single point failure at Fukushima led to a 1:1 probability that a design basis earthquake and tsunami lead directly to core failure. You haven't explained why the same applies to a plant that has no tsunami risk.

I've explained that NRC didn't come up with the numbers for seismic risk, it was US Geological Survey - you know, the same source used by insurance companies.

You are categorically wrong that PRA doesn't include possible human errors. Accident sequences identify critical human actions and include estimates of misoperation, failure to perform, and so on. Human Factors upgrades to control room layouts, mimics and design was one of the biggest post-TMI changes. This type of design error where a plant hasn't accounted for a tsunami is not included in PRA. What is the right number for that kind of human error? Now, what activity in human life is immune to that kind of error. These are the kinds of errors that you fix when you find them, try to prevent recurrence, and move on.

You are trying to imply that a 1:700,000 year probability at VY or HB Robinson is wrong, because Fukushima didn't even review tsunamis earlier than the late 1800s. Can't you see how unrelated those two things are?

Further you seem to be ignoring photographic evidence of only limited damage to the SFP4. Remember the report you are so critical of deals with damage to spent fuel pools.

A lot of people on this forum have spent time and effort to answer your objections. You have dismissed us as liars, self-deceivers, stupid, propagandists and a few other choice charges. What should be done differently? How is it possible to make things better? if you can't be part of a solution you are just noise and distraction. Lead, follow, or get the "h-e- double toothpicks" out of the way.

 

[Susudake]

Nuceng,

I've now read most of your posts, though I had to gloss over sizable parts of your extended pissing match with Dmytry. You're obviously a smart guy but also obviously someone who needs to be large-and-in-charge, and you seem to be marshaling your intellect and knowledge as much to achieving that end as to discovering (un-covering) the truths about this situation we should all be focusing on finding.

But that wasn't the point of this post. It was that however many different analogies linking nuclear safety to that of cars, bridges, coffee-makers, space shuttles, what have you, there's one absolutely gargantuan difference that should be as obvious as the mole on the face of the "mole" in that Austin Power's movie:

One word: radiation. You'd think it'd be obvious, but it seems the more of an insider to the nuclear power industry one is, the more one has forgotten this simple fact.

A quick side-step, I see this in Drakkith's tag line:

"It's not about what's possible, it's about what's probable."

Thats just dangerously false when it comes to nuke power; and to preempt piling on, I'm not making any determinations about Drakkith's metier or sympathies, but I have seen the same quantification of risk from him as from you.

I earlier saw an analogy of "if someone's holding a gun to your child's head," etc., an attempt to make the point that no risk re nukes is acceptable, but such mushy analogies leave room for counter-arguments. In fact there are no apt analogies, no apt comparisons about risks from other sources.

You (i mean the impersonal you) can argue all day about the deaths caused by coal, etc, and use that to promote nuke energy. But in the end, dangers from coal dust, CO2, dams for hydro, what have you, are simply not of the magnitude of those from radiation, that's just obvious to anyone who's not lying to others or, worse, to themselves.

Why don't you put this superior (I mean that without sarcasm) intellect of yours towards helping find a solution to this colossal problem rather than beating down everyone who doesn't share your faith in nukes and the nuclear energy/weapons complex? Better yet, consider something--we got ourselves into these many messes, or rather some of us have, by favoring intellect over compassion, the head over the heart--maybe it's time to redress that imbalance.

I encourage you to go to Japan and, as i did until I left a few days ago (thanks mostly to info gleaned from this forum, thanks to all for that! And btw both the airport and airplane were nearly empty), walk down the streets of a city when you know there's fallout in the air, and wonder if you inhaled or ingested any I131 that day. Look at the innocent little kids around you and consider whether they have done the same that day, or will tomorrow, or whether they will grow up and live and then die too young, and possibly horribly, in a poisoned city or country, or give birth to a monstrously deformed baby.

Then do something else--go to one of the "poor" countries in the world. See people with hardly any possessions--without computers, ipods, iphones, mobile phones, cars, A/C, etc etc etc. And see that they still have self-respect, that they smile, and love, and play, and actually enjoy life despite their hardships. Hey, just like my great-grandparents did on their midwestern farms!

Maybe then you'll rethink whether the unimaginable risks with nuclear energy--risks that, again, are not just quantitatively, but qualitatively different from those associated with any other electric-power-producing technology--are worth it so that people can enjoy convenience and comfort--and lots of questionable mass-produced "entertainment." (As a linguist I also recommend looking forensically as these neologisms like "entertainment." Just don't look to hard if you're reluctant to see such concepts dissolve into meaninglessness before your very eyes).

Last, no matter how many facts and figures you put out there, they won't cover up these incontrovertible truths:

Radiation is the most poisonous thing on the planet, but more importantly poisonous in a way that is many orders of magnitude worse than others (i.e. the amount of genetic mutations it can cause).

No nuclear power plant can be designed to be 100% safe--no anything can be.

There are no long-term solutions yet for storage, and no one can guarantee that any storage site thus selected or under construction (like in Finland) will be 100% secure for 100,000 years. This is the elephant in the room that nuke power supporters seem mostly unwilling to acknowledge.

The risk of potentially poisoning half of the planet means the c factor in hazard x consequences=risk is as close to infinity as you can get on this earth. And even to a purely science-minded person that should make the equation clear: the only safe planet is a nuclear-free one.

I expect you'll pull my argument apart and look forward to that as it will help me hone it (this post was just written in one passionate 10-minute jag so I'm sure it's about as air-tight as any of those reactors are). Give it your best shot, please.

 

[NUCENG]

...

I've now read most of your posts, though I had to gloss over sizable parts of your extended pissing match with Dmytry. You're obviously a smart guy but also obviously someone who needs to be large-and-in-charge, and you seem to be marshaling your intellect and knowledge as much to achieving that end as to discovering (un-covering) the truths about this situation we should all be focusing on finding.

I came to PF because I was impressed that most posters were working with documents and math and logic. I thought I could add information based on the years I have worked in nuclear power, especially in BWR3s and BWR4s with Mk1 containments. I started this thread because the mentors were trying to keep management and regulatory issues off the technical main thread. But instead of addressing Fukushima management and Regulatory performance much of this thread has been diverted to all out attacks on nuclear everywhere. I am really beginning to doubt how smart a guy I am because I keep responding to people who think I’m “lying to others or, worse, to themselves.”

Would a smart person really debate with someone who wrote:

“Last, no matter how many facts and figures you put out there, they won't cover up these incontrovertible truths:

Radiation is the most poisonous thing on the planet, but more importantly poisonous in a way that is many orders of magnitude worse than others (i.e. the amount of genetic mutations it can cause).

No nuclear power plant can be designed to be 100% safe--no anything can be.

There are no long-term solutions yet for storage, and no one can guarantee that any storage site thus selected or under construction (like in Finland) will be 100% secure for 100,000 years. This is the elephant in the room that nuke power supporters seem mostly unwilling to acknowledge.

The risk of potentially poisoning half of the planet means the c factor in hazard x consequences=risk is as close to infinity as you can get on this earth. And even to a purely science-minded person that should make the equation clear: the only safe planet is a nuclear-free one.”

But that wasn't the point of this post. It was that however many different analogies linking nuclear safety to that of cars, bridges, coffee-makers, space shuttles, what have you, there's one absolutely gargantuan difference that should be as obvious as the mole on the face of the "mole" in that Austin Power's movie:

One word: radiation. You'd think it'd be obvious, but it seems the more of an insider to the nuclear power industry one is, the more one has forgotten this simple fact.

A quick side-step, I see this in Drakkith's tag line:

"It's not about what's possible, it's about what's probable."

Thats just dangerously false when it comes to nuke power; and to preempt piling on, I'm not making any determinations about Drakkith's metier or sympathies, but I have seen the same quantification of risk from him as from you.

I earlier saw an analogy of "if someone's holding a gun to your child's head," etc., an attempt to make the point that no risk re nukes is acceptable, but such mushy analogies leave room for counter-arguments. In fact there are no apt analogies, no apt comparisons about risks from other sources.

One word: radiation. And if the world were nuclear power and nuclear weapons free it would still be one word: radiation. Radiation in the soil, rocks, air and water. Radiation in you and everyone you meet. I’m sure you also intend to get rid of radiation therapy, xrays, CAT scans and the like.

You (i mean the impersonal you) can argue all day about the deaths caused by coal, etc, and use that to promote nuke energy. But in the end, dangers from coal dust, CO2, dams for hydro, what have you, are simply not of the magnitude of those from radiation, that's just obvious to anyone who's not lying to others or, worse, to themselves.

Why don't you put this superior (I mean that without sarcasm) intellect of yours towards helping find a solution to this colossal problem rather than beating down everyone who doesn't share your faith in nukes and the nuclear energy/weapons complex? Better yet, consider something--we got ourselves into these many messes, or rather some of us have, by favoring intellect over compassion, the head over the heart--maybe it's time to redress that imbalance.

I encourage you to go to Japan and, as i did until I left a few days ago (thanks mostly to info gleaned from this forum, thanks to all for that! And btw both the airport and airplane were nearly empty), walk down the streets of a city when you know there's fallout in the air, and wonder if you inhaled or ingested any I131 that day. Look at the innocent little kids around you and consider whether they have done the same that day, or will tomorrow, or whether they will grow up and live and then die too young, and possibly horribly, in a poisoned city or country, or give birth to a monstrously deformed baby.

Then do something else--go to one of the "poor" countries in the world. See people with hardly any possessions--without computers, ipods, iphones, mobile phones, cars, A/C, etc etc etc. And see that they still have self-respect, that they smile, and love, and play, and actually enjoy life despite their hardships. Hey, just like my great-grandparents did on their midwestern farms!

Maybe then you'll rethink whether the unimaginable risks with nuclear energy--risks that, again, are not just quantitatively, but qualitatively different from those associated with any other electric-power-producing technology--are worth it so that people can enjoy convenience and comfort--and lots of questionable mass-produced "entertainment." (As a linguist I also recommend looking forensically as these neologisms like "entertainment." Just don't look to hard if you're reluctant to see such concepts dissolve into meaninglessness before your very eyes).

I expect you'll pull my argument apart and look forward to that as it will help me hone it (this post was just written in one passionate 10-minute jag so I'm sure it's about as air-tight as any of those reactors are). Give it your best shot, please.

You presume a lot in the previous paragraphs. I have seen first hand one thing that is much worse than even your fears of radiation – war.

I lived in Japan for three years. I love their culture and rich history. I have been criticized here because I keep pointing out that thousands of Japanese men, women, and children died in the earthquake and tsunami. While there I went through a magnitude 7.5 earthquake that did a lot of damage, but luckily did not kill anyone. I have also piled sandbags during floods and helped cleanup after tornados. I have not been to a lot of the “poor” countries, but have seen pictures of a village gathered around a battery powered TV learning about the outside world. I have seen that cell phones and laptops can cross the highest walls and help people seek their human rights.

I believe through my work that I have helped make nuclear power safer. I only ask you to do two things, First, hold Dmytry and yourself to the same standards you apply to me. Don’t let him get away with sarcasm. Second, can we try to stay on topic? As to my sarcasm, and wanting to be “large and in charge,” you have already found me guilty as charged. I’m also stubborn, so I’ll keep leading you to the facts and figures like a horse to water. It is up to you whether you die of thirst. Oops, was that an analogy or a simile? Oops, was that sarcasm? That much you may have right!

 

[rowmag]

Maybe someone would be so kind as to translate this:
http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/01kiban08_01000023.html
Google does an OK job, but I'd like to hear what others think.

It wouldn't take much to move "unauthorized release of nuclear blueprints" into the "illegal" category IMO, and receiving cooperation from other nations in an effort to eradicate said illegal information is probably a good bet. See the current CEO of General Electric, for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_R._Immelt

I don't have time to translate, but it is a "request" (similar to the Hamaoka closure -- i.e., in principle not compulsory) to some Japanese media and telecommunications organizations to self-police wild rumors on their networks. It comes with the caveat that the right to free expression should be respected -- which really makes it meaningless, as far as I can see, and anyone who didn't want to agree to delete "secret military experiments caused the tsunami" or "space aliens blew up Unit 4" rumor-mongers from their networks could not be compelled to do so, as far as I can see.

And this would certainly have no force outside Japan.

But again, not an expert of any kind.

 

[Dmytry]

...

For nth time in the row. I am discussing the study itself. This study:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0933/sec3/082r3.html
Which is much broader in scope than just the seismic accidents or just the vermont-yankee plant.
Quoting the study:

We will assume, based purely on judgment, that the conditional failure probability for this method of makeup is on the order of 5%.
...
(conditional failure probability of 1%, based purely on judgment)
...
In addition, the pool could be drained by a cask drop accident (2.5 x 10-7/RY, from WASH-1400)16 or a turbine missile (4.1 x 10-7/RY, also from WASH-1400).16 Here, the RHR might not have sufficient capacity and the time frame is not as long as the previous scenarios. Based again on judgment, it was assumed that the combined RHR conditional failure probability is 10%
...

and so on and so forth, culminating in this:

Because of the large inherent safety margins in the design and construction of spent fuel pools, this issue was RESOLVED and no new requirements were established

There is no study what so ever of cascading failure, when the reactor failure leads to the spent fuel pool failure. Gross neglect of the cascading failures, is in my opinion fairly analogous to Japanese neglect of tsunami.
There are also multiple judgements that study relies on, but the probability of wrong judgment is assumed to be negligible. For the very tiny result such as 1 in 700 000 years, the probability of wrong judgement must be UNREALISTICALLY SMALL. You cannot obtain such tiny numbers when you're doing everything purely on judgment, because the pure judgment has certain margin of error orders of magnitude too high. It's like measuring nanovolts with a voltmeter that has noise floor of microvolts. The risk of missing an one in 1000 years accident scenario that would run the pool dry must be fractions of percent to allow for 1/700 000 figure - that's for a study which does not even cover cascading failures - that is ridiculous.
You ask what number do we assign to it? Well, just do a historical study, how often basing things purely on judgment fails, then assign the error margins to every number that was made up by pure judgment, that would be a step in the right direction, and would incidentally prevent you from obtaining unrealistically small probabilities.

Instead of discussing the issues with the study, you merely keep asserting that the fact vermont yankee NPP does not have tsunami risk proves me wrong, and telling of the unrelated things that were done right. See, I am not trying to show that NRC is always wrong. I am not trying to show that NRC is wrong in some example that you are coming up with. There is a specific example of NRC study which I am criticizing.

As for Fukushima - I did not yet criticize the study based on what was learned from Fukushima.
The actual spent fuel pool risk at Fukushima came from the cascading failure - the reactor failure, which led to hydrogen explosion, falling of debris into the pool and obstructing the convection (with a possibility of geyser effect, discussed in the main fukushima thread), radioactive contamination keeping the workers away, etc. The resolution I am criticizing neglects this entire class of failures. The cascading failures are not something that was unknown before Fukushima.

 

[Susudake]

Would a smart person really debate with someone who wrote:

“Last, no matter how many facts and figures you put out there, they won't cover up these incontrovertible truths:

Yes it was a stupid thing to contrast "facts and figures" with "truth."

But what you do is use that one sloppy choice of words, when I should have said "data" and or "statistics," (think of Disrea) to make one more of your many ad hominem attacks. You're saying I'm not worthy of debating with a smart guy like yourself; i.e. that I'm stupid.

I'm not going to dignify that cheap shot with any more of a response.

One word: radiation. And if the world were nuclear power and nuclear weapons free it would still be one word: radiation. Radiation in the soil, rocks, air and water. Radiation in you and everyone you meet. I’m sure you also intend to get rid of radiation therapy, xrays, CAT scans and the like.

Now you're putting words in my mouth in order to misrepresent my argument to suit your needs. Are you claiming that radiation is not extremely dangerous just because it might be non-harmful at certain doses?

Your examples are not well-chosen since there are recent studies indicating that "radiation therapy" does more harm than good to cancer patients. I could have told you that 20 years ago when I saw how much "good" it did to a family member with cancer.

Anyway it's all dosage, you know that so cut the intellectual dishonesty. And try to resist calling people paranoid, delusional, or just plain stupid, it rarely wins converts to your point of view.

Many years living in Asia has inculcated a habit in me, namely being at first generous to someone's character/intellect, which is partially why I wrote:

"Why don't you put this superior (I mean that without sarcasm) intellect of yours..."

I think that was a mistake based on the above.



You presume a lot in the previous paragraphs. I have seen first hand one thing that is much worse than even your fears of radiation – war.

False comparison--fears vs. actual war. Also more of this "I've seen more/I know better" stuff. You've seen war? You were in 'Nam? You were in "the ****?" Must be a tough guy, whereas I'm a pansy full of fear. Right.

I lived in Japan for three years. I love their culture and rich history...

I don't do these "I know Asia better than you" comparisons. BTDT. If you re-read my paragraph about being in Japan it may be clear to you that I was saying "go to where you're actually close to or within the fallout zone." It had nothing to do with Japan or it's culture per se. If this problem were in, I don't know, Botswana, I'd have recommended you go there. Get it now? Or to use one of your phrases: non-responsive.


I have been criticized here because I keep pointing out that thousands of Japanese men, women, and children died in the earthquake and tsunami.

Good for you. Now explain what that has to do with the dangers of radiation.

While there I went through a magnitude 7.5 earthquake that did a lot of damage, but luckily did not kill anyone. I have also piled sandbags during floods and helped cleanup after tornados. I have not been to a lot of the “poor” countries, but have seen pictures of a village gathered around a battery powered TV learning about the outside world. I have seen that cell phones and laptops can cross the highest walls and help people seek their human rights.

Once again, that has little to nothing to do with my point about poor countries.

I believe through my work that I have helped make nuclear power safer. I only ask you to do two things, First, hold Dmytry and yourself to the same standards you apply to me.

You lumped someone else with him, didn't you. Guilt by association is another intellectually dishonest ploy--bad debating.

Don’t let him get away with sarcasm.

I'm not his keeper.

Second, can we try to stay on topic?

So your choice of topic is THE topic? I consider challenging spurious arguments about the relative safety of nuclear power to be one of the most important topics around this whole disaster.


As to my sarcasm, and wanting to be “large and in charge,” you have already found me guilty as charged.

I’m also stubborn, so I’ll keep leading you to the facts and figures like a horse to water. It is up to you whether you die of thirst.

More faulty logic--I'll be kind and assume it's not intentional. You're stubborn, so am I, but that has nothing to do with your alleged sysiphistic attempts to enlighten poor benighted me.

I will say it's gratifying to see just how well you fit the picture of the condescending hubristic nuclear power defender.

I even asked you to debunk my arguments as I knew there'd be something sloppy in my post, and sure enough there was. But you did not even make a dent in my statement that radioaction is the most dangerous stuff on earth--"you'd ban x-rays?"--and instead use all kinds of slippery tactics, strawman arguments, ad hominem attacks, etc.


But you'll look less foolish if you actually lay out a strong argument for why the one thing on Earth that can cause massive genetic mutations, never mind horrible deaths to individuals, and that sometimes for 1000s or millions of years, is a smart thing to boil water with for electricity. My whole post was an attempt to get you to reconsider some of your basic assumptions. You're very good at challenging those of others, and I welcome that (as long as it's done civilly and intelligently, neither of which you accomplished IMO), but you seem extremely armored against having your own challenged in the least.

So, I don't expect to be engaging you in any debate again--that would just be, well, plain stupid of me.

 

[Susudake]

NUCENG wrote:

"Would a smart person really debate with someone who wrote:"

“'Last, no matter how many facts and figures you put out there, they won't cover up these incontrovertible truths:'"

Yes it was a stupid thing to contrast "facts and figures" with "truth."

But what you do is use that one sloppy choice of words, when I should have said "data" and or "statistics," (think of Disraeli) to make one more of your ad hominem nuke-the-opposition attacks. I'm not going to dignify that cheap shot with any more of a response.Nuceng wrote: "One word: radiation. And if the world were nuclear power and nuclear weapons free it would still be one word: radiation. Radiation in the soil, rocks, air and water. Radiation in you and everyone you meet. I’m sure you also intend to get rid of radiation therapy, xrays, CAT scans and the like."

Once again, exxagerate what I said to make it and me look ridiculous. Are you claiming that radiation is not extremely dangerous just because it might be non-harmful at certain doses?

Your examples are not well-chosen since there are recent studies indicating that "radiation therapy" does more harm than good to cancer patients. I could have told you that 20 years ago when I saw how much "good" it did to a family member with cancer.

Anyway it's all dosage, you know that so cut the intellectual dishonesty. And try to resist calling people paranoid, delusional, or just plain stupid, it rarely wins converts to your point of view.

Many years living in Asia has inculcated a habit in me, namely being at first generous to someone's character/intellect, which is partially why I wrote:

"Why don't you put this superior (I mean that without sarcasm) intellect of yours..."

I think that was a mistake based on the above.Nuceng wrote:"You presume a lot in the previous paragraphs. I have seen first hand one thing that is much worse than even your fears of radiation – war."

False comparison--fears vs. actual war. Also more of this "I've seen more/I know better" stuff.


Nuceng wrote:"I lived in Japan for three years. I love their culture and rich history..."

I don't do these "I know Asia better than you" comparisons; anyway, if you re-read my paragraph about being in Japan it may be clear to you that I was saying "go to where you're actually close to or within the fallout zone." It had nothing to do with Japan or it's culture per se. If this problem were in, I don't know, Botswana, I'd have recommended you go there. Get it now? Or to use one of your phrases: non-responsive.Nuceng wrote:"I have been criticized here because I keep pointing out that thousands of Japanese men, women, and children died in the earthquake and tsunami."

Good for you. Now explain what that has to do with the dangers of radiation.

[Nuceng wrote:"While there I went through a magnitude 7.5 earthquake that did a lot of damage, but luckily did not kill anyone. I have also piled sandbags during floods and helped cleanup after tornados. I have not been to a lot of the “poor” countries, but have seen pictures of a village gathered around a battery powered TV learning about the outside world. I have seen that cell phones and laptops can cross the highest walls and help people seek their human rights."

Once again, that has little to nothing to do with my point about poor countries.

Nuceng wrote:"I believe through my work that I have helped make nuclear power safer. I only ask you to do two things, First, hold Dmytry and yourself to the same standards you apply to me."

You lumped someone else with him, didn't you. Guilt by association is another intellectually dishonest ploy--bad debating.

Nuceng wrote:"Don’t let him get away with sarcasm."

I'm not his keeper.

Nuceng wrote:"Second, can we try to stay on topic?"

So your choice of topic is THE topic? I consider challenging spurious arguments about the relative safety of nuclear power to be one of the most important topics around this whole disaster. More evidence of what some call "control issues."Nuceng wrote:"As to my sarcasm, and wanting to be “large and in charge,” you have already found me guilty as charged."

Nuceng wrote:"I’m also stubborn, so I’ll keep leading you to the facts and figures like a horse to water. It is up to you whether you die of thirst."

More faulty logic--you're stubborn, so am I, but that has nothing to do with your alleged sysiphistic attempts to enlighten poor benighted me.

I will say it's gratifying to see just how well you fit the picture of the condescending hubristic nuclear power engineer (and defender). TEPCO has work for you.

I even asked you to debunk my arguments as I knew there'd be something sloppy in my post, and sure enough there was. But you did not even make a dent in my statement that radioactive material is the most dangerous stuff on earth--"you'd ban x-rays?"--and instead use all kinds of slippery tactics, strawman arguments, ad hominem attacks, etc. You'll look less foolish if you actually lay out a strong argument for why the one thing on Earth that can cause massive genetic mutations, never mind horrible deaths to individuals, and that sometimes for 1000s or millions of years, is a smart thing to boil water with for electricity.

Or address the hazard formula as it pertains to something so GD dangerous.

My whole post was an attempt to get you to reconsider some of your basic assumptions. You're very good at challenging those of others, and I welcome that (as long as it's done civilly and intelligently, neither of which you accomplished IMO), but you seem extremely armored against having your own challenged in the least.

So, I don't expect to be engaging you in any debate again--that would just be, well, plain stupid of me.

Note: in editing for clarity the whole quotey-thing got very complicated so I resorted to the tiresomely repetitive "Nuceng wrote:"

 

[MiceAndMen]

I don't have time to translate, but it is a "request" (similar to the Hamaoka closure -- i.e., in principle not compulsory) to some Japanese media and telecommunications organizations to self-police wild rumors on their networks. It comes with the caveat that the right to free expression should be respected -- which really makes it meaningless, as far as I can see, and anyone who didn't want to agree to delete "secret military experiments caused the tsunami" or "space aliens blew up Unit 4" rumor-mongers from their networks could not be compelled to do so, as far as I can see.

And this would certainly have no force outside Japan.

But again, not an expert of any kind.

Thanks for taking a look at it.

 

[AntonL]

Last, no matter how many facts and figures you put out there, they won't cover up these incontrovertible truths:

Radiation is the most poisonous thing on the planet, but more importantly poisonous in a way that is many orders of magnitude worse than others (i.e. the amount of genetic mutations it can cause).

No nuclear power plant can be designed to be 100% safe--no anything can be.

There are no long-term solutions yet for storage, and no one can guarantee that any storage site thus selected or under construction (like in Finland) will be 100% secure for 100,000 years. This is the elephant in the room that nuke power supporters seem mostly unwilling to acknowledge.

The risk of potentially poisoning half of the planet means the c factor in hazard x consequences=risk is as close to infinity as you can get on this earth. And even to a purely science-minded person that should make the equation clear: the only safe planet is a nuclear-free one.

Nicely put! alternatively the only lasting monument of mankind is nuclear waste, everything man-made you see today will have degraded beyond recognition in 100,000 years

once upon a time man learned to master fire
something no other living creature done before him
man conquered the entire world

one day he found a new fire
a fire so powerful it could never be extinguished
man reveled in the thought
that he now possessed the power of the universe

then in horror he realized
that his new fire could not only create but could also destroy
not only could it burn on land but inside all living creatures
but inside his children the animals and all crops

man looked around for help but found none
and so he build a burial chamber deep in the bowls of the earth
a hiding place for the fire to burn into eternity
when the burial chamber was complete
man laid his new fire to rest and tried to forget about it

he knew only through oblivion would he be free of it
but then he started to worry
that his children might find the burial chamber
and awake the fire from its sleep

so he begged his children
to tell their children and their children's children too
to remember forever to consign the burial chamber to oblivion
to remember forever to forget

extracted from
a 71 minute film documenting "Onkalo"
Finland's world’s first permanent repository for nuclear waste
that must last 100,000 years as this is how long the waste remains hazardous.